


WHEN ARE WE GOING?

The Army National Guard and the Korean War, 1950-1953



BY
RENEE
HYLTON

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS


This would have been a very different work if William Berebitsky had not published *A Very Long Weekend: The Army National Guard in Korea, 1950-1953* (White Mane Publishing Company, Shippensburg, PA, 1996).

The book is an oral history, and Berebitsky traveled the country to interview National Guardsmen and the men assigned to National Guard units which fought in the Korean War.

Berebitsky's book is all the more valuable because, unlike most Korean War histories, it concentrates on the last years of the fighting rather than the first.


Almost all of the first-hand accounts concerning Guard units in the following narrative were taken from Berebitsky's book, and the author is in his debt.

The author also would like to thank LTC Jim Hill of the West Virginia National Guard, an officer who believes that history is important, for providing material from the National Archives on the 1092d Engineer Battalion.



WHEN ARE WE GOING ?

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and the Korean War, 1950-1953



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
4 BACKS TO THE SEA

Most Americans could not imagine that the U.S. would again be at war -- in a country many had never heard of ...



14 VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

Federalized Guardsmens' chances of seeing Korea appeared remote. Eighth Army had broken out at Pusan, joining X Corps across the 38th Parallel ...



32 STATUS QUO

United Nations forces were ordered on the defensive and to undertake only 'limited tactical operations to repel aggression' ...



INTRODUCTION

3

BIBLIOGRAPHY

62

APPENDIX A.

48

FOOTNOTES

63

Army National Guard units
that served in Korea

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

64

APPENDIX B.

49

Army National Guard units
Federalized for the Korean War

INTRODUCTION

The first year of the Korean War was arguably the single most dramatic year in the military history of the United States.

Between July 1950 and July 1951, the course of the fighting vacillated wildly from near disaster to the promise of overwhelming victory, then back to disaster, before finally reaching a bloody stalemate that would last another two years and cost the U.S. and its allies thousands of additional lives.

The Army National Guard played a significant role in the Korean War. 138,600 men -- about one third of the Army Guard's total strength -- were mobilized for the conflict; 43 units, including two infantry divisions, served in Korea itself. It was the National Guard's largest mobilization of the last half of the twentieth century, and it was also the most combat the Army Guard would see during those same 50 years.

From the vantage point of half a century, it is easy to forget that while the Korean War was actually being fought, it was not referred to as a war. Coming just five years after the end of the massive global effort of World War II, the Korean peninsula seemed too small and too insignificant to justify a war that had the potential to erupt into nuclear conflagration; American political and military leaders were only too glad to try and soothe public opinion, both at home and abroad, by not using the term. Thus, the war in Korea was variously described as a "police action" (a United Nations term); the "Korean Emergency" (as President Harry Truman proclaimed it); and even the "Korean Incident" (the term used by a National Guard Bureau report).

The refusal to call the Korean War a war infuriated many of the men who had to fight it. Even after the Army began alternating the terms "conflict" and "war"



Men of Oklahoma's 245th Tank Battalion, 45th Infantry Division shortly after their arrival in Korea in the winter of 1951-1952.

in the late 1950s, there was comparatively little interest in it, even among professional military historians. Outside of South Korea, the vast majority of whose citizens are touchingly appreciative of the sacrifices made to keep their country out of the Communist bloc, the three-year fight for the Korean Peninsula was "the Forgotten War," sandwiched between World War II and Vietnam -- another limited conflict of the Cold War which it in so many ways foreshadowed.

America's Vietnam veterans dedicated their Washington, D.C. memorial in 1982. Not until 13 years later did the veterans of the Korean War dedicate their memorial, at a ceremony attended by thousands of U.S. veterans and their United Nations comrades from more than a dozen countries around the globe. The dedication of the Korea memorial sparked interest in the war itself, and at the turn of the 21st century, the 3-year conflict is finally being viewed as one of the seminal events of the Cold War -- the war the free world didn't have to win, but couldn't afford to lose.

BACKS TO THE SEA

Most Americans could not imagine that the United States would again be at war -- in a country many of them had never heard of ...



American military advisors withdraw from Seoul three days after the North Korean invasion. Their escape included a ferry ride over the Han River, whose bridges had been destroyed, and a 16-mile march.



BACKS TO THE SEA

In the euphoric months after the Allied victory in the largest conflict the world had ever seen, most Americans could not have imagined that less than five years later, the United States would again be at war -- in a country most Americans had never heard of.

But in 1947 President Harry Truman decided to send aid to Greece and Turkey to counter the threat of Soviet domination, starting what came to be known as the "Cold War." In 1948, with most of Eastern Europe under their control, the Soviets blockaded the parts of Berlin occupied by the Americans, British, and French, leading to the eleven-month Berlin Airlift. And 1948 saw another World War II ally, the Nationalist Chinese, flee to the island of Formosa (Taiwan) as the Communist forces under Mao Zedong took control of China.

It was no accident that 1948 saw Congressional legislation authorizing the nation's second peacetime conscription. The United States' first peacetime draft of military manpower -- and the National Guard's first peacetime Federalization -- had come in 1940. Those draftees and Guardsmen had been the first to fight in World War II, and many had not returned. However, the military prospects of the new draftees, and of the National Guardsmen who were busy reorganizing their units following their return from WWII service, were tempered by the United States' sole possession of the nuclear technology which had ended World War II. But in 1949 the Soviet Union exploded a nuclear bomb of its own. Now the two main Cold War antagonists were operating on a playing field which had suddenly become much more level.

ATTACK on SOUTH KOREA

The Korean peninsula had been part of the Cold War from its beginning. A Japanese colony since 1905, Korea was



occupied after World War II by the Soviets in the north, above the 38th parallel of latitude, and the Americans in the south, beneath it. (One of the U.S. occupation divisions to arrive in Korea in 1945, the 40th Infantry Division from the California National Guard, would return again under different circumstances.)

The newly-established United Nations had called for free elections to establish one democratic government for Korea, but the Communist government installed by the Soviets in North Korea refused to allow them, and the peninsula remained divided when Soviet and U.S. occupation troops left in 1948 and 1949. The Soviets had established a North Korean People's Army (NKPA), and when the U.S. occupation forces departed South Korea, a small



Part of 'Task Force Smith,' men of the 21st Infantry arrive in Taejeon, Korea on July 2, 1950.

Army and its 500 American advisors were completely surprised by a North Korean invasion of seven divisions, supported by an armored brigade. (When the South Korean government had asked the U.S. for tanks, they were told that they didn't need them because the North Koreans didn't have any armor). The North Korean People's Army rolled toward the South Korean capital of Seoul in a four-pronged assault which took the city in just three days.

AMERICAN REACTION

First to hear of the North Korean invasion was the Tokyo headquarters of General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, hero of World War II and Commander-in-Chief of Far East Command. MacArthur did not wait for orders from Washington, and a Navy ship full of ammunition was on its way from Yokahama to the South Korean port of Pusan before the day was out.³

When President (and former National Guardsman) Harry Truman was informed of the seriousness of the attack, he cut short a visit to his home state of Missouri, returned to Washington, and ordered the matter brought before the United Nations Security Council. Truman then gathered for a late-night meeting with his diplomatic and military advisors, including the secretaries of the military departments, the Secretary of Defense, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Army General Omar Bradley, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and another World War II hero), spoke for all present as he told Truman "... that the United States would have to draw the line on communist aggression somewhere-and that somewhere was Korea. He did not believe that Russia was ready to fight the United States, but was merely testing American determination."⁴

The President agreed completely, and told the military to continue the aid

Military Assistance Group (MAG) of several hundred U.S. advisors stayed behind to help the South Koreans establish the Republic of Korea, or "ROK" Army. This 100,000-man force, "little more than a national police force," was organized into 8 divisions, with minimal artillery, and no tanks, planes, or manpower reserves.¹

In January, 1950 U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson, in a speech at Washington's National Press Club, addressed U.S. strategy for defending its interests in the Far East. South Korea was not mentioned, and its omission was seen by some as "an invitation to Communist China, North Korea, and Russia that they could invade the republic with impunity."²

Less than six months later, in the early-morning hours of June 25, 1950, the ROK

MacArthur had already begun. MacArthur was ordered to provide naval and air support to safely evacuate more than 1,500 Americans, most of them missionaries, their families, and the families of military and diplomatic personnel, from Korea to Japan. A day later President Truman extended the naval and air support to combat operations, but the outnumbered and dispirited ROK Army continued to fall back.

General MacArthur had already sent a team of observers to South Korea to report first-hand on the military situation when he decided that his own personal visit, as a symbol of U.S. commitment and resolve, would bolster South Korean morale. His staff argued against the dangerous trip, but on June 29th MacArthur visited the front lines. Near the ancient walled city of Suwon, south of Seoul, the general watched thousands of civilian refugees streaming southwards on foot to avoid the Communists.

"The progeny of a proud and sturdy race that for centuries had accepted disaster imperturbably -- they painfully plodded south, carrying all their worldly possessions on their back, and leading their terror-stricken but wide-eyed, uncrying children." It was then, MacArthur later wrote, that he began to devise the brilliant strategic plan which would enable them to return home.⁶

Within hours MacArthur was back in Tokyo and cabling Army Chief of Staff General Joseph Lawton "Lightning Joe" Collins for permission to dispatch U.S. ground combat troops from occupation duty in Japan to Korea. ⁷ Truman, using his authority as Commander in Chief, gave his consent. Because Congress had not declared, or been asked to declare, that a state of war existed, Truman used his authority as Commander in Chief to expand the U.S. military role in Korea. Within two days, the first elements of what



became known as "Task Force Smith" began arriving in Korea.

PUSAN PERIMETER

From the moment they arrived, U.S. troops on the ground in South Korea were engaged in a desperate struggle to keep the North Koreans from pushing them completely off the peninsula. The first U.S. combat troops arrived by air on July 1st, barely 5 days after the North Korean invasion. U.S. occupation forces in Japan



Soldiers of the African-American 24th Infantry (left) move to the front on July 18, 1950. Lt. Gen. Walton Walker (below, left) confers with Maj. Gen. William Dean.

were organized into four divisions manned at 2/3 strength, and Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith landed at Pusan with one under-strength infantry battalion, the 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry, part of the 24th Infantry Division, joined two days later by a battery of the 52d Field Artillery Battalion. The men of "Task Force Smith," who days before had been living the relatively luxurious life of occupation troops, with Japanese houseboys to shine their shoes and make up their bunks, were entering a desperate fight for survival.

On July 5th, Task Force Smith moved north to reinforce the ROK Army. When the North Koreans mounted a major assault the next day, the ROKs broke and ran, leaving Smith and his men to be encircled. The Americans held for seven hours until their ammunition was exhausted, at which point the survivors abandoned their equipment and

attempted to exfiltrate in small groups.

The rest of the 24th Infantry Division was at this time arriving piecemeal from Japan. The mission of its commander, Major General William Dean, was to slow the North Korean advance down the peninsula. This was accomplished, but at terrible cost to the poorly-trained and poorly-equipped U.S. troops, who went overnight from garrison duty to combat in the rugged mountains and humid July heat of South Korea. The ubiquitous rice

paddies were fertilized with human excrement, and many veterans remembered the all-pervading stench of that first Korean summer. Worst of all, the North Korean Army, initially dismissed by some as a peasant rabble, was tough and capable. They were also equipped with Soviet T-34 tanks, while the Americans had to wait for their M-4 Shermans to be shipped from the U.S. 8

The early fighting took an unusually high toll among officers. The lack of trained NCOs meant that junior officers had to take over as squad leaders, and battalion staff had to direct operations at company and even platoon level. One veteran of those dark early days wrote in a letter to historian Clay Blair:

"The original group of officers was gallant (far beyond those who followed) and far under-ranked as well. Most of the rifle company commanders were only first lieutenants, which was a disgrace in itself. They were forty-year-old, gray-haired World War II combat veterans -- and still lieutenants. I knew all of them and have regretted at times that I did not join them (in death) for they by-and-large died unknown and unrewarded for their bravery." 9

General Dean was personally commanding the 24th Division's rear guard at Taejon on July 21st when his small force was cut off. Aided by Korean villagers, Dean avoided capture for 36 days. Once caught he became the highest-ranking of the thousands of U.S. troops to suffer as prisoners of war of the communists during the Korean War.

Nevertheless, the North Korean advance was being slowed. The 25th Infantry and 1st Cavalry Divisions began arriving from Japan during the second week of July, followed by Lieutenant General Walton H. "Johnnie" Walker and the staff of the



" There were heroes in Korea, but I was not one of them. I wouldn't have awarded myself a wooden star for what I did as a commander "

Maj. Gen. William Dean upon his release from a North Korean POW camp in 1953. President Truman had presented Dean's Medal of Honor to his wife two years before. 10

BACKS TO THE SEA

Eighth U.S. Army. Walker, an armor officer and corps commander in George Patton's Third Army during World War II, was given command of all U.S., South Korean, and (eventually) United Nations (U.N.) troops in Korea.

By August 1st Walker had established a defensive perimeter around the port of Pusan on the peninsula's southeastern corner. The line was thinly held, and when relentless North Korean attacks managed several times to penetrate the defensive line, some U.S. commanders began to question whether it could be held. "But General Walker," reports the official U.S. Army history, "remained determined that it would (hold); his pugnacious temperament fitted him for directing the fighting of a bitter holding action...he told one general he did not want to see him back from the front again unless he was in a coffin." 11

INCHON LANDINGS

All through the month of July, as U.S. and ROK forces were being pushed down the Korean peninsula by the North Koreans, Douglas MacArthur was concentrating on reversing the situation. Amphibious landings had brought victory island-by-island in MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Theater during World War II, and he resolved on an amphibious landing well behind the North Korean lines to open a second front. His landing site would be the port of Inchon, about 25 miles from Seoul on Korea's western coast.

It was a controversial choice, to say the least, for not only were the 30-foot tides at Inchon Harbor among the highest in the world, but when the tides were out the harbor was a mudflat. This left a very small time window for an amphibious landing, and to add to the complexity of the operation, the landing force would first have to neutralize the fortified island of Wolmi in the middle of Inchon Harbor. These were

all excellent reasons not to attempt landings at Inchon -- but to MacArthur, the many negatives all combined to create the greatest of positives: surprise.

Not one of the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved of MacArthur's choice of Inchon, and on July 20th Army Chief of Staff Collins and Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Forrest P. Sherman arrived in Tokyo for a conference. There MacArthur laid out his plan: the landings at Inchon, the recapture of Seoul, the drive back across the 38th Parallel and through North Korea, and the ultimate reunifica-



U.S. Marines (below, left) use scaling ladders to storm ashore during the landings at Inchon. Gen. Douglas MacArthur (inset) commands the operation from the *U.S.S. Mt. McKinley*.

tion of the peninsula after North Korea was defeated. Inchon would split the North Korean supply lines and immediately relieve the pressure on the Pusan Perimeter, allowing troops there to break out. "Caught between our northern and southern forces, both of which are completely self-sustaining because of our absolute air and naval supremacy, the enemy cannot fail to be ultimately shattered." 12

Although Collins and Admiral Sherman argued for an alternate landing site, MacArthur held fast to Inchon. After a one-hour visit to Eighth Army headquar-

ters in Korea, Collins and Sheman returned to Washington, where, after much discussion, and long cables from MacArthur, the Joint Chiefs reluctantly approved MacArthur's plans.

In the short run, MacArthur was right. The Inchon landing was a strategic masterpiece, one of the greatest in history. The 1st Marine Division, most of it only recently arrived from the United States, captured Wolmi Island and took Inchon itself with only 21 killed. Joined by the Army's 7th Infantry Division as the U.S. X (Tenth) Corps, they retook Seoul in 10 days, capturing more than 120,000 North Korean soldiers. The rest of the North Koreans took off their uniforms and fled north into the hills.

The long run began when MacArthur's forces followed them, across North Korea and toward the Chinese border. Many within the Defense Department, both civilian and military, questioned the wisdom of advancing non-Korean troops north of the 38th parallel, into North Korea itself. But in August of 1950 the reputation and prestige of Douglas MacArthur, 70 years old, 51 years a soldier, and an architect of victory in World War II, was too formidable for those who disagreed with him. No one yet dared tell MacArthur "no".

MOBILIZATION

During the first weeks of the war, as MacArthur and his staff planned the bold strategy that they hoped would end the fighting quickly, the Pentagon's senior leaders grappled with the problem of supplying troops for Korea while also maintaining U.S. military commitments around the globe. Hanging over their deliberations was the fact that two of the largest nations on earth, the Soviet Union and China, were in the Communist camp -- and the Soviets possessed the technology of the nuclear bomb.



BACKS TO THE SEA

The fear that the fighting in Korea could escalate into nuclear war with the Soviets was very real, and it was felt all over the world. The theory that Korea was a Communist feint, planned by the Soviet Union and China to draw U.S. forces away from the real blow (which would come against Western Europe) was taken very seriously. There were 95,000 Army troops stationed in Europe, 80,000 of them in Germany. U.S. commitments to the recently-formed North Atlantic Treaty Alliance (NATO) meant that most of those troops would have to remain in Europe.

MacArthur's Far East Command included 108,500 U.S. Army troops, most of them stationed in Japan and dispatched to Korea in the first months of the fighting. Most of the rest of the active Army, some 360,000 personnel, were stationed in the Continental U.S. Some could be sent to Korea, but by no means all.

In addition to finding units for Korea, military planners had to address the problems of maintaining a manpower reserve. No matter how many troops Korea might require, the possible threats to U.S. interests in the rest of the world made it necessary to keep both active and Reserve units available for future contingencies. The need for this manpower reserve had a direct impact on the Federalization of the Army Guard during the Korean War.

When the 81st Congress voted in the first days of the fighting in Korea to extend the Selective Service Act of 1948, it also gave President Truman the authority to "... order into the active military or naval service of the United States for a period of not to exceed twenty-one consecutive months [later extended to 24 months], with or without their consent, any or all members and units of any or all Reserve components of the Armed Forces of the United States and retired personnel of the Regular Armed Forces." But there



was a question as to whether or not mobilization planners would ask the White House to exercise its call-up authority.

The Guard's recently-reorganized 25 infantry and two armored divisions, although not manned at full strength, represented the Army's largest single source of trained units and manpower. But it appeared that only a portion of the Guard would be needed, and the Joint Chiefs seem to have feared that limited mobilization of the Guard would cause political repercussions from the states in which Federalized units were located. Army Chief of Staff Collins, apparently anticipating a brief fight in Korea, also felt that the Guard's effectiveness would be limited by the time it would take to deploy its units overseas.¹³

Collins' views were countered, however, by those of his Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Major General Charles Bolte. Bolte pointed out that if the Chinese were to intervene in Korea and widen the



U.S. troops caught in a flood of refugees. Millions of North and South Koreans were displaced during 3 years of war.

the 45th Division (Oklahoma); and the 50th Armored Division (New Jersey).

... (Evaluators had) looked very closely at the leadership in the particular divisions, wishing to avoid the difficulties experienced at the beginning of World War II when many of the National Guard commanders had been relieved after call-up. They had compared the state of training of each division and had also taken into consideration the divisional strength in men and qualified officers to keep to a minimum the number of filler replacements which would have to be transferred to a particular National Guard division to bring it up to full strength.” 15

The actual mobilization list, however, was modified by the politically-driven need for a broader geographic spread. California's 40th Infantry Division replaced the 37th Division on the list, and the 43d from Rhode Island and Connecticut replaced the 50th Armored Division.

On August 1st, 1950, the 28th, 40th, 43d, and 45th Infantry Divisions, as well as dozens of battalion and company-sized units, were formally alerted for Federalization. In four increments, they were placed in active Federal service between August 14th and September 1st, 1950. The Chief of the National Guard Bureau, Major General Kenneth Cramer, resigned his position in order to take command of his old division, the 43d. Pennsylvania's Lieutenant Governor, Maj. Gen. Daniel Strickner, executive officer of the 110th Infantry during its heroic Battle of the Bulge holding action, resigned his political office to lead the 28th into Federal service.

These were the first of 19 increments in a mobilization that would take place over the course of 19 months, with the last Army Guard units reporting for active duty in February, 1952. In all, almost 500 units, from separate companies to divisions, comprising some 138,000 personnel, would be Federalized.

scope of the conflict, a Guard call-up was unavoidable. Obviously remembering back a decade to the early mobilization for World War II which had provided the Guard's units and personnel with invaluable months of full-time training, Bolte argued forcefully to begin Federalizing the Guard immediately. 14


General Collins saw his point, and ordered his Chief of Army Field Forces to prepare a list of divisions and smaller units to be considered for Federalization. The recommendations of the Continental Army Commanders from their respective geographic areas produced a list of six National Guard divisions:

“... most appropriate to be called on the grounds of training, manning, equipment status, and general fitness. The divisions recommended in order of priority of selection were the 28th Division (Pennsylvania); the 29th Division (Virginia and Maryland); the 31st Division (Mississippi and Alabama); the 37th Division (Ohio);

Federalized Guardsmens' chances of seeing Korea appeared remote. Eighth Army had broken out at Pusan, joining X Corps across the 38th Parallel ...

VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY





VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

Clay Blair,
author of
the *The
Forgotten
War*, lists
retired
Brig. Gen.
William
Harris's
book about
his experi-
ences com-
manding
Puerto
Rico's 65th
Infantry
as one of
only four
reliable
accounts
by actual
combatants
used in his
research.

At the end of the Federalized Guardsmen's second month on active duty, their chances of seeing Korea appeared remote. Soon after the daring landing at Inchon, Eighth Army had broken out at Pusan, driving the North Koreans before them and joining X Corps across the 38th parallel in North Korea on October 9th.

PUERTO RICO'S "BORINQUEERS"

Part of Eighth Army during its rapid push up the peninsula was an infantry regiment that, while not a National Guard unit at the time, might as well have been, and later was. This was the 65th Infantry, organized in Puerto Rico in 1899 after the Spanish-American War and allotted to the Regular Army in 1908. With the exception of a few "Anglo" officers, the regiment was composed entirely of Puerto Ricans; in 1959 it was transferred to the Puerto Rico National Guard.

The 65th had served in Europe during World War II, but the same racial and ethnic prejudice that kept most African-Americans out of combat relegated the 65th mostly to non-combat duty as garrison troops. When Colonel William W. Harris received orders assigning him as the regiment's commander in 1949, his fellow officers in the Pentagon referred to the 65th as a "rum and coca cola" outfit, and Harris was furious at being "put out to pasture" in the Caribbean. ¹

Little did Harris know that less than a year after arriving in San Juan, he and his regiment would be on board ship, bound for Pusan. The "Borinqueneers," a nickname chosen aboard ship and the name of Puerto Rico's aboriginal population at the time of the Spanish conquest, landed in South Korea on the 20th of September. As the Puerto Ricans disembarked, Colonel Harris was called to the headquarters of General Walker, Eighth Army's commander, who bluntly asked Harris if he



thought his Puerto Ricans would fight. Harris answering strongly in the affirmative, Walker pointed out some railroad cars and told Harris to get on them and head north. ²

The regiment wasn't ten miles from Pusan when their train came under North Korean attack. Colonel Harris' suspicions fell on the Korean railroad engineer -- in fact, on Koreans in general. Stories circulated among troops (and obviously among commanders) of North Koreans who took off their uniforms in order to blend in with the local South Korean population. As Harris wrote in 1980, "the longer we were in the country the less we trusted any of them."

Less than a month after arriving in Korea, the 65th Infantry had lost 23 men



Members of the 65th Infantry Regiment (left) relax aboard ship enroute to Korea, September 1950. Col. William Harris (above, behind wheel) drives a two-star visitor in October, 1950.

killed and 17 wounded. The Puerto Ricans quickly adjusted to the tactics of the North Koreans, especially their propensity for night attacks.

"(The North Korean People's Army) technique was to try to slip up on us at night, usually during the early morning hours. Then when they were discovered, they would blow bugles and whistles and give bloodcurdling yells as they attacked, in hope they could scare hell out of us ...

"... We learned that our most effective technique was to hunt out and destroy them during the daylight hours and then go into an all-around, wagon-wheel, defensive position on the high ground at night. We also learned to remain in those defensive positions ... regardless of the number of yelling, screaming enemy that hit us. Many times with the arrival of daylight, the bodies of dead NKPA soldiers ... would be stacked up in front of our positions like so much cordwood." 3

TRUMAN MEETS MACARTHUR

As the Puerto Ricans were learning how to handle night attacks, the strategy for ending the fighting was being hammered out at higher levels. President Harry Truman and General Douglas MacArthur each flew halfway across the Pacific Ocean for an October 15th meeting on tiny Wake Island.

Truman's political aides thought a meeting with MacArthur, with the Inchon triumph fresh under his belt, would be good publicity for the President (and to make sure it was Truman, not MacArthur, who got the publicity, news media from Tokyo were barred from Wake). 4

MacArthur assured Truman and the senior State and Defense Department officials who made up the Presidential party that the war was as good as over, and that he hoped to be able to send the 8th Army back to Japan by Christmas. President Truman asked specifically about Communist China's threat to enter the fighting if U.S. and South Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel into North Korea. MacArthur replied that he thought the Chinese were bluffing and posed no threat, an answer which apparently satisfied the President, who did not return to the topic. 5 But Truman did uphold his already-stated policy of limited confrontation: MacArthur was not to antagonize the Chinese by sending troops or aircraft across the Yalu River into the Chinese province of Manchuria.



VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

MacArthur now had more than 350,000 troops assembled for his drive on North Korea. His plan was to send X Corps, which included the 1st Marine and 3d and 7th Infantry Divisions, up the peninsula's east coast, while Eighth Army, consisting of two U.S. and one ROK corps, would advance up the west coast. As the Encyclopedia of Military History puts it, "X Corps

would turn west on reaching the Yalu and drive all enemy forces south of the border into the arms of Eighth Army." 6

By this time the U.S. Eighth Army was a true multi-national force. The United Nations Security Council had met in emergency session immediately after the North Korean invasion and voted to ask U.N. member nations to send troops to assist in repelling the North Koreans. As one of five permanent Security Council members (the others being Great Britain,



Men of the 65th Infantry load a wounded comrade aboard a helicopter, November 1950. Helicopter evacuation of the wounded was pioneered in Korea.

France, Nationalist China, and the United States), the Soviet Union could have used the veto which that status conferred to block this troop request. But in a tactical mistake which they never repeated, the Soviets were boycotting the Security Council over its refusal to replace the Nationalists Chinese, now on Taiwan, with their Communist successors.

The Soviets' absence on the day of the crucial vote opened the way for the United Nations Command in Korea. Under its blue and white flag troops from Britain, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Turkey, the Philippines, Belgium, France, the Netherlands, Thailand, Ethiopia and Columbia would fight in Korea, usually integrated with or attached to U.S. divisions. Italy, Norway and Sweden sent non-combatant medical units.

Added to the melting pot of ethnicities that was about to sweep north of the 38th Parallel were the Puerto Ricans of the 65th Infantry, who had been sealifted to the North Korean port of Wonsan in late October. At first operating independently in a series of brief hit-and-run engagements, in mid-November Colonel Harris was informed that his regiment would be attached to the 3d Infantry Division when it arrived at Wonsan. ⁷ While the 3d and the 1st Marine Division headed north, the 65th pushed west, skirmishing against strong North Korean resistance and probing for contact with Eighth Army units.

DISASTER AT THE YALU

As the United Nations troops moved north in October and November, they began to encounter Chinese Communist troops in ever-increasing numbers. The

Chinese denied that they had organized forces in Korea, their government radio describing them as the "Volunteer Corps for the Protection of the Hydroelectric Zone." ⁸ An intelligence report from MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters dated October 29, 1950 asked, "is this the beginning of open intervention on the part of Chinese forces to defeat UN forces in Korea?" The author answered his own question with "At present, the evidence is insufficient to say."

On November 24th, with the ROK II Corps almost at the Manchurian border, MacArthur was given permission from Washington to continue the U.N. advance. A day later, the question of Chinese intentions was made horribly clear: 180,000 Chinese troops in 18 divisions poured over the Manchurian border and attacked the Eighth Army. The Chinese ripped through the ROK II Corps and struck the U.S. 2d Infantry Division, which in attempting to withdraw was ambushed in a narrow pass south of the village of Kunu-ri. The 2d Division lost 4,000 men and most of its divisional artillery on the narrow road through what became known as "the Gauntlet."

Survivors of what was later officially termed the "First Chinese Communist Forces (CCF) Offensive" were interviewed soon after their return to relative safety by historian S.L.A. Marshall, who had pioneered the technique of combat after-action interviews during World War II. Marshall's *The River and the Gauntlet* describes the horrors endured by the men who struggled through the pass at Kunu-ri, as well as dozens of heroic small unit and individual actions which helped Eighth Army to recover, and turn what might have been annihilation into an orderly retreat that would turn out to be the longest in U.S. military history.

One of Marshall's chapters is titled "Death of a Hero" and describes the per-

"Is this the beginning of open intervention on the part of Chinese forces to defeat UN forces in Korea?"

An intelligence report, dated Oct. 29, 1950, from Gen. Douglas MacArthur's Tokyo headquarters

VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

sonal leadership of company commander Captain Reginald Desiderio of the 25th Infantry Division. Desiderio, killed in action on the morning of November 27th after successfully rallying his men to hold all night against repeated Chinese attacks, had begun his military service in 1940 in the California National Guard. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor.

RETREAT FROM THE RESERVOIR

On November 27th the Chinese struck X Corps, which was snaking through the high mountains of Korea's northeastern coast. Two U.S. Army battalions from the 7th Infantry Division and a contingent of British Royal Marines were cut off and annihilated, but the 1st Marine Division and some 2,000 attached Army troops fought off overwhelming Chinese attacks to consolidate their positions south of the Changjin Reservoir (referred to by the Marines as the "Chosin" Reservoir; "Chosin" is the Korean word for Korea). These men would have to fight their way out of what was by now complete encirclement by a force which vastly outnumbered them.

The Puerto Ricans of the 65th Infantry, operating to the west, had first encountered the Chinese on November 21st, before the main CCF intervention. Their westward probing toward Eighth Army ended, however, when the danger of X Corps's precarious position finally became clear to Corps Commander Lieutenant General "Ned" Almond and MacArthur's Tokyo staff (of which Almond was also a member: he continued to serve as MacArthur's Chief of Staff even as he commanded X Corps). The decision was made to evacuate X Corps by sea from the port of Hungnam.

The 3d and 7th Infantry Divisions would hold a perimeter around Hungnam; the 1st Marine Division and attached Army



troops would fight their way through the surrounding Chinese into the safety of the perimeter and evacuation. When a British reporter flown in for a press conference suggested to Marine commander Major General Oliver P. Smith that this maneuver was a retreat, Smith replied, in a remark which quickly entered Marine Corps legend, that he and his men were not retreating, but rather advancing in a different direction.

By December 9th the Marines had fought their way to their southernmost defensive perimeter at the town of Koto, and all of the 15,000-man Chosin Reservoir force was now on the march. In temperatures that reached 40 degrees below zero, the exhausted Marines and soldiers cleared the ridges of Chinese so that the column could continue its advance.



Exhausted and half-frozen U.S. Marines rest during their fight out of encirclement at the Chosin Reservoir, "the greatest fighting retreat in history."

end of the last mountain pass through which the Chosin column would advance, so that engineers could bridge it, and then to hold the pass. Company G of the 65th's 2d Battalion was part of Task Force Dog's forward elements, and repelled a strong Chinese attack on the night of December 10th. These Puerto Ricans were among the first U.S. troops encountered by the Chosin column, and as a Marine company commander later commented, "It sure was a wonderful sight to see friendly troops on the ridges."¹⁰

With the perimeter around the port still under attack, the Chosin survivors marched straight to the waiting Navy transports at Hungnam. They were the first of 105,000 U.S. and ROK troops and 98,000 civilian refugees to leave by ship. The last Army troops to leave were the Puerto Ricans of the 65th Infantry, who were fighting off

Chinese attacks on December 22d, and aboard ship two days later. ¹¹ It was too early to evaluate their experiences, but the "Borinqueneers" had just played their part in one of the greatest feats of arms in American history.

LIMITED WAR

At 6:15 on the morning of November 28, 1950, General Omar Bradley placed a call to a stunned President Harry Truman to inform him that the Chinese had "come in with both feet." ¹² During the autumn months, after the daring success of Inchon appeared to put a quick U.N. victory within easy grasp, the fighting in Korea had not been a priority for Truman and his political advisors, who were preoccupied with that fall's Congressional elections. With defeat, however, it was time for the

"The men were exhausted, walking like zombies. The CCF attacked the column repeatedly, like raiding Indians in the Old West. The Americans fought back. Many men fell by the wayside, wounded or too weary to go on. Medics picked up these men and put them on trucks. The road and ditches were littered with burned-out vehicles and dead CCF bodies, frozen stiff." ⁹

The American dead, also frozen stiff, were lashed to the outsides of vehicles. They, too, would be evacuated when "the greatest fighting retreat in history" was over.

On December 7th the Marine column was days away from safety when the 65th Infantry, as the spearhead of "Task Force Dog," headed north. Their mission was to drive the Chinese away from the southern

VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

White House to take control of the conduct of the fighting.

Truman met with his closest military and political advisors in a session of the National Security Council. All agreed that World War III must be avoided at all costs. In effect, this meant that the war would not be carried into Chinese territory, lest the Soviets join the fighting on the side of their fellow Communists. In the coming weeks, MacArthur would be forbidden to send his Far East Air Forces across the Yalu to destroy the Chinese staging areas in Manchuria. If U.S. fighter pilots encountered Soviet-made MiG aircraft over the Korean Peninsula, they were in most cases forbidden to chase them over Chinese airspace, even if in "hot pursuit." Such restrictions, which were also applied to ground and naval operations, would continue until the end of the fighting.

Although he limited U.N. combat operations, Truman absolutely rejected the "cut your losses" option of withdrawing from Korea. Instead, on November 28th Harry Truman, in the face of possible nuclear war with the Soviet Union, made one of the instinctive, off-the-cuff decisions that years later landed him on the list of "near great" American Presidents. As Clay Blair explains:

"Up to that day Truman, still hoping to fight the Korean War on the cheap, had merely authorized 'creeping' manpower mobilizations and modest increases in defense spending. In September he had authorized the JCS to plan for huge force levels and outlays for defense materiel - but he had not yet asked Congress for money to begin that buildup. But three days after this meeting he submitted to Congress a supplemental appropriation bill requesting an additional \$16,844,247,000 for this purpose.

Until the CCF intervention, it is conceivable that upon the wind-down of the Korean War Truman would have returned



President Harry Truman signs a proclamation declaring Korea a national emergency in December 1950.

to conservative defense budgets, thereby diminishing Washington's ability to deal with worldwide Soviet aggression. The CCF intervention set America on a course of massive rearmament that was to continue almost unabatedly for decades to come." 13

Truman's decision to counter Communist aggression on the one hand, while at

**“ In the face of possible nuclear war
with the Soviet Union, Truman made
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the same time doing everything possible to avoid all-out war, was a foreign concept to General Douglas MacArthur, a soldier of the old school who saw no substitute for victory. MacArthur was not panicked by the Chinese intervention; he had been through greater disasters at Bataan and Corregidor. It was MacArthur's position that if allowed to use sufficient force, he could “not only save Korea, but also inflict such a destructive blow upon Red China's capability to wage aggressive war that it would remove her as a further threat to peace in Asia for generations to come.” If this course were not followed, MacArthur advised minimizing casualties by pulling U.N. forces out completely rather than fight a limited war. 14

LIMITED MOBILIZATION

“Limited war” was not part of the American military tradition, and when President Truman went on the radio on December 15th to proclaim a state of national emergency, the country remembered Pearl Harbor and mentally prepared to put most of its young men in uniform. The men of the National Guard, whether Federalized or not, were already in uniform. Those already on active duty, who had anticipated an early release during the heady days of September and October, now expected to be on their way to Korea at any moment. This was especially true of the men in the four Federalized infantry divisions, and in fact, three days after Truman's December 15th address, MacArthur asked the Joint Chiefs to

authorize immediate shipment of all four divisions to Korea, a request that was denied. 15

The Truman administration was not willing to increase the size of its overall troop commitment in Korea, but it did need replacements for the units already there. In February, the Federalized 28th

Infantry Division was levied for several thousand men to be shipped to Korea, and since draftees assigned to the division could not be sent until their initial training was completed, most of these men were Guardsmen.¹⁶ And within weeks of the Chinese intervention, which made it clear that the fighting might drag on for years, two more Guard infantry divisions, the 31st (Mississippi and Alabama) and the 47th (Minnesota and North Dakota) had been alerted for Federalization. Along with other non-divisional units, they reported for active duty on January 16th, 1951.

Several months later, the 28th Division, along with the 43d, was ordered to prepare for overseas movement. But fears of a Soviet move against Western Europe sent these two divisions not to Korea, but to Germany. They arrived in Europe in November, 1951, their presence a reassurance to the NATO allies that the war in Korea was not deflecting U.S. attention from its commitment to the security of Western Europe.

“WHEN ARE WE GOING?”

Meanwhile, reported *National Guardsman* magazine, those Guardsmen not already mobilized or alerted for mobilization were reading the newspapers and asking the logical question:

“When are we going to be mobilized?”

The question was not: “Are we going to be mobilized?” It was: “When?” 17

Rather than mobilize units it might not need, the Army wanted to designate six National Guard divisions and necessary



VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

support elements as high-priority. These units would be authorized higher strength, extra drills, and the latest equipment. They would be at a higher level of readiness and would be called first if needed. The National Guard Association, however, opposed this as discriminatory, pointing out that the National Defense Act of 1916 prescribed that funds for the Guard must be allocated according to enlisted strength in each state.

The National Guard Association's position, expressed through a newly-formed Committee on Policy, was for full mobilization of the National Guard -- phased over a period of time according to a definite schedule. A schedule would allow individual Guardsmen to plan for their futures, and mobilizing all of the Guard appeared to be good politics. The Guard's senior leadership remembered back 30 years, to 1920, when the Regular Army had tried to do away with the Guard -- and this after the Guard had formed the

combat backbone of the American Expeditionary Force in World War I.

"The people will wonder," said *National Guardsman* magazine, "why the Guard should be maintained unless it goes when the need arises, regardless of whether Congress formally has declared an emergency." 18

Although Army National Guard units continued to be Federalized for another year, full mobilization was not to occur. Although it took several months for the U.S. policy of limited war to be articulated and communicated to the public, that policy -- containment of Communism, but not total war -- had already been set. The Korean War, as historian Russell Weigley noted:

"... became a contest not unlike those limited wars for territorial prizes that the European powers were accustomed to waging (in the 18th century), before the wars of the French Revolution loosed democratic passions and mass armies upon Europe to open the modern age of total war ... The Army faced larger responsibilities than could be borne by

Soldiers of the 31st Infantry Division train at Camp Atterbury, Ind., after being Federalized.

Regulars alone. Citizen soldiers had to be called on ... yet since there was no need for all the country's manpower, who was to be called? How could the burdens of war be distributed fairly?" 19

The Truman administration's answer was a manpower smorgasbord. The draft was extended, but without the need for total mobilization, whole categories of men were exempted or deferred from service. Some Army Reservists wound up on active duty like their Guard counterparts, Federalized with their units. But the vast majority of the 244,300 Army Reservists called up for Korea were World War II veterans who were members of the Inactive Reserve, not in drilling units. These men were "involuntarily recalled" to active duty because of their WWII experience in various branches, and because the Army wanted to keep its reserve units available should they be needed elsewhere. But those involuntarily recalled, as Russell Weigley points out, "... were especially apt to wonder why they should be in Korea while thousands of active Reservists were still at home" -- and while men who had been too young for WWII received draft deferments for graduate or professional school. 20

THE GUARD ARRIVES

By January 1st, 1951, one week after the 65th Infantry had followed the rest of X Corps out of Hungnam, the first Army Guard units began to arrive in South Korea. Some of these units had been scheduled to join X Corps at Hungnam, but after the CCF Intervention all were diverted to Pusan while at sea.

The first Guard unit to land, on New Year's Eve, 1950, was Maryland's 726th Transportation Truck Company. Along with Headquarters Company, 231st Transportation Truck Battalion, also from Maryland, and the District of Columbia's 715th Transportation Truck Company, the 726th was one of three African-American Guard units to serve in Korea -- the last three segregated Army National Guard units ever to be Federalized. President Truman had signed the Executive Order that began the integration of the Armed Forces in 1948, but the process was proceeding very slowly in the active forces, and was not interpreted as applying to the Guard at all, since it was commanded by the Governors in peacetime.

So 1st LT Joseph Bracy of the 726th Transportation Truck Company (TTC) arrived in Korea as an African-American officer in a unit composed entirely of African-Americans. Bracy spent his first night in Korea in a squad tent with officers from a field artillery battalion that had just arrived from Hungnam.

"They said we would not be able to go forward, that it was impossible. The Chinese had overrun their outfit and they had lost all their equipment and taken many casualties. Their whole attitude was one of defeatism." 21

But Eighth Army had just gotten a new commander, replacing General "Johnnie" Walker who had been killed in a jeep accident on December 23d. MacArthur had requested Lieutenant General Matthew Ridgway, commander of the 101st Airborne Division in World War II, to take over as field commander in Korea, and Ridgway left his wife and young son in Washington on Christmas Eve, arriving in Korea the day after Christmas. Ridgway moved immediately to restore morale to his command, which was in the midst of a planned withdrawal that had already brought it almost to the 38th Parallel.

The 1950 proposal to designate certain Guard units as high-priority was implemented in 1965 as the 'Selected Reserve Force.' The program was abandoned after the limited Vietnam mobilization.



VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY


On the 1st of January, 1951, U.N. forces pulled back even further when a second Communist assault sent 400,000 Chinese and another 100,000 North Koreans across the 38th Parallel, and Seoul fell to the Communists a second time. This assault, however, was expected, and under Ridgway's leadership, U.N. forces pulled back skillfully, forcing the Chinese and North Koreans to fight for every yard of ground.

By the second week of January, five National Guard transportation truck companies and two transportation battalion headquarters had arrived in Pusan, to be put to work shuttling troops and supplies north toward the front lines. Captain Bedford Bentley, commander of Maryland's 726th TTC, remembered how poor the Korean road network was, "really more like one lane trails." 22 Poor road conditions were exacerbated by the unusually warm and rainy winter weather, which meant that roads normally frozen were instead quagmires of mud.

All the National Guard truck units were

in the line on January 25th, when the U.N. began its first major counteroffensive since the Chinese had entered the war. In two weeks Ridgway's forces had pushed the Communists back almost to the outskirts of Seoul. A larger offensive, which Ridgway named "Operation Ripper," began on March 7th. Seoul was retaken and U.N. forces again moved north of the 38th Parallel.

The Guard's truck units sometimes found themselves in the thick of the fighting. Captain Simon Porter, a maintenance officer in Maryland's 231st Transportation Truck Battalion, north of Seoul at Uijongbu in support of I Corps, noticed through his field glasses that the surrounding hills were swarming with what looked like ants. The battalion commander didn't believe Porter, but the "ants" were of course Chinese soldiers, and within an hour the 231st were ordered out of the trap, a maneuver they executed speedily. 23





65th Infantry soldiers (far left) spend Christmas aboard ship; they were the last Army troops out of Hungnam. (Left) An Australian 'digger' helps a wounded American during the fierce fighting in the spring of 1951.

Between the 9th of February and 3d of March, 1951, ten Army Guard engineer units, most of them battalion-sized, landed at Pusan. The experiences of Michigan's 1437th Engineer Treadway Bridge Company, recalled by then-Corporal Ernest Perron, who retired 38 years later as the company's First Sergeant, were typical.

"After we were mobilized (on 1 September 1950) we went out to Ft Lewis. There the unit filled up with recalled Reservists. They were from all branches of the Army and the finest people I ever served with. We shipped out in January; the trucks and equipment went ahead on different ships and some of it we never saw again. The first stop was Camp Schimmelpfenning near Sendai, Japan. We stayed there 30 days or so training, then headed for Pusan. It took about 10 days to get our equipment, then we headed up to Taegu.

"It was bitter cold and snowing, and we were damn ill equipped. All we had was a poor vest under our field jackets. We had no parkas, the only winter underwear we had we brought from home -- we damn near froze to death." 24

Mississippi's 138th Pontoon Bridge Company didn't have to spend ten days in Pusan: most of their equipment had been shipped from stocks in Japan, and the 138th was headed north in three convoys within hours of their February 16th arrival. They built two bridges across tributaries of the Han River, and after Seoul was retaken went to work bridging the Han itself. Their

bridge was endangered several months later when the Chinese opened the sluice gates of the Hwachon Reservoir north of the 38th parallel, causing severe flooding to the south.

TRUMAN FIRES MACARTHUR

This flooding was the preamble to another major Communist offensive. But while the Chinese and North Koreans were massing for the attack, President Harry Truman went on an offensive of his own: he relieved Douglas MacArthur of his command.

Truman had considered firing MacArthur as early as 1949, when in violation of a direct order from the Joint Chiefs of Staff he made a personal visit to the newly-installed Nationalist Chinese on Taiwan to discuss defense issues. But Truman during his presidency did not have the "near great" status which historians later conferred on him. Instead, he was viewed by many Americans (including many in his own Democratic Party) as an uncouth hack politician who owed his Senate seat to the notoriously corrupt Prendergast "machine" which ran Missouri politics, and who had inherited the Presidency by default when Franklin Roosevelt inexplicably gave him the Vice Presidency in 1944.

In a popularity contest, or a contest of reputation, Douglas MacArthur would have beaten Truman hands down, and Harry Truman knew it. He also knew that firing a World War II hero would not be good politics. Finally, however, "Give 'em Hell Harry" (a nickname that suited Truman's outspoken personality) had had enough. MacArthur refused to defer to the Commander in Chief, and good politics or not, Commander in Chief Harry S. Truman decided that the general must go.

MacArthur had never been able to accept the idea of a limited war in Korea.

VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

The press releases put out by his Tokyo headquarters, and the general himself when he spoke with reporters, emphasized that MacArthur's views were not those of the White House or the administration. MacArthur's press releases alone gave Harry Truman grounds for relief for insubordination, but waited for something more blatant, and he soon had it.

On April 5th Republican Congressman Joe Martin of Massachusetts, Minority Leader of the House of Representatives and a severe critic of Truman's limited war policy, read to the House a letter from MacArthur indirectly attacking the administration's Korea policy. Truman consulted the Joint Chiefs, who agreed that MacArthur had finally gone too far, but who did not relish the personal criticism they would incur by sacking him. But Harry Truman, in order to preserve the authority of the office of the President, was willing to take the heat, and on April 9th, Truman announced that because MacArthur was "unable to give his wholehearted support to the policies of the United States government and the United Nations", he was relieved as commander, Far East Command, to be replaced by Matthew Ridgway.²⁵

Harry Truman was the villain when America learned that Douglas MacArthur had been fired. MacArthur, who had not set foot in the United States since 1935, received a ticker tape parade in New York City, and a standing ovation when he delivered his famous "old soldiers never die" speech to the U.S. House of Representatives. But the general's hopes for a political career never materialized, and as MacArthur retired with his wife and son to a luxurious apartment in New York City, the war in Korea went on without him.

ANOTHER CHINESE OFFENSIVE

Ridgway's successor as commander of Eighth Army, Lieutenant General James

Van Fleet, arrived in South Korea in mid-April. When Ridgway had taken over Eighth Army four months before, MacArthur had given him complete authority over field operations. Van Fleet, however, did not have this authority; in effect, operations north of the 38th parallel, including "hot pursuit" of the enemy, had to be approved by Ridgway in Tokyo.

Soon after Van Fleet assumed command in Korea, the Chinese launched their sec-



Tennessee Guardsmen of the 196th Field Artillery (below) fire on the North Koreans during a night attack.

ond major offensive, designed to protect their staging area north and south of the 38th parallel. The Americans were soon calling this mountainous region, because of its shape and because of the amount of ordnance that was expended there, the "Iron Triangle."

In contrast to the first Chinese intervention, this time Eighth Army was prepared for the overwhelming force of the expected attack. Artillery was a primary part of the U.N. preparation for battle, and during the spring of 1951 several Army National Guard field artillery battalions would play a key role in beating back the numerically-superior Chinese and North Koreans.

These units had begun arriving in Korea in February, to become Corps artillery assets. Most spent about a month in intensive training, with heavy emphasis on perimeter defense, and had to pass an inspection before being released for combat duty. By the time the Chinese began mounting what turned out to be a series of major attacks, eight had passed their Eighth Army inspection and were in the front lines.

The fighting of the last week of April, 1951, was the largest single battle of the Korean War. In the I Corps sector which stretched north from the outskirts of Seoul to the section of the Iron Triangle north of the 38th parallel, the Puerto Ricans of the 65th Infantry came under severe attack and were forced to fall back. The brunt of the Chinese assault, however, hit the British Brigade.

One battalion, the Gloucesters, was completely surrounded in what became a British version of Custer's Last Stand. When the


understated British finally got across the seriousness of their situation, Colonel Harris of the 65th Infantry was sent to confer with the brigade commander on plans for a rescue; he drank tea with the brigadier and his staff as bullets whizzed through the top of the command tent and mortars exploded all around it. 26 Luckily for the 65th, the idea of a rescue was abandoned; only a few of the Gloucesters managed to escape.

The Gloucesters' adjutant was one of the survivors, and he described the Chinese "human wave" attack which was so terrifying for the U.N. troops:

"... Chinese soldiers clad in khaki suits; their shoulders, chests and backs criss-crossed with cotton bandoliers of ammunition; upon their hips, grenades ... Their weapons -- rifles, carbines, 'burp guns' and Tommy guns -- that we supplied to (defeated Nationalist leader) Chiang Kai-shek are ready in their hands. Behind, on mule or pony limbers, are their guns and ammunition. Between the two lines, on sweating backs or slung between two men upon stout bamboo poles, their mortars and machine guns travel forward.

"No jeeps or trailers, no gun prime-movers here; but if they lack these aids to war, they do not lack what we do most: men. The hundreds grow to thousands on the river bank as, padding through the night, they close with us." 27

It was the artillery's job to stop what were literally hordes of Chinese from overrunning the frontline U.N. infantry. In addition to its divisional artillery, I Corps had three Guard artillery battalions: the 176th Armored Field Artillery, from Pennsylvania; and the 936th and 937th Field Artillery, both from Arkansas. The 176th with its 105 mm howitzers was in support of the 27th "Wolfhound" Regiment of the 25th Infantry Division when the Chinese onslaught began, and on the night of April 22d, the Pennsylvania gunners



VICTORY, DEFEAT, VICTORY

killed thousands of Chinese. 28

The story was repeated in IX Corps, where Utah's 213th Armored Field Artillery was sent to support the Australian, New Zealand, and Canadian troops of the Commonwealth Brigade, who were holding a critical position at the town of Kapyong. It was the baptism of fire for 1st Lt. Thomas Christensen, Executive Officer of "A" Battery.

"When the word came to withdraw to Kapyong, 'A' battery was left behind as the rear guard. We fired the rest of the night at road junctions and mountain passes and at the same time defended the perimeter of the battery -- just as it got dawn we withdrew amid bugle calls, small arms fire and with mortar rounds following us back to Kapyong. Welcome to the shooting war." 29

When the Chinese attacks stopped on May 1st, Seoul was still in U.N. hands, although the U.N. Command had taken some 8,500 casualties, most of them suffered by the South Koreans. Communist losses, however, were estimated at 70,000 -- most of them inflicted by U.N. artillery. Eighth Army commander Van Fleet commended his troops for their successful holding action, but pointed out that the Chinese would be back.

On the night of May 16th, the Chinese and North Koreans struck again. Again, U.N. forces were prepared for the attack, but General Van Fleet and his staff were surprised that the main thrust came not against Seoul, but to the east. Four South Korean divisions, terrified by the onslaught of 175,000 Communist troops, "collapsed or disintegrated within hours," leaving the 2d Infantry Division to face

attack from three sides. 30

Again, artillery saved the day, and among the battalions firing day and night during the six days of the Communist onslaught were the 196th Field Artillery, from Tennessee; Wyoming's 300th Armored Field Artillery (which had just arrived at the front lines); and the 937th from Arkansas. All three received Presidential Unit Citations as attached units of the 2d Infantry Division.





Arkansas gunners prepare to fire the 936th Field Artillery's 100,000th round in the early autumn of 1951.

Also attached to the "Indianhead" Division was Alabama's 252d Transportation Truck Company. Private Darce Emerson recalled the six days which won the Presidential Unit Citation for his unit:

"I remember we hauled ammo right up to the front and came under sniper fire. I'd fire the .50 caliber machine gun in the general direction of the snipers ... We carried the wounded and dead back off the line; they didn't have enough ambulances

... I recall driving around a corner and there was a burned out (U.S.) tank with a six inch hole in the side of the turret. There were dead Chinese or Koreans all around it. They had taken a lot (of enemy) with them before they got it.

"... Back in Alabama, before we were a truck outfit we had been a tank company. I thanked God we had been changed (from an armored to a transportation unit)." 31

A patrol from the 160th Infantry, 40th Infantry Division, ready to move out in the spring of 1952.



STATUS QUO

United Nations forces were ordered on the defensive and limited only to 'tactical operations to repel aggression' ...



STATUS QUO


With most of Eighth Army positioned north of the 38th Parallel by the end of May, United Nations forces were ordered on the defensive. General Van Fleet was authorized to undertake "limited tactical operations ... to repel aggression and inflict maximum personnel losses on the Communist forces," but the U.N. Command's main missions would now be convince the Communists that "further efforts to advance in Korea were too costly and to induce them to consider negotiation as an alternative." ¹

America's allies were strongly opposed to another attempt to unify the peninsula, and so "discretion appeared the better part of valor at this point, and a negotiated settlement preferable to ..." military victory. ²

After negotiations over exactly what format the actual negotiations would take, military representatives from China, North Korea, South Korea and the United States (the U.S. was authorized to negotiate on behalf of the United Nations) met on July 8th at the old Korean capital of Kaesong, just inside the Communist lines some 40 miles northwest of Seoul. The formal truce negotiations began two days later. They would continue for more than two years.

ROTATING PERSONNEL

In the spring of 1951 Eighth Army commander General James Van Fleet observed after a visit to the front lines that the morale of his troops appeared to be high, which General Van Fleet attributed to the rotation policy which the Army had adopted early that winter. ³ In order to spread the burden of service in the combat zone in a more equitable manner, recalled Reservists, Guardsmen, and draftees with a high enough number of months in Korea itself, or a total of nine months in combat, would be reassigned, or, depending on



their active duty time remaining, released from military service altogether. ⁴

This was a departure from the "total war" experience of World Wars I and II, when enlistment, conscription, and Federalization were "for the duration." In both world wars, but especially in World War II, which lasted much longer, this policy was particularly hard on the front-line infantry of the long-serving, high-casualty European Theater divisions, such as Oklahoma's 45th. In those divisions, the infantrymen lived with ever-increasing levels of fear, stress, and emotional withdrawal. They fought on for month after month because they knew they weren't going home until the war was won -- unless, of course, they were killed or severely wounded first, as indeed many of them were.

It was one thing to ask men to die for



U.S. troops guard captured Chinese during the spring of 1951.

combat service out among a wide spectrum of men, thereby increasing the chances of survival for those who did have to fight.

While this decision did improve morale, especially among the front-line troops, it had (as it would again in Vietnam) serious implications for unit cohesion and unit readiness, as experienced troops were replaced by inexperienced newcomers. And men who knew they would be rotated out after serving their time did not develop the strong identification with their units that was characteristic of the soldiers of World Wars I and II.

In the spring of 1951, the survivors of Task Force Smith, men who had come to Korea nine months before, began rotating out of the peninsula, either to Japan or to the United States itself. By the summer, the first rotations had become a flood, a flood which would soon sweep over the Guard units which had arrived in Korea in the winter

of 1951.

The S-2 (Intelligence) log of West Virginia's 1092d Engineer Combat Battalion is a concrete depiction of the effects of the Korean War rotation policy on a single unit. Federalized on August 19th, 1950, the 1092d had landed in Pusan in March, 1951, and was assigned to the 36th Engineer Combat Group. It had been reassigned to I Corps' 1169th Engineer Combat Group, whose headquarters was a Federalized Alabama Army National Guard unit, when it went into the front lines in April. During the opening days of the second Chinese offensive later that month, the West Virginians were attached as infantry to the 3d Infantry Division, blocking the Chinese advance north of Uijongbu.

The unit had returned to engineer duties

victory in a worthy cause, as in World War II. In Korea, however, the U.S. war aim after the Chinese Intervention was not victory; it was a return to the status quo, which would re-establish the independence of South Korea, thereby providing the U.S. and the U.N. with an honorable end to the fighting.

Before the Korean War, the U.S. government had not utilized its right to draft citizens into military service unless the nation's interest was directly threatened -- or presented to the public as threatened, as with the U.S. entry into World War I in 1917. It was difficult to paint the situation in Korea in these stark terms. Therefore, in democratic American fashion which would be repeated during the Vietnam War, military and civilian leaders made the decision to spread



other hand, approximated that of whites. (The report) also confirmed previous Army findings that efficient officers and noncommissioned officers, regardless of race, were accepted by soldiers of both races." 7

On May 14th, 1951, Matthew Ridgway requested permission to integrate, first, Eighth Army in Korea, and then units of Far East command stationed in Japan. Rather than break up units, the rotation process already in operation would be used

Members of Maryland's 726th Transportation Truck Company take a reading break. When the unit arrived in Korea the year before, it was 100 percent African-American.

to achieve integration. On July 1, 1951, the Chief of Staff gave Ridgway the green light to proceed.

Truman's Executive Order had not applied to the National Guard, which in peacetime was under command of the governors, not the President. But Federal-

STATUS QUO

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Written by Lt. Gen. Ned Almond, X Corps Commander in 1972, 20 years after integration 5

that summer, when the Command Reports of Lieutenant Colonel Wrene Smith, who had enlisted in the West Virginia Guard in 1927, began detailing his unease at the personnel losses which were about to descend upon his battalion. Colonel Smith had himself been reassigned to the I Corps staff when the personnel turnover began at all levels of the battalion. In September, the 1092d received 232 enlisted replacements for the 129 men who were transferred out, either because their term of service in Korea was completed, or their term of service itself had expired.

Many of these replacements, however, were not well-trained in the operation of the battalion's specialized equipment. In succeeding months, replacements would run far below the numbers of Guardsmen and draftees who were departing as their terms of service expired, leaving the battalion greatly understrength. By this time, however, there were hardly any Guardsmen around to care: the last enlisted West Virginians and most of the officers originally Federalized with their unit had all left Korea by 1952. Unless one knew its history, the 1092d Engineer Combat Battalion was no longer recognizable as a National Guard unit.

INTEGRATING UNITS

The Army's policy of rotating individuals, rather than units, out of Korea created a cluttered personnel replacement pipeline. And as the "old veterans" left Korea by the thousands in the summer of 1951, the new troops coming in as individual replacements became part of a critical period in the Army's history: the complete racial integration of Eighth Army, which, by proving on the battlefield that integration worked, led to the complete integration of all the U.S. Armed Forces.

In 1948 President Truman had signed Executive Order 9981 calling for "equality of treatment and opportunity" in the

nation's Armed Forces. But the order was not specific, and with no definition of "equality" or directions on how to achieve it, none of the services had rushed to implement Truman's order. 5

Thus the Army that began fighting the Korean War in 1950 was still almost completely segregated by race, and many African-American units fought in Korea in the war's first months.

The all-black 999th Field Artillery was often attached to the 65th Infantry, which was itself labelled a "black" outfit. Col. Harris of the 65th recalls his meeting with X Corps commander Gen. Ned Almond, who had commanded the African-American 93d Infantry Division in Italy in World War II -- and who was a notorious racist, even in an era when racism was common. When Almond told Harris that he didn't have confidence in the 65th or any other "colored" troops, Harris responded:

"General, these troops are not colored ... my artillery battalion and tank company are colored ... but the men of the 65th are white Puerto Ricans. And I might say the colored troops have fought like real troopers." 6

Harris' words were confirmed by a Department of the Army study of segregated units' combat performance in Korea, and the few rear-echelon support units which the Army had begun, tentatively, to integrate. The report found that

"... large black units were, on average, less reliable than large white units, but the effectiveness of small black units varied widely. The performance of individual black soldiers in integrated units, on the



STATUS QUO

ized units of the National Guard were a different story, and when Eighth Army integrated, the Guard units that were part of it integrated, too.

Like the rest of Eighth Army, the Guard units, even those from the Deep South, reported only minor problems. Years later, author Bill Berebitsky interviewed Major Vernon Sikes of Florida's 227th Antiaircraft Artillery Group, which landed at Pusan in the spring of 1952. Sikes, who in 1965 became the state of Florida's first Civil Rights Coordinator, recalled his unit's integration immediately following its arrival in Korea:

"Although a Southern born officer, I had complete confidence that integration would work. We had a few problems -- the black troops wanted separate quarters and all black gun crews. Our Southern Colonel, Colonel Percy L. Wall, said absolutely not - that the order was to integrate, and we did. It was a wise decision to completely mix up everyone. It worked out exceptionally well" 8

For the African-American Guard units in Korea, like their many Regular Army counterparts, integration worked in the opposite way, as these units received white replacements. Joseph Bracy, originally a Maryland Guardsman, was commanding D.C.'s 715th Truck Company after its original commander rotated home.

"I had been with the unit about a month when the integration began. There was no advance notice or fanfare. If you needed x number of truck drivers or maintenance personnel you sent a request in and they sent you a qualified replacement. I saw my unit go from 100 percent black to about 60 percent white, 40 percent black within four months

"... In many units they did it overnight. You went to bed 100 percent black or white and the next day people transferred in and out, and that night your unit might be only 70 percent black or white." 9



GUARD DIVISIONS TO JAPAN

While integration proceeded in units of Far East Command during the late summer of 1951, two infantry divisions stationed in Japan were specifically excluded (for domestic political considerations) by order of the Chief of Staff: the 40th and 45th. These two National Guard divisions would be integrated when they were deployed to Korea. But like their arrival in Japan, their deployment to Korea had been far from certain.

The 40th and 45th Infantry Divisions had been Federalized (along with the 28th and 43d) in the summer of 1950. All four divisions had been requested by MacArthur as reinforcements on December 18, 1950 as a response to the Chinese entry into the war, a request turned down by the Joint Chiefs. 10 On December 30th, MacArthur tried a different tack, pointing out that with no U.S. divisions in Japan (they had all been sent to Korea), and with no other deployable divisions available, he needed the National Guard divisions there. At the end of January, the Secretary of Defense approved the shipment of two

STATUS QUO

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Members of the 245th Tank Battalion, 45th Infantry Division, muster in Hokkaido, Japan.

Guard divisions, the 40th (California) and 45th (Oklahoma) to Japan - but with specific instructions that the two divisions were to remain in Japan and not be sent to Korea. 11

In early March of 1951, the two divisions were alerted for overseas shipment. The 40th, which had been stationed in California since its Federalization, would leave from the West Coast. The 45th, which had been sent to Camp Polk, Louisiana, shipped out from the port of New Orleans. Both divisions arrived in Japan in April, 1951, with the 40th assigned to the main island of Honshu, and the 45th to the northernmost island, Hokkaido, where Japanese workers rushed to erect "tent cities" to house the troops.

Both divisions began intensive training programs, especially important in light of the thousands of untrained draftees which had been assigned to them as "fillers" after mobilization. The divisions had to provide basic training for these men, who by Army policy could not leave the United States until their initial training cycle was complete. In the case of the 45th, 4,000

draftees had to be left behind at Camp Polk in order to complete their training, 12 and these men arrived on Hokkaido several months after the rest of the "Thunderbirds."

Douglas MacArthur may have been told that he was not to send either Guard division to Korea, but the veteran officers and NCOs of both divisions had little doubt that Korea was where they would wind up, one way or the other. The National Guard Association was adamantly opposed to using the men assigned to the Guard divisions as individual replacements; it wanted the divisions themselves in Korea. The political point was made, and in August, 1951, Ridgway's original instruction, to keep the two divisions in Japan, was reversed.

The Joint Chiefs told Ridgway that they wanted the two divisions employed in Korea. But Ridgway demurred, first arguing that he needed the 40th and 45th to defend Japan, and then, several months later, shifting his argument and asking for permission to use the personnel of the two Guard divisions as individual replacements.

Army Chief of Staff "Lightning Joe" Collins cabled back sharply that "in his opinion an attempt to break up the divisions would invoke a storm of protest from Congress and imply that the National Guard divisions were not fit for combat duty after a year of training." General Collins also pointed out that the Guardsmen were already through more than half of their two-year call-up. If they were going to Korea at all they would have to go soon. 13

"SWAP IN PLACE"

In order to avoid having to ship all the divisions' equipment, a technique that had been used in the Pacific theater in WWII was employed: the two Guard divisions would "swap in place" with divisions

STATUS QUO

rotating out of Korea, the 40th with the 24th Infantry Division and the 45th with the 1st Cavalry Division. The 45th and the 1st Cav began the rotation cycle, with the 45th's 180th Infantry arriving at Inchon on December 5th. By the time the last of the Thunderbirds, the 279th Infantry, arrived on the 30th of December to exchange places with the 8th Cavalry Regiment, the 180th Infantry was already in the front lines.

The 279th Infantry had received a new commander just before leaving the States, and as a Regular officer he wasted no time in telling the regiment's officers that he didn't think much of the National Guard. The Oklahomans, however, were contemptuous: during World War II this particular colonel (who left the division for Korea while it was still in Japan and was replaced by a Guardsman) had commanded the 89th Infantry Division's 353d Infantry, which didn't arrive in Europe until the 45th Division was in the middle of its seventh campaign of the war. One of the first divisions to fight in Europe, the 45th in several bloody campaigns in Italy, France, and Germany had earned a reputation as one of the finest divisions in the U.S. Army. Every Oklahoma Guardsman, whether he wore the Thunderbird patch during the war or joined in the years after, knew the division's war record and was intensely proud of it -- an *esprit de corps* that was quickly communicated to the thousands of draftees and recalled Reservists who had been assigned to the 45th after its Federalization.

But the combat that the 45th Infantry Division entered in the winter of 1951-1952 in Korea was not the same as it had experienced in World War II. By the time the two National Guard divisions arrived in Korea, the combat mission was not to close with the enemy, inflict maximum casualties, and thereby force him to surrender. Instead, the object was to


maintain the territorial status quo along the 38th Parallel with just enough force to convince the Communists that they might as well settle at the negotiating table, which since November, 1951 had been permanently fixed at the village of Panmunjon.

The Chinese and North Koreans no longer attacked in human waves; U.N. artillery and air strikes had inflicted so



Gung-ho 'Thunderbird' Guardsmen of the 45th Infantry Division (below) announce their arrival in Korea.

many casualties that the Communists no longer enjoyed the overwhelming manpower advantage that had made their mass attacks possible. Instead, each side now operated out of fortified bunkers eerily reminiscent of the trenches of the First World War, mounting "limited offensive actions designed to seize better defensive positions, or to regain lost territory, or to establish outpost lines."



*"Artillery duels, night patrols, deadly ambushes and bloody raids were characteristic of this so-called 'active defense.' For any larger action (division commander Major General James C. Styron) had to get prior approval from I Corps, which sometimes had to clear the operation with officials in Washington, D.C. As a result the majority of actions were on the platoon or smaller scale."*¹⁴

Each of the division's rifle companies was responsible for approximately one mile of rugged mountain terrain, which they defended with two-man rifle positions 25 or 30 yards apart, supplemented with platoon-sized fortified outposts. The series of fortified bunkers which ran behind the front lines were referred to by the troops as "hoochies." With the men alternating between the rifle pits and the "hoochies," a regiment would spend 45 days on the line, before rotating to the rear for a few weeks in reserve.

Each regiment of the 45th was required to send out one patrol a day. After "C" Company of the 279th lost 4 killed, 4 missing, and 25 wounded in a patrol which encountered stiff Chinese resistance, the regimental commander issued a call for volunteers to set up a special "Raider Platoon." Many of the men who responded were ex-Army Rangers from World War II, and they immediately began training for specialized night raids. One enterprising squad leader, in response to the Communist penchant for bugle calls and other noises which had so unnerved U.N. troops when they first encountered them, decided to give the enemy a taste of their own aural tactics: having heard somewhere that the Chinese considered a howling dog bad luck, he taught his men to howl ferociously before closing with Chinese patrols.¹⁵

In the spring of 1952, both the temperature and the level of combat operations increased in the 45th Division's sector. On

STATUS QUO

the night of March 22d, "Outpost Eerie," (as the troops had named it), an exposed position in front of a major Chinese bunker complex on "T-Bone Hill," came under heavy attack. When the 3d Platoon of the K Company, 179th Infantry began to run out of ammunition after a two-hour firefight, the Chinese began to break through the barbed-wire defenses. Platoon leader Lt. Omer Manley yelled for his men to scatter and "bug out," courageously remaining behind to be captured so that he could attempt to convince the Chinese that artillery and air strikes were on the way. In fact, they were on the way -- Colonel Fred Daugherty, the regimental commander, had ordered artillery fire directly on Outpost Eerie, the only time in his combat career (which was considerable, since it included World War II) that he had felt it necessary to call in fire directly on one of his own positions. 16

Two months later Colonel Daugherty was breaking in a new division commander, replacing General Styron, who was due to rotate back to Oklahoma and retirement. The new commander, who was not a combat veteran, wanted to visit an outpost in the 179th's sector which had beaten off a Chinese attack the night before. Knowing that the Communists were still observing the outpost and would notice the arrival of "brass," Daugherty argued strongly against the visit. He was unsuccessful, and soon he and the general were hiking the last 1/2 mile up to the outpost.

"They'd been fighting all night and the position didn't look very pretty. They had a fence around the position -- straight up and down, about six feet high, made of interwoven wire ...

"I counted nineteen dead Chinese on or in front of that fence. The Chinese had gone off and left them, which was unusual. They'd begun to draw flies, but they weren't smelly yet. If our men went out to do something about those bodies in the daylight, the Chinese would start shelling the position ... so we just left them alone and would do something about them at night when our men couldn't be seen.

"(The division commander) saw these dead Chinese and he wondered why we didn't (remove) them. We explained why to



Troops of the California National Guard's 40th Infantry Division arrive in Chun Chon, Korea, Jan. 23, 1952.

him. Then he went up to a soldier ... who had a knife stuck in the dirt on the edge of his foxhole. The general chewed his ass out, saying, 'That is no way to take care of a knife.' The soldier told him, 'It has to be where I can get it. If they get through that fence, it's hand to hand.'" 17

Sure enough, the general's visit did indeed draw mortar fire, and shells followed Colonel Daugherty and the new division commander down the hill. Daugherty never saw the general again:

within days his number came up for rotation, and he was back in Japan. 18

CALIFORNIANS IN THE COLD

The 40th Infantry Division had followed the 45th to Korea. The 160th Infantry had arrived on January 12th, 1952 for the division's swap in place with the 24th Infantry Division, with the rest of the division landing at Inchon some three weeks later. By mid-February the Californians, like their Oklahoma counterparts, were trying to keep warm in their fortified

bunkers by day and patrolling by night. 19

Corporal Harry Nelson of the 160th Infantry recalled his first night in the mountainous Kumsong sector:

"We took over from the 19th (Infantry) Regiment on Hill 714. We got up there and they gave us some spikes to put underneath our boots because it was nothing but ice. There was a large rope coming down from the top of the hill we were going to occupy, and we had to pull ourselves up it for a hundred yards or more. It

was quite a climb, pure ice all the way

"... It was cold and miserable, I don't think I was ever so miserable in my life. We were from California and not used to that cold stuff." 20

The "Sunshine" Division set up company-sized command posts as much as 1,000 yards in front of the Mail Line of Resistance (MLR), in order to keep the Chinese and North Koreans from occupying this ground. The Californians' first major action came on February 18th, when Company L, 3d Battalion, 223d Infantry, supported with tanks, mortar and artillery fire, attempted to dislodge the Chinese from atop a small mountain north

of the MLR. The action was not a success. The regimental commander, under fire, personally retrieved the body of the L Company commander, killed in action, and several wounded; L Company's First Sergeant was awarded the Distinguished Service Cross for retrieving six wounded soldiers just yards from the Chinese bunkers. 21

This marked the end of company-sized assaults in the Kumsong sector, but in the spring of 1952 the 40th Division was transferred to the lower elevations of the Kumwha Valley. There, relates author Bill Berebitsky, they were much closer to the Chinese lines. Flat land is at a premium in the environs of the 38th Parallel, and the men of the 40th were about to discover that the enemy was more aggressive in trying to gain control of it.

In mid-April, the 223d Infantry's 2d Battalion came under battalion-sized attack, a large action at this stage of the war. The Californians had the protection of barbed wire, but just as in the days of the human wave attacks, it was artillery that saved the day: the division's 625th Field Artillery, running the risk of annihilating the 2d Battalion if their fire coordinates were incorrect, fired 3,500 rounds on the battalion's perimeter, killing some 500 Chinese who were massed to assault the wire. 22

GOING HOME

This was the last major action of the war for many of the 40th Division Guardsmen who had arrived in Korea several months ago: the two-year period of their Federalization was about to expire. In mid-March, 1952, there were 5,400 Guardsmen serving in the 40th Infantry Division; by the first of April, 400 of them had departed, ready to ship home. By July, all the Guardsmen, except the handful who voluntarily extended their Korea service to remain with the division, had returned to



STATUS QUO

the States for discharge. 23 In the 45th, Federalized at the same time, it was the same story, with most of the Thunderbirds back in Oklahoma by July, 1952. 24

The Guardsmen went home as individuals; their units, both divisional and non-divisional, remained in Korea, and over the course of the rest of the war, thousands of men would rotate through them as replacements. But with these units remaining in Federal service, the states (particularly those from which divisions had been Federalized) had nowhere to put their returning Guardsmen, and not enough units for use in state emergencies. To solve this problem, the 82d Congress passed Public Law 461, which authorized the states to organize duplicates of the units still in Federal service. Held to 1/2 strength for officers and 1/4 strength for enlisted personnel, these units were also authorized little more than individual arms and equipment for their members. The letters "NGUS" (for "National Guard of the United States") after their numerical designation separated them from their active-duty counterparts.

LATE ARRIVALS

As the three-year war in Korea passed its half-way point, the number of Army Guard units arriving on the peninsula began to decrease. In the last six months of 1951, only four non-divisional Guard units deployed to the combat zone. Three of these were artillery: the 213th Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion from Pennsylvania, which sent two of its batteries to tiny islands in Inchon Harbor, where they spent the rest of the war in almost total isolation; Kentucky's 623d Field Artillery Battalion; and the 145th Field Artillery Battalion, the third artillery battalion from the Utah National Guard to serve in Korea.

1952 saw the arrival of the last four Army National Guard units in Korea. Florida's 227th Antiaircraft Artillery

Group headquarters, mobilized in May, 1951 in one of the last three increments of the Guard's Federalization, arrived with its Guard personnel, and consequently its Guard identity, intact (unit personnel traded whiskey to get hard-to-find grits). 25 In contrast, the last Guard unit to arrive in Korea, Pennsylvania's 235th Field Artillery Observation Battalion, had been Federalized in September 1950 in one of the first increments of the call-up. By the time it landed in Pusan on December 10th, 1952, almost two years after the arrival of the first Army Guard unit, the only Guard personnel to remain in the 235th - if indeed there were any at all -- would have had to volunteer to remain on active duty. 26

NEGOTIATING PEACE

As the last Guard units arrived in Korea in 1952, the peace negotiations begun the previous year dragged on, as did the fighting. When preliminary talks had commenced in the summer of 1951, the Communists had proposed a cease-fire during the negotiations. But the U.S. feared that the Chinese and North Koreans would use any lull in the fighting to stage another massive offensive, and so the fighting continued simultaneously with the peace talks.

Early negotiations had first raised the issue of a boundary between North and South Korea. Would it be along the 38th Parallel, as it had been fixed at the end of World War II, or would it run along the actual battle line at the time an armistice was signed, a line which in some cases was almost 20 miles north of the parallel? This contentious issue was finally settled





in the United Nations' favor, as the actual battle line.

The question of repatriation of prisoners of war took many months to resolve. The South Koreans claimed (with a high degree of truthfulness) that some 40,000 prisoners from the North Korean People's Army were in fact South Koreans who had been impressed into service when the North invaded, and who should be allowed to remain in South Korea. In addition, fervent anti-Communists in the United States argued that the Chinese prisoners

A Guardsman with the 140th Tank Battalion, 40th Infantry Division, breaks ice to free a tank near Chuk-Tong, Korea, Feb. 6, 1952.

may also have been coerced, and that they should be given the option of joining the Nationalist government on Taiwan. These claims led the U.N. negotiators to press for the concept of "voluntary repatriation" for all POWs. The Communists objected strenuously enough to twice stop the peace talks over this issue, but finally accepted a limited form of the concept. 27

STATUS QUO

By the summer of 1952, the vast majority of Americans had become disenchanted with the bloody stalemate that the undeclared war in Korea had become, and the war became an issue in the U.S. presidential campaign. Harry Truman, his popularity rating polled at 30%, had sounded out General Dwight D. Eisenhower's willingness to run for the Presidency as a Democrat. Eisenhower's political affiliation was unknown until the liberal, internationalist wing of the Republican Party convinced him to run against conservative Senator Robert Taft of Ohio, who had promised to make Douglas MacArthur his Vice Presidential running mate. Eisenhower narrowly defeated Taft for the Republican nomination, and defeated liberal Democrat Adlai Stevenson after promising in the campaign's final weeks that if elected, "I shall go to Korea."

The World War II Supreme Commander of Allied forces in the European Theatre was as good as his word, and the new President-elect was photographed in Korea, a tray on his lap, eating Thanksgiving dinner with the troops. But "Ike" had no grand plan for ending the stalemate; that remained the slow and painstaking job of the negotiators at Panmunjon.

As the peace talks appeared headed for success in the spring of 1953, the U.S.'s biggest problem proved to be South Korean President Syngman Rhee. Like Douglas MacArthur, Rhee had never been able to accept the idea of a divided Korea, and was opposed to any deal with the Communists. The U.S., ready to threaten a complete pull-out if Rhee refused to accept armistice terms, finally won his grudging approval by promising large amounts of economic and military aid, including the continued presence of U.S. troops to maintain the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) between North and South Korea that the armistice would set up. 28

Finally, on July 27, 1953, three years,

one month, and two days after the North Korean invasion which began the fighting, an armistice was signed by military representatives of the United States (representing the United Nations) and the North Korean government. The Korean War of 1950-1953 was over. But it was a military, not a political, end to the fighting. Almost 50 years later, at the dawn of the 21st century, the "truce village" at Panmunjon remains, and the DMZ is still patrolled by North Korean, South Korean, and U.S. troops.



COSTS AND BENEFITS

In *The Forgotten War*, historian Clay Blair reminds his readers that the United States “paid a high price for President Truman’s decision to ‘draw the line’ in South Korea.”²⁹ Total U.S. casualties were 33,665 battle dead, 3,275 non-battle deaths, and more than 90,000 wounded.

British historian Max Hastings, in his book on the Korean War, makes the point that “The cost of the last two years of the ‘talking war,’ in order to fix the DMZ and to effect the release of 12,773 UN POWs

(including 3,597 Americans), was especially dear: 63,200 American casualties alone, 12,300 of whom were killed on the battlefield.” Hastings continues by noting that total United Nations casualties in Korea were 142,000, and that Chinese casualties ran into the hundreds of thousands. More than one million Koreans were killed, many of them civilians.³⁰

Was it worth the price? Military strategist Harry Summers, who retired from the Army as a colonel after service in both Korea and Vietnam, notes that in the decades following the 1953 armistice, Korea was unfairly compared to the U.S. experience in World War II. “Because we were suffering from a kind of hubris as a result of our overwhelming World War II victories,” wrote Summers, “we saw our limited victory in Korea as a kind of defeat.”³¹ Summers, however, argues that after the Chinese intervention, the U.S. successfully limited its war aim to restoring independence to South Korea, a goal which was accomplished.

At the turn of the year 2000, fifty years after North Korea invaded the South, the Communist government in Pyongyang remains one of the most isolated and repressive regimes on earth. At the end of the century, it could not even feed its population, and the few Westerners allowed into the country reported signs of severe famine.

In contrast, South Korea in the year 2000 boasts an advanced industrial economy, a high standard of living, and, after decades of dictatorial politics, a democratic government. If the U.N. soldiers -- including those from the Army National Guard -- who gave their lives in Korea in the years between 1950 and 1953 did so to keep South Korea out of Communist hands, then their deaths were not in vain.

Hours after the signing of the Armistice, 40th ID troops prepare to move to new positions South of the new Demilitarized Zone (DMZ).



APPENDIX A. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS THAT SERVED IN KOREA

Unit	State	Federalized	Arrived Korea
30th Ordnance Bn, HQ & HQ Det.	NC	14 Aug 50	21 Mar 51
32d Ordnance Bn, HQ & HQ Det.	IL	19 Aug 50	10 Jul 51
32d Quartermaster Gp, HQ & HQ Co.	PA	11 Sep 50	17 Feb 52
40th Infantry Division	CA	1 Sep 50	■ 11 Jan 52
45th Infantry Division	OK	1 Sep 50	■ 5 Dec 51
65th Infantry Regiment	PR	(Regular Army; later ARNG)	
101st Signal Battalion	NY	19 Aug 50	7 Apr 51
106th Ordnance (H) Maint Co.	MO	9 Aug 50	26 Mar 51
107th Ordnance (M) Maint Co.	MI	9 Aug 50	9 Mar 51
107th Transportation Truck Co.	AL	9 Aug 50	8 Jan 51
116th Engineer Combat Battalion	ID	3 Sep 50	28 Feb 51
121st Transportation Truck Co.	PA	19 Aug 50	4 Jan 51
131st Transportation Truck Co.	PA	19 Aug 50	1 Jan 51
138th Engineer Pontoon Bridge Co.	MS	14 Aug 50	6 Feb 51
145th Field Artillery Battalion	UT	3 Sep 50	5 Dec 51
151st Engineer Combat Battalion	AL	14 Aug 50	9 Feb 51
167th Trans Truck Bn, HQ & HQ Det.	PA	9 Aug 50	1 Jan 51
176th Armored Field Artillery Bn.	PA	19 Aug 50	17 Feb 51
194th Engineer Combat Battalion	TN	19 Aug 50	16 Feb 51
196th Field Artillery Battalion	TN	19 Aug 50	9 Feb 51
204th Field Artillery Battalion	UT	19 Aug 50	2 Feb 51
213th Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Bn.	PA	14 Aug 50	11 Nov 51
213th Armored Field Artillery Bn.	UT	19 Aug 50	16 Feb 51
217th Medical Collecting Company	AR	19 Aug 50	4 May 51
227th AAA Group, HQ & HQ Btry	FL	15 May 51	21 Mar 52
231st Trans Truck Bn, HQ & HQ Det.	MD	19 Aug 50	1 Jan 51
235th FA Observation Bn.	PA	1 Sep 50	10 Dec 52
252d Transportation Truck Co.	AL	19 Aug 50	1 Jan 51
300th Armored Field Artillery Bn.	WY	19 Aug 50	16 Feb 51
378th Engineer Combat Bn.	NC	14 Aug 50	24 Feb 51
568th Ordnance (H) Maintenance Co.	TN	14 Aug 50	19 Mar 51
623d Field Artillery Battalion	KY	1 Sep 50	23 Dec 51
715th Transportation Truck Company	DC	14 Aug 50	5 Jan 51
726th Transportation Truck Company	MD	19 Aug 50	31 Dec 50
773d Antiaircraft Artillery Gun Bn.	NY	1 May 51	18 Oct 52
936th Field Artillery Battalion	AR	19 Aug 50	10 Feb 51
937th Field Artillery Battalion	AR	19 Aug 50	10 Feb 51
955th Field Artillery Battalion	NY	19 Aug 50	2 Feb 51
987th Armored Field Artillery Bn.	OH	14 Aug 50	16 Feb 51
1092d Engineer Combat Bn.	WV	19 Aug 50	3 Mar 51
1169th Engineer Gp, HQ & HQ Co.	AL	14 Aug 50	28 Feb 51
1343d Engineer Combat Battalion	AL	14 Aug 50	9 Feb 51
1437th Engineer Treadway Bridge Co.	MI	14 Aug 50	2 Mar 51
2998th Engineer Treadway Bridge Co.	TN	19 Aug 50	27 Feb 51

■ First divisional elements arrive. Note: Two ARNG infantry divisions, the 28th (PA) and 43d (RI and CT), deployed to Germany after Federalization.

APPENDIX B. ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
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ALABAMA

31st Inf Div (in part)	13	30 Jun 54
31st Inf Div Hq (in part)	13	30 Jun 54
31st Inf Div Med Det, Div Hq	13	30 Jun 54
31st Inf Div Hq Co	13	30 Jun 54
31st MP Co	13	30 Jun 54
731st Ord Maint Co	13	30 Jun 54
31st QM Co	13	30 Jun 54
31st Sig Co	13	30 Jun 54
167th Inf	13	30 Jun 54
200th Inf	13	30 Jun 54
31st Div Arty, Hq & Hq Btry (in part)	13	30 Jun 54
31st Div Arty, Med Det	13	30 Jun 54
117th FA Bn (105-mm How)	13	30 Jun 54
933d FA Bn (105-mm How)	13	30 Jun 54
104th AAA AW Bn (SP)	13	30 Jun 54
31st Inf Div Band	13	30 Jun 54
226th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	6	03 Sep 52
711th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	6	03 Sep 52
464th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	14	22 Dec 52
378th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	23 Oct 53
1169th Engr Cbt Gp, Hq & Hq Co	1	20 Jan 55
151st Engr Cbt Bn	2	21 Feb 55
1343d Engr Cbt Bn	2	21 Feb 55
131st Hvy Tank Bn	2	17 Dec 54
109th Ord M Maint Co	7	1 Dec 54
107th Trans Trk Co	3	21 Feb 55
252d Trans Trk Co	3	21 Feb 55

ARKANSAS

142d FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	5	17 Dec 54
936th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	3	10 Nov 54
937th FA Bn (155-mm Gun, SP)	3	26 Nov 54
101st Med Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	26 Nov 54
217th Med Coll Co (Sep)	3	21 Feb 53
218th Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	14	20 Dec 54

CALIFORNIA

40th Inf Div		
40th Inf Div Hq	4	30 Jun 54
40th Inf Div, Med Det, Div Hq	4	30 Jun 54
40th Inf Div Hq Co	4	30 Jun 54
40th MP Co	4	30 Jun 54
740th Ord Maint Co	4	30 Jun 54

Units entered active military service in 19 separate increments.

- Increment No. 1, 14 Aug 1950
- Increment No. 2, 14 Aug 1950
- Increment No. 3, 19 Aug 1950
- Increment No. 4, 1 Sep 1950
- Increment No. 5, 3 Sep 1950
- Increment No. 6, 14 Sep 1950
- Increment No. 7, 11 Sep 1950
- Increment No. 8, 11 Sep 1950
- Increment No. 9, 15 Sep 1950
- Increment No. 10, 5 Oct 1950
- Increment No. 11, 15 Oct 1950
- Increment No. 12, 21 Oct 1950
- Increment No. 13, 16 Jan 1951
- Increment No. 14, 23 Jan 1951
- Increment No. 15, 16 Mar 1951
- Increment No. 16, 1 May 1951
- Increment No. 17, 15 May 1951
- Increment No. 18, 15 Jan 1952
- Increment No. 19, 15 Feb 1952

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
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CALIFORNIA

40th QM Co	4	30 Jun54
40th Sig Co	4	30 Jun 54
160th Inf	4	30 Jun 54
223d Inf	4	30 Jun 54
224th Inf	4	30 Jun 54
40th Div Arty Hq & Hq Btry	4	30 Jun 54
40th Div Arty, Med Det	4	30 Jun 54
143d FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	30 Jun 54
625th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	30 Jun 54
980th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	30 Jun 54
981st FA Bn (155-mm How)	4	30 Jun 54
140th AAA AW Bn (SP)	4	30 Jun 54
140th Hvy Tank Bn	4	30 Jun 54
40th Recon Co	4	30 Jun 54
578th Engr Cbt Bn	4	30 Jun 54
115th Med Bn	4	30 Jun 54
40th Inf Div Band	4	30 Jun 54
250th AAA Gp Hq & Hq Btry	2	20 Jul 52
718th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	17	14 May 53
719th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	2	20 May 52
728th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	17	14 May 53
746th AAA Gun Bn (120-mm)	2	13 Jun 52
184th AAA Opn Det	7	10 Aug 52
186th AAA Opn Det	6	3 Sep 52
1401st Engr Cbt Bn	7	17 Jan 55
1402d Engr Cbt Bn	7	17 Jan 55
3632d Ord M Maint Co	14	20 Jan 55
161st Ord Depot Co	1	10 Mar55
425th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	15 Nov 54
93d Army Band	11	24 Feb 55
117th Trans Trk Co	7	10 Mar 55

COLORADO

193d Hvy Tank Bn	5	2 Jul 52
199th Engr Cbt Bn	7	17 Jan 55
947th Clr Co (Sep)	7	9 Feb 55
869th Med Coll Co (Sep)	7	9 Feb 55
928th Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	14	7 Mar 55

CONNECTICUT

43d Inf Div (in part)		
43d Div Hq (in part)	4	16 Jun 54
43d Div Hq Co	4	15 Jun 54

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
COLORADO		
43d Inf Div, Med Det, Div Hq	4	15 Jun 54
43d MP Co	4	15 Jun 54
102d Inf	4	15 Jun 54
169th Inf	4	15 Jun 54
43d Div Arty Med Det (in part)	4	15 Jun 54
192d FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	15 Jun 54
963d FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	15 Jun 54
143d Hvy Tank Bn	4	15 Jun 54
118th Med Bn	4	15 Jun 54
43d Inf Div Band	4	15 Jun 54
172d AAA Opn Det	1	13 Jul 52
208th AAA Gp Hq & Hq Btry	17	13 May 53
242d AAA Gp Hq & Hq Btry	17	14 May 53
238th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 Jun 52
745th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 Apr 52
400th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	14	7 Mar 55
DELAWARE		
736th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	2	28 Aug 52
286th AAA Opn Det	16	18 Mar 55
361st Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 54
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA		
260th AAA Gp Hq & Hq Btry	7	10 Sep 52
260th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Jan 53
380th AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	17	14 Apr 53
370th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	13 Oct 53
715th Trans Trk Co	1	21 Jan 55
163d MP Bn	5	2 Jul 52
171st MP Bn	7	10 Jul 52
FLORIDA		
227th AAA Gp Hq & Hq Btry	17	14 May 53
712th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	30 Apr 53
144th Trans Trk Co	7	10 Mar 55
GEORGIA		
108th AAA Brig Hq & Hq Btry	1	13 Jun 52
178th AAA Opn Det	1	13 Aug 52
101st AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 Apr 52
250th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 May 52
420th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 54

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
IDAHO		
116th Engr Cbt Bn	5	20 Jan 55
148th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	16	18 Mar 55
25th Army Band	11	24 Jun 55
ILLINOIS		
44th Inf Div	19	10 Oct 54
44th Inf Div HQ	19	10 Oct 54
44th Inf Div, Med Det, Div Hq	19	10 Oct 54
44th Inf Div Hq Co	19	10 Oct 54
44th MP Co	19	10 Oct 54
744th Ord Maint Co	19	10 Oct 54
44th QM Co	19	10 Oct 54
44th Sig Co	19	10 Oct 54
123d Inf	19	10 Oct 54
129th Inf	19	10 Oct 54
130th Inf	19	10 Oct 54
44th Div Arty Hq & Hq Btry	19	10 Oct 54
44th Div Arty Med Det	19	10 Oct 54
209th FA Bn (105-mm How)	19	10 Oct 54
223d FA Bn (105-mm How)	19	10 Oct 54
233d FA Bn (105-mm How)	10	10 Oct 54
123d FA Bn (155-mm How)	19	10 Oct 54
144th AAA AW Bn (SP)	19	10 Oct 54
106th HvY Tank Bn	19	10 Oct 54
44th Recon Co	19	10 Oct 54
135th Engr Bn	19	10 Oct 54
203d Med Bn	19	10 Oct 54
44th Inf Div Band	19	10 Oct 54
184th Med Coll Co	7	9 Feb 55
698th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Jan 53
768th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	17	14 Apr 53
179th AAA Opn Det	16	18 Mar 55
385th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	14	7 Mar 55
32d Ord Bn Hq & Hq Det	3	26 May 55
3637th Ord M Auto Maint Co	7	9 Feb 55
INDIANA		
915th Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	5	6 Jan 55
IOWA		
194th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	7	17 Jan 55
3657 Ord M Maint Co	14	7 Mar 55

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
KANSAS		
130th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	7	25 Jul 52
195th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	16	10 Oct 54
174th MP Bn	12	20 Dec 52
KENTUCKY		
198th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	16	2 Dec 54
623d FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	14	18 Mar 55
452d Armd FA Bn (155-mm How, SP)	7	17 Jan 55
201st Engr Cbt Bn	16	30 Mar 55
916th Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	7	9 Feb 55
917th Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	14	21 Feb 55
113th Ord M Maint Co	5	20 Jan 55
413th Ord By Maint Co (Army)	5	6 Jan 55
718th Trans Truck Co	3	3 Dec 54
LOUISIANA		
773d Hvy Tank Bn	10	1 Nov 54
MAINE		
703d AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 Apr 52
354th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	15 Nov 54
MARYLAND		
231st Trans Truck Bn, Hq & Hq Det	3	21 Feb 55
147th Trans Truck Co	3	3 Dec 54
165th Trans Truck Co	5	2 Sep 54
726th Trans Truck Co	3	21 Feb 55
MASSACHUSETTS		
173d AAA Opn Det	6	3 Sep 52
704th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	15	15 Mar 53
685th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Jan 53
356th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	15 Nov 54
357th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	15 Nov 54
272d FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	7	17 Jan 55
86th Army Band	11	30 Jun 54
272d Army Band	11	7 Nov 53
MICHIGAN		
387th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	6	6 Jan 55
107th Ord M Maint Co	3	27 Oct 54
1279th Engr Cbt Bn	3	3 Dec 54

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
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MICHIGAN

1437th Engr Treadway Br Co	1	18 Mar 55
979th FA Bn (155-mm Gun, SP)	14	4 Apr 55

MINNESOTA

47th Inf Div (in part)		
47th Inf Div Hq (in part)	13	2 Dec 54
47th Inf Div, Med Det, Div Hq	13	2 Dec 54
47th Inf Div Hq Co (in part)	13	2 Dec 54
47th MP Co	13	2 Dec 54
747th Ord Maint Co	13	2 Dec 54
47th QM Co	13	2 Dec 54
47th Sig Co	13	2 Dec 54
135th Inf	13	2 Dec 54
136th Inf	13	2 Dec 54
47th Div Arty Hq & Hq Btry	13	2 Dec 54
47th Div Arty Med Det (less one Bn Det)	13	2 Dec 54
125th FA Bn (105-mm How)	13	2 Dec 54
175th FA Bn (105-mm How)	13	2 Dec 54
151st FA Bn (155-mm How)	13	2 Dec 54
256th AAA AW Bn (SP)	13	2 Dec 54
194th Hvy Tank Bn	13	2 Dec 54
47th Recon Co	13	2 Dec 54
682d Engr Cbt Bn	13	2 Dec 54
204th Med Bn	13	2 Dec 54
47th Inf Div Band	13	2 Dec 54
216th AAA Gp Hq & Hq Btry	2	13 Jun 52
109th Trans Truck Bn Hq & Hq Det	7	18 Sep 54
114th Trans Truck Co	7	30 Jun 54
115th Trans Truck Co	7	3 Dec 54

MISSISSIPPI

31st Inf Div (in part)		
31st Inf Div Hq (in part)	13	30 Jun 54
155th Inf	13	30 Jun 54
31st Div Arty, Hq & Hq Btry (in part)	13	30 Jun 54
31st Div Arty, Med Det (less three Bn Dets)	13	30 Jun 54
932d FA Bn (105-mm How)	13	30 Jun 54
114th FA Bn (155-mm How)	13	30 Jun 54
198th Hvy Tank Bn	13	30 Jun 54
31st Recon co	13	30 Jun 54
106th Engr C Bn	13	30 Jun 54
106th Med Bn	13	30 Jun 54
115th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Jan 53

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
MISSISSIPPI		
101st Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	15 Nov 54
631st AFA Bn (155-mm How SP)	5	17 Dec 54
114th Engr Cbt Bn	7	17 Jan 55
138th Engr Pon Br Co (Rigid Boat)	1	01 Mar 52
139th Engr Tdwy Br Co	7	17 Jan 55
213th Med Bn Hq & Hq Det	7	21 Feb 55
932d Clr Co (Sep)	3	5 Dec 54
123d Med Coll Co (Sep)	3	3 Dec 54
854th Med Coll Co (Sep)	7	10 Jul 52
913th Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	3	3 Dec 54
MISSOURI		
1438th Engr Tdwy Br Co	3	3 Dec 54
923d Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	14	21 Feb 55
175th MP Bn	7	9 Feb 55
106th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Army)	3	26 May 55
NEBRASKA		
43d Army Band	11	10 Oct 54
NEW HAMPSHIRE		
197th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	2	13 Aug 52
358th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 54
NEW JERSEY		
112th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	5	17 Jan 55
150th Engr Pon Br Co, Rigid Boat	3	20 Oct 54
695th Armd FA Bn	5	17 Dec 54
30th Ord Bn, Hq & Hq Det	1	26 Nov 54
122d Ord M Maint Co	14	20 Dec 54
63d Army Band	11	20 Jun 54
NEW MEXICO		
181st AAA Opn Det	16	18 Mar 55
716th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 Aug 52
717th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	28 Feb 53
726th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 May 52
394th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	6	06 Jan 55
395th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	14	07 Mar 55
NEW YORK		
102d AAA Brig Hq & Hq Btry	1	13 Jul 52

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
NEW YORK		
102d AAA Opn Det	1	13 Jul 52
105th AAA Opn Det	6	03 Sep 52
209th AAA Gp Hq & Hq Btry	1	13 Aug 52
773d AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	30 Apr 53
369th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	7	10 Sep 52
715th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	2	13 Jun 52
336th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	17	14 Mar 53
245th AAA Gun Bn (120-mm)	2	13 Jul 52
259th AAA Gun Bn (120-mm)	14	22 Dec 52
102d AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	1	13 Jul 52
633d AAA AW Bn (Mbl)	17	14 Apr 53
367th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	11 Nov 54
368th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	13 Oct 53
369th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	18 Mar 55
421st Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	15 Nov 54
187th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	7	17 Jan 55
187th FA Obsn Bn	5	17 Dec 54
955th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	3	18 Mar 55
29th Ord Bn Hq & Hq Det	3	18 Nov 54
102d QM Gp Hq & Hq Det	7	24 Jan 55
148th Trans Truck Bn, Hq & Hq Det	5	03 Dec 54
701st QM Subs Sup Co	3	03 Dec 54
148th Trans Truck Co	3	21 Feb 55
289th QM Petrl Sup Co (Mbl)	3	03 Dec 54
101st Sig Bn (Sep)	3	23 Sep 54
89th Army Band	11	24 Feb 55
199th Army Band	11	15 Feb 55
133d Ord M Maint Co	7	20 Jan 55
132d Ord M Auto Maint Co	7	28 Jan 55
134th Ord M Auto Maint Co	7	28 Jan 55

NORTH CAROLINA

150th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Mar 53
382d Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 54
378th Engr Cbt Bn	1	21 Feb 55
449th FA Obsn Bn	7	17 Jan 55
690th FA Bn (155-mm How Trac-dr)	14	4 Apr 55
540th FA Bn (155-mm Gun, Trac-dr)	5	17 Dec 54

NORTH DAKOTA

47th Inf Div (in part)		
47th Inf Div Hq (in part)	13	2 Dec 54
47th Inf Div Hq Co (in part)	13	2 Dec 54

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
NORTH DAKOTA		
164th Inf	13	2 Dec 54
188th FA Bn (105-mm How)	13	2 Dec 54
47th Div Arty	13	2 Dec 54
231st Engr Cbt Bn	5	10 Oct 54
OHIO		
37th Inf Div		
37th Inf Div Hq	18	15 Jun 54
37th Inf Div, Med Det, Div Hq	18	15 Jun 54
37th Inf Div Hq Co	18	15 Jun 54
37th MP Co	18	15 Jun 54
737th Ord Maint Co	18	15 Jun 54
37th QM Co	18	15 Jun 54
37th Sig Co	18	15 Jun 54
145th Inf	18	15 Jun 54
147th Inf	18	15 Jun 54
148th Inf	18	15 Jun 54
37th Div Arty, Hq & Hq Btry	18	15 Jun 54
37th Div Arty, Med Det	18	15 Jun 54
134th FA Bn (105-mm How)	18	15 Jun 54
135th FA Bn (105-mm How)	18	15 Jun 54
140th FA Bn (105-mm How)	18	15 Jun 54
136th FA Bn (155-mm How)	18	15 Jun 54
137th AAA AW Bn (SP)	18	15 Jun 54
137th Hvy Tank Bn	18	15 Jun 54
37th Recon Co	18	15 Jun 54
112th Engr Cbt Bn	18	15 Jun 54
112th Med Bn	18	15 Jun 54
37th Inf Div Band	18	15 Jun 54
182nd AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Dec 52
1428th Engr Tdwy Br Co	7	28 Jan 55
987th Armd FA Bn (105-mm How)	2	27 Sep 54
151st Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	7	28 Jan 55
50th Ord Gp, Hq & Hq Det	7	10 Jun 54
37th Ord Bn, Hq & Hq Det	3	3 Dec 54
38th Ord Bn, Hq & Hq Det	3	3 Dec 54
357th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Army)	5	6 Jan 55
3641st Ord M Auto Maint Co	7	28 Jan 55
112th Ord M Maint Co	7	1 Dec 54
112th Trans Truck Bn, Hq & Hq Det	5	28 Jan 55
3582d Trans Truck Co	3	3 Dec 54
3583d Trans Truck Co	3	3 Dec 54
3584th Trans Truck Co	5	3 Dec 54
122d Army Band	12	24 Feb 55

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
OKLAHOMA		
45th Inf Div		
45th Inf Div Hq	4	30 Apr 54
45th Inf Div, Med Det, Div Hq	4	30 Apr 54
45th Inf Div, Hq Co	4	30 Apr 54
45th MP Co	4	30 Apr 54
700th Ord Maint Co	4	30 Apr 54
45th QM Co	4	30 Apr 54
45th Sig Co	4	30 Apr 54
179th Inf	4	30 Apr 54
180th Inf	4	30 Apr 54
279th Inf	4	30 Apr 54
45th Div Arty, Hq & Hq Btry	4	30 Apr 54
45th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	30 Apr 54
158th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	30 Apr 54
160th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	30 Apr 54
171st FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	30 Apr 54
189th FA Bn (155-mm How)	4	30 Apr 54
145th AAA AW Bn (SP)	4	30 Apr 54
245th Hvy Tank Bn	4	30 Apr 54
45th Recon Co	4	30 Apr 54
120th Engr Cbt Bn	4	30 Apr 54
120th Med Bn	4	30 Apr 54
45th Inf Div Band	4	30 Apr 55
143d Engr Treadway Br Co	7	17 Jan 55

PENNSYLVANIA

28th Inf Div		
28th Inf Div Hq	4	15 Jun 54
28th Inf Div, Med Det, Div Hq	4	15 Jun 54
28th Inf Div, Hq Co	4	15 Jun 54
28th MP Co	4	15 Jun 54
728th Ord Maint Co	4	15 Jun 54
28th QM Co	4	15 Jun 54
28th Sig Co	4	15 Jun 54
109th Inf	4	15 Jun 54
110th Inf	4	15 Jun 54
112th Inf	4	15 Jun 54
28th Div Arty, Hq & Hq Btry	4	15 Jun 54
28th Div Arty, Med Det	4	15 Jun 54
107th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	15 Jun 54
109th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	15 Jun 54
229th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	15 Jun 54
108th FA Bn (155-mm How)	4	15 Jun 54

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
PENNSYLVANIA		
899th AAA AW Bn (SP)	4	15 Jun 54
628th Hvy Tank Bn	4	15 Jun 54
28th Recon Co	4	15 Jun 54
103d Engr Cbt Bn	4	15 Jun 54
103d Med Bn	4	15 Jun 54
28th Inf Div Band	4	15 Jun 54
51st AAA Brig, Hq & Hq Btry	2	15 Jun 54
151st AAA Opn Det	2	28 Jul 52
213th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	28 May 52
337th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Dec 52
707th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	2	13 Jun 52
708th AAA Gun Bn (120-mm)	16	28 Feb 53
709th AAA Gun Bn (120-mm)	2	13 Aug 52
3622d Ord M Maint Co	7	10 Oct 54
3623d Ord M Maint Co	7	10 Mar 55
372d Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 54
393d Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	1	15 Nov 54
373d Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 54
68th Engr Cbt Gp, Hq & Hq Co	9	24 Feb 55
645th Engr Cbt Bn	7	17 Jan 55
190th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	7	15 Feb 55
176th Armd FA Bn (105-mm)	3	27 Sep 54
967th Armd FA Bn	16	18 Mar 55
200th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	14	07 Mar 55
235th FA Obsn Bn	7	20 Dec 54
32d QM Gp, Hq & Hq Det	7	28 Jan 55
154th Trans Truck Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	28 Jan 55
167th Trans Truck Bn, Hq & Hq Det	3	23 Jun 55
121st Trans Truck Co	3	21 Feb 55
131st Trans Truck Co	3	18 Sep 54
721st Trans Truck Co	3	3 Dec 54
722th Trans Truck Co	7	7 Jan 55
185th Sig Lt Const Bn	5	21 Sep 54
243d Army Band	11	20 May 54
276th Army Band	11	14 Mar 54
129th Sig Svc Co (Rad Int), Corps	7	15 Apr 55
130th Sig Svc Co (Rad Int), Corps	7	25 Jun 55
PUERTO RICO		
296th Regtl Combat Team		
296th Inf	8	19 Nov 54
482d FA Bn (105-mm How)	14	19 Nov 54
225th Engr Cbt Co	14	2 Dec 54

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
RHODE ISLAND		
43d Inf Div (in part)	4	15 Jun 54
43d Inf Div Hq (in part)	4	15 Jun 54
743d Ord Maint Co	4	15 Jun 54
43d QM Co	4	15 Jun 54
43d Sig Co	4	15 Jun 54
43d Div Arty, Hq & Hq Btry	4	15 Jun 54
43d Div Arty Med Det (less Three Bn Dets)	4	15 Jun 54
103d FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	4	15 Jun 54
169th AAA AW Bn (SP)	4	15 Jun 54
43d Recon Co	4	15 Jun 54
118th Engr Cbt Bn	4	15 Jun 54
705th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	2	13 Jul 52
359th Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 54
SOUTH CAROLINA		
228th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	7	13 Jul 52
713th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	1	13 Jun 52
383d Sig Radar Maint Unit, Type C	2	15 Nov 55
95th Army Band	11	24 Feb 55
SOUTH DAKOTA		
196th Regtl Combat Team		
196th Inf	4	10 Oct 54
147th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	10 Oct 54
200th Engr Cbt Co	4	10 Oct 54
109th Engr C Bn	5	17 Dec 54
TENNESSEE		
278th Regtl Combat Team		
278th Inf	4	8 Oct 54
191st FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	8 Oct 54
190th Engr Cbt Co	4	8 Oct 54
194th Engr Cbt Bn	3	20 Jan 55
2998th Engr Tdwy Br Co	3	20 Jan 54
196th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	3	18 Mar 55
933d Clr Co (Sep)	7	21 Feb 55
168th MP Bn	5	2 Jul 52
961st Ord M Maint Co	3	3 Dec 54
568th Ord Hvy Maint Co (Army)	1	14 Mar 55
129th Army Band	11	24 Feb 55
TEXAS		
95th Med Gp, Hq & Hq Det	7	21 Feb 55

ARMY NATIONAL GUARD UNITS FEDERALIZED FOR THE WAR

Unit Designation	Increment No.	Release Date
TEXAS		
211th Med Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	28 Mar 55
926 Mtr Amb Co (Sep)	7	9 Feb 55
95th Army Band	11	20 Feb 55
UTAH		
115th Engr C Gp Hq & Hq Co	3	5 Dec 54
115th Engr C Bn	16	1 Feb 56
213th Armd FA Bn (105-mm How)	3	28 Oct 54
204th FA Bn (155-mm Gun, Sp)	5	18 Mar 55
145th FA Bn (155-mm Gun, Trac-dr)	5	18 Mar 55
653d FA Obsn Bn	7	17 Jan 55
VERMONT		
43d Inf Div (in part)		
43d Inf Div Hq (in part)	4	15 Jun 54
173d Inf	4	15 Jun 54
43d Div Arty, Med Det (one Bn Det)	4	15 Jun 54
206th FA Bn (105-mm How)	4	15 Jun 54
VIRGINIA		
177th AAA Opn Det	17	18 Mar 55
224th AAA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	2	13 Aug 52
710th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	2	13 Apr 52
560th FA Bn (155-mm How, Trac-dr)	16	18 Mar 55
221st Army Band	11	14 Feb 54
WASHINGTON		
115th AAA Opn Det	1	13 Aug 52
420th AAA Gun Bn (90-mm)	16	31 Dec 52
770th AAA Gun Bn (120-mm)	2	13 Jul 52
66th FA Gp, Hq & Hq Btry	7	10 Jul 52
WEST VIRGINIA		
201st Armd FA Bn (155-mm How SP)	7	17 Jan 55
1092d Engr Cbt Bn	3	18 Mar 55
126th Trans Truck Bn, Hq & Hq Det	7	9 Feb 55
480th Trans Truck Co	7	9 Feb 55
254th Trans Truck Co	7	10 Mar 55
WYOMING		
141st Tank Bn	7	17 Jan 55
300th Armd FA Bn	3	27 Sep 54

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FOOTNOTES

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Renee Hylton became an Army brat when her father, a platoon leader in Illinois' 33d Infantry Division during WWII, was recalled to active duty during the Korean War. Capt. Hylton spent the last months of the war "dug in in downtown Tokyo," where his family later joined him.


Renee was raised in Tokyo; Ft. Hood, Texas; Bangkok, Thailand; and Baltimore, Md. She received degrees in history from the University of Arizona and from Princeton University, where she studied under the noted Civil War scholar James McPherson. She became a historian for the National Guard Bureau in 1986.

Ms. Hylton lives with her husband and daughter in Northern Virginia. Husband Francis Thomas, retired from the Louisiana National Guard, fought in WWII as a rifleman with the 29th Infantry Division. When the Korean War began, he was a newly-commissioned 2d Lieutenant in Louisiana's 227th Antiaircraft Artillery Brigade, and spent the next three years waiting for the summons to active duty which never came.


Daughter Maggie, a second-generation Army brat, was born in Seoul. Her first intelligible words were in the Korean language, *hanguk mal*.



Seoul in ruins, September 1950. (Inset) The author at Seoul's Changdok Palace (which miraculously escaped total destruction) in 1982, the first of two years she spent in South Korea.








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WHEN ARE WE GOING?

The Army National Guard and the Korean War, 1950-1953



BY
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