TURNING
THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD
AND THE KOREAN WAR

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POINT
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INTRODUCTION

The Air National Guard (ANG) was once considered to be a collection of state-sponsored, federally-funded flying clubs with questionable combat capabilities. But, during the Cold War, it became an increasingly-effective reserve component of the Air Force.

A combination of political expediency and military necessity drove that transformation which began during the Korean War. During that conflict, the Air Force and the Air Guard ceased arguing about command prerogatives. Instead, they established a pragmatic and flexible working relationship which integrated the Guard on a daily basis with the planning, budgeting, training, and operational activities of the active duty establishment. The Air Guard traded some of its historic autonomy for increased federal resources, and responsibilities. In the process, Air Guardsmen accepted professional military standards and values as the proper measure of their own performance while adapting their own distinctive militia culture and organization to the demanding requirements of air warfare in the second half of the twentieth century.

Although National Guard aviation pre-dated the American declaration of war against Imperial Germany in April 1917, the Air Guard was not established as a separate reserve component until September 1947. It was a product of the politics of interservice rivalry and postwar military planning during World War II, especially the competing drives to create a separate Air Force and preserve the National Guard’s federal mission as a combat reserve force. Wartime Army Air Forces (AAF) leaders like General Henry H. Arnold had been determined to achieve the long-time goal of Army airmen, a separate military service built around the largest possible standing force. They were convinced that future wars would be short and highly destructive affairs decided by the ability of long range strategic bombers to deliver massive firepower on an enemy's industrial heartland. The employment of atomic bombs against Japan in 1945 reinforced those convictions.

They were convinced that the National Guard and Reserves could not operate the complex modern weapons which air warfare demanded without extensive post-mobilization preparations. Further, they were determined to avoid the state politics, politicalcronyism, and military incompetence that professional Army officers associated with the National Guard. But General George C. Marshall, the Army’s wartime Chief of Staff, had a more realistic reading of the postwar political and military possibilities. He forced the AAF to redraw its plans to include a scaled-back active force with substantial reserve programs.

Meanwhile Guardsmen had become alarmed by the fact that the War Department had denigrated their wartime military service and frozen them out of postwar planning. Led by Major General Ellard A. Walsh of Minnesota, President of the National Guard Association of the United States (NGAUS), and Major General Milton A. Record, Maryland’s Adjutant General, they flexed their considerable political muscle in Washington, D.C. They compelled the military establishment to retain the National Guard as the Army’s primary combat reserve force and created the Air Guard to play the

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same role for a planned new military service, the United States Air Force. 1

By February 1950, the Air Guard included 72 fighter and 12 light bomber squadrons as well as numerous aircraft control and warning (AC&W) units and support organizations. The Guard’s inventory boasted 2,401 aircraft including 211 jet fighters. It provided nearly 70 percent of the Air Force’s total fighter strength in the continental United States. The Air Guard’s personnel strength stood at 44,728 including 3,600 pilots. Built from scratch after World War II, Air Guardsmen were justifiably proud of their organization.

But it was far from ready to play its intended combat role. In the dawn of the jet age, most of its fighters were obsolete propeller-driven F-47s and F-51s. Driven by low budgets as well as Air Force neglect, its training was grossly inadequate.

Regular Air Force officers could see no compelling military need for state-controlled Air Guard organizations whose missions were almost entirely national. They saw the immediate postwar period trying to seize control of the Air Guard and its meager budgets from the states. Those futile efforts created high levels of acrimony, distrust, and political controversy between the Air Force and the ANG.

Lieutenant General Ennis C. Whitehead had referred to the Air Guard in 1949 as “... aircraft in flyable storage.” 2 His attitude was common among senior Air Force officers. Whitehead led the Continental Air Command which, among its many responsibilities, inspected and supervised the peacetime training of ANG units. Privately, even some Air Guardsmen considered their units little better than glorified government-sponsored flying clubs. Some went public with their doubts. Idaho Air Guardsman Colonel Thomas G. Lanphier Jr., had compiled a distinguished combat record in the Pacific during World War II, including shooting down the aircraft carrying Japanese Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. In 1949, he publicly advocated federalizing the Air Guard and merging it with the Air Force Reserve. Lanphier stressed that the federal government had no way of standardizing and inspecting Air Guard training in each of the states. In his opinion, the states operated 48 different programs. The problems created by this lack of standardization were compounded by the duplication inherent in maintaining two separate reserve programs for the Air Force. Lanphier dismissed the argument that the Air Guard had a state mission with the caustic comment that “an air arm is about as useful to the governor of the sovereign state of Idaho as a bombsight to a freight train.”

Rejecting Air Guardsmen’s image of themselves as 20th century aerial minutenmen, the Air Force wanted to strip them of combat missions and convert their units to less demanding, lower status tasks like airlift, close air support of ground troops, and civil defense. Such missions implied greatly reduced levels of federal support for the Air Guard and the death knell of its aspirations to become a first line combat reserve force of the nation’s newest and most glamorous military service. 4
Eighty percent of the Air Guard was called-up for the Korean War, exposing its weaknesses as a reserve program.
Members of the Colorado Air Guard's 120th Fighter Squadron are mobilized on April 1, 1951 for federal service during the Korean War.
MOBILIZED

The Korean War began in June 1950. It proved a turning point for the U.S. military establishment, including the Air Guard. Over 45,000 Air Guardsmen, 80 percent of the force, were mobilized. That call-up exposed the weaknesses of all U.S. military reserve programs including the ANG.

Unprepared for a limited war in Asia and fearing a global conflict with the Soviet Union, the Air Force had to improvise its responses to the crisis. It needed trained or partially trained manpower as quickly as possible. First, it asked Reservists and Guardsmen to volunteer as individual fillers in active duty units. In July 1950 it began involuntary recalls of Reservists. The following month it started to mobilize Air Force Reserve (AFRES) flying units. Because its early jet fighters were incapable of operating from unimproved airfields in South Korea, the Air Force stripped the Air Guard of 145 of its 764 propeller-driven F-51Ds during the summer of 1950 and dispatched them to the Far East.

Once Congress and the President authorized a permanent expansion of the service in September 1950, the Air Force called upon the Air Guard. On October 10th, 15 Air Guard flying squadrons and numerous support units were mobilized. The Air Force saw that move as only temporary expedient; however, massive Chinese communist intervention in the war in late October destroyed that assumption. Korea was the Air Guard’s largest war. Eventually, 67 of its 84 flying squadrons, most of its aircraft control and warning units, along with many support organizations, were mobilized.

Before the Korean War, ANG units lacked specific wartime missions. Their equipment, especially aircraft, was obsolete. Their training was usually deplorable. Once mobilized, they proved to be almost totally unprepared for combat. Guard units were assigned almost at random to various major air commands regardless of their previous training and equipment. Many key Air Guardsmen were stripped away from their units and used as individual fillers elsewhere in the rapidly expanding Air Force. Although considered a necessity for the active force because of the national emergency created by the war, it was an anathema for the unit-oriented Air Guard which insisted that its organizations, which had trained as teams in peacetime, would be more effective if they served together in wartime.

It took three to six months for some ANG units to become combat ready. Some never did. Eventually, the mess was sorted out, but
not before the mobilization of all the U.S. reserve components had created a tremendous political uproar. Since Korea was a limited conflict unlike World War II, universal manpower mobilization was not needed. Unfortunately many World War II veterans, who had not received drill pay for serving in Guard and Reserve units after V-J Day, were called up for Korea before many draft-eligible youths or drill status Guardsmen and Reservists who had been receiving monetary compensation for their part-time military training. The difficulties encountered in mobilizing the Air Guard were part of the much larger problem of adapting to a fair and equitable manner a system, designed by the Department of Defense for total global war, to provide manpower for a limited war. 5

The Korean War experience of North Dakota’s fledgling Air Guard unit illustrated the impact of pre-war neglect. Although the 178th Fighter Squadron was not mobilized until April 1951, the Air Force had already stripped the unit of eight badly-needed F-51s late in the previous year. After a month at their home station, its officers and men were transferred to Moody AFB outside Valdosta, Georgia for assignment with the Strategic Air Command’s (SAC’s) 146th Fighter-Bomber Wing (FBW). Neither, the Air Force or the Air Guard were prepared for mobilization. According to one participant, it essentially was a case of “fall out in Fargo and fall in at Georgia.” 6

The 178th’s Commander, Major Robert M. Johnson, reported that “some difficulty was encountered in working into an entirely new wing organization and converting to the Strategic Air Command Fighter Wing structure.” 7

The unit remained in Georgia through mid-October undergoing intensive training. After SAC belatedly discovered that its F-51s could not serve as long range escorts for the command’s strategic bombers, the squadron accompanied the 146th to George AFB at Victorville, Calif., for reassignment to the Tactical Air Command (TAC). Subsequently, many of the 178th’s pilots and enlisted members were reassigned to other units throughout the Air Force.

By April 1952, very few North Dakota Air Guardsmen remained in the squadron. Some Guardsmen feared that the Air Force would not reconstitute the unit in their home state after it was demobilized. However, those fears were never realized. In December 1952, the Air Force released the 178th from federal service and returned it to North Dakota’s control. At that point, most of the state’s Air Guardsmen had completed their active service and returned home. 8

TURNING POINT
BAPTISM

Air Guardsmen flew 39,530 combat sorties and destroyed 39 enemy aircraft. However, the Korean War claimed 101 of its members.

UNDER FIRE
An airman with the Texas Air Guard's 11th Fighter-Bomber Squadron fuels an F-84 in Targu, Korea, during the war.
BAPTISM UNDER FIRE

Despite their poor initial readiness, Guard units and individuals contributed substantially to the air war in Korea. Air Guardsmen flew 39,530 combat sorties and destroyed 39 enemy aircraft. But, the Air Guard paid a high price in Korea as 101 of its members were either killed or declared missing in action during the conflict.

The Air Guard’s 136th and the 116th FBWs compiled excellent combat records. The 136th—composed of the 111th (Texas), 154th (Arkansas) and the 182nd (Texas) Fighter-Bomber Squadrons—flew its first combat mission in the Far East on May 24, 1951 in F-84E “Thunderjets.” While escorting B-29s near “Mig Alley,” 1st Lieutenant Arthur E. Olinger and Captain Harry Underwood of the 182nd shared credit for the Air Guard’s first jet kill. On June 26, 1951, they destroyed one of five Mig-15s that attacked their formation. The 116th arrived in Japan in late July 1951. Its fighter-bomber squadrons included the 158th (Georgia), 159th (Florida) and the 196th (California).

The experience of Florida’s 159th Fighter Squadron was typical of ANG units that saw combat during the Korean “police action.” The unit was mobilized in October 1950 and received brand new F-84s to replace its F-80s. Originally the squadron was slated to deploy to France to strengthen the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) against the threat of Soviet aggression. Rumors about a possible “European vacation” stimulated recruiting for the 159th. In June 1951, the squadron actually packed its gear and shipped its aircraft to Europe. At the last minute its orders were changed. Fears of a massive buildup of communist air power in the Far East prompted Lieutenant General O. P. Weyland, Commander of the Far East Air Forces, to strengthen Japan’s air defenses. The 159th was given some older F-84s and shipped out from the west coast on two Navy escort carriers, arriving in Japan in late July and early August.

The 159th was stationed at Misawa Air Base. With the rest of the 116th FBW, it was made responsible for the air defense of northern Japan—a role that its F-84s were poorly suited to. The squadron pulled air defense alert for a week at a time. When it was not on alert or training for its air de-
A crew works on a Florida Air Guard F-84 (left) in Korea. Members of the state's 159th Fighter Squadron flew combat missions during the war.

The 159th initially deployed there on November 28th and began flying interdiction missions that same day against rail lines near Woonsan in North Korea. Each F-84 flew with a mix of 500 and 1,000-pound conventional bombs. The squadron's pilots were very aggressive, flying as low as possible in poor weather to attack hard-to-find targets. In addition to railroads, the 159th also began attacking enemy infantry and artillery positions in December.

The squadron resumed its air defense alert duties when it returned to Japan the following month. It continued to lose pilots and other experienced personnel to Air Force units, a process that had begun when it was mobilized. They were eventually replaced by less-experienced newcomers. On May 28-29, 1952 the 159th and the other fighter squadrons assigned to the 116th FBW participated in an historic experiment. As part of Operation "High Tide," they performed some of the Air Force's earliest air refuelings under combat conditions. The 159th's role in the operation was to attack targets near Sariwon, North Korea. They were refueled near Taegu on the return flight to Japan by KB-29 tankers. Various problems forced several fighters to land at Taegu. Between June 7th and July 4th, the squadron flew additional air refueled missions against North Korean targets. But the test was not considered successful. It involved a long and difficult hookup between a tanker hose and two wing tip refueling points on each fighter. Poor
BAPTISM UNDER FIRE

weather and the glutinous appetite of the F-84s for jet fuel produced marginal air refueling results. 12

In July 1952, the 159th was demobilized. By that time, many of its original members had either returned home or were on the way there. The war was over for Florida’s Air Guardsmen. 13

During the Korean War, as in previous conflicts, Air Guardsmen made some of their most dramatic contributions as individuals. They demonstrated their combat skills with four Air Guardsmen achieving the status of aces. Capts. Robert J. Love and Clifford D. Jolley of the 196th transferred to the USAF’s 4th Interceptor Wing. While flying F-86 “Sabrejets,” they became the Air Guard’s first jet aces. Love destroyed six enemy aircraft while Jolley downed seven. 14

Major James P. Hagerstrom became an ace in two different wars. During World War II, he volunteered for duty in the AAF, flew 170 combat missions, and was credited with destroying six enemy aircraft. After the conflict ended, he left active duty and joined the 111th Fighter-Bomber Squadron of the Texas Air Guard. In October 1950, Hagerstrom was recalled duty with the 111th which was equipped with F-51s. Subsequently, he transferred to an active duty Air Force squadron. Flying F-86 Sabrejets in the skies over North Korea, Hagerstrom was credited with 8.5 kills. 15

Captain Robinson Risner was destined to leave his mark on the Air Force. He had joined the AAF during World War II and served in obscurity as a fighter pilot in Panama. Following the war, Risner left the service, went into business in Tulsa, Okla., and married. Because he was determined to remain involved with aviation, Risner joined the Oklahoma Air National Guard and began flying F-51s in its 185th Fighter Squadron. His squadron was mobilized for the Korean War and transitioned to the F-80, the Air Force’s first operational jet fighter. When

Texas Air Guard Maj. James Hagerstrom, 8.5 kills.

Utah Air Guard Capt. Clifford Jolley, 7 kills.
it became clear that the 185th was not going to the Far East, Risner arranged a series of voluntary transfers that ultimately landed him in the Air Force’s 4th Fighter Wing in Korea. After learning to fly the F-86, he was credited with destroying eight enemy aircraft.

Risner completed 108 combat missions and returned to the United States. Like some other Air Guard pilots who served during Korean War, he decided to remain on active duty with the Air Force. His career progressed and, as a lieutenant colonel, Risner was given command of the 67th Tactical Fighter Squadron based at Korat, Thailand. While flying against a heavily-defended target in North Vietnam, his F-105 was shot down in 1965. Risner was captured and imprisoned in the infamous “Hanoi Hilton.” Despite torture, filth, and isolation, Risner took charge and played a key role in creating a disciplined military organization among his fellow American prisoners of war. He was released from his horrible ordeal following the B-52 “Christmas” bombing offensive in 1972. He returned to the cockpit and quickly mastered the F-4. Risner was then give command of an F-111 wing and promoted to brigadier general before his last assignment at the Air Force’s Fighter Weapons School. Risner’s captivity in Hanoi epitomized the courage, professionalism, and patriotism of Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy pilots during the Vietnam War.

To the surprise of the Air Force, experience and maturity, not youth, had proved essential to the combat effectiveness of fighter pilots in Korea. World War II combat veterans scored a disproportionate number of aerial victories. Brigadier General Paul E. Hoover, who later served as Ohio’s Assistant Adjutant General for Air, reflected on his own combat experience in Korea. He had been there as an Air Guardsman assigned to the Air Force’s 49th Fighter-Bomber Squadron.
BAPTISM UNDER FIRE

Hoover stressed that “When we first got to Korea, we had a lot of youngsters, Air Force types that had been put through [pilot] training rather rapidly and they were losing quite a few. Then, as the Reservists and the Air Guard got there, the average age climbed quite a bit ... our loss rate decreased rapidly. We didn’t make silly mistakes like making three or four passes on the same target and we plotted our entries into target areas more efficiently than we did in the early days. They were young and not aware of what could happen. Many of us that got over there came from that World War II experience and we applied some of that experience in Korea. It reduced our losses considerably.” 17 The main burden of fighting the war fell heavily on citizen-airscrews. A Fifth Air Force survey in 1951 found that approximately 80 percent of its personnel were recalled Air Guardsmen and Air Force Reservists. 18

Major General Stanley F.H. Newman of Oklahoma’s 185th Fighter Squadron exemplified the importance of combat experience and the tendency of the Air Force to draw upon mobilized Air Guard units to provide a pool of individual replacement pilots for service in the Far East. During WWII, Newman had downed one German aircraft while flying 57 combat missions over Europe. After the war, he joined the Oklahoma Air Guard. His unit was mobilized in April 1951 and remained in the continental United States transitioning first to RF-51Ds and then to RF-80As. By February 1952, most of the 185th’s pilots, including Newman, had been transferred to the Far East. Due to “their experience the Air Guardsmen were usually assigned to command or supervisory slots once they arrived in the battle zone ... Almost half of the 185th’s pilots found themselves assigned to the Fifth Air Force and stationed at Kimpo (K-14) Air Base near Seoul. Here they were once again assigned RF-51Ds.” 19 Later, those pilots transitioned to RF-80As and F-80Cs. 20

Newman reported to the 45th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing at Kimpo in March 1952. The greatest drawback that he and other reconnaissance pilots faced during their combat missions was that they could only fire their weapons in self defense. That restriction made them especially eager to fly strike missions on the rare occasions when such opportunities presented themselves. Newman once “... received word that another reconnaissance pilot had spotted a group of communist tanks but was running too low on fuel and had to return to home base. Hurriedly briefed by intelligence and

his tour in Korea ended. During the war, his Guard unit had remained in federal service, minus many of its original pilots and support personnel, at Shaw AFB, S.C., until it was demobilized on December 31, 1952.

After their Korean War service ended, less than 25 percent of the 185th's original pilots returned to the Air Guard. The remainder stayed on active duty and completed their military careers with the Air Force. 23

Many Air Guard pilots, assigned to Korea as individual replacements, flew highly dangerous ground support missions. Some never made it back to base.

Unlike many others, 1st Lt. Orval Tandy lived to recount his harrowing experience. He was one of nine flyers from Oregon's 142nd Fighter Group who were sent to Korea as individual replacements after their unit was mobilized in March 1951. Tandy's Air Force unit in Korea focused on attacking enemy railroads, supply lines, and troop convoys.

On September 5, 1951, during his 57th mission, Tandy was shot down while strafing a train near the Yalu River. He spent the next two years in Chinese prison camps in North Korea. It was a terrible ordeal for Tandy and other prisoners of war. Medical care was non-existent. His only clothing during the entire period was the summer flight suit, under-shorts and boots that he was wearing when shot down. His food usually consisted of one cup of soupy rice in the morning and another in the evening. When Tandy was finally released exactly two years to the day after he was captured, he weighed just 128 pounds. And this was after the communists had fattened-up Tandy and other POWs before releasing them. He had tipped the scales at 170 pounds when he was shot down. Like some other recalled Air Guard pilots, Tandy made the Air Force his career following the war. 24

quickly airborne, Newman located the tanks parked in a valley along with anti-aircraft guns on the valley floor and in the surrounding hills." 21 It was an extremely dangerous situation because "The hillside weapons were able to spread a network of tracer fire across the valley. Nevertheless, Newman led two flights of fighter-bombers on their runs and marked the targets with his machine guns. After the fighters completed their work, Newman recorded the destruction with his reconnaissance camera." 22

Newman flew 100 combat missions over Korea. He enjoyed a long and distinguished career with the Oklahoma Air Guard after
CONTAINING

The Air Guard played an integral role in strengthening NATO defenses in Europe, and trying to prevent another world war.

THE CONFLICT
CONTAINING THE CONFLICT

After Chinese communist forces intervened in the Korean War, the Truman administration sought to contain the fighting and prevent the conflict from escalating into another world war.

It was especially concerned that Soviet dictator Joseph Stalin would launch an attack on Western Europe while the United States was preoccupied militarily in Asia. To counter the larger threat to American national security in Europe, it accelerated plans to build up the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s (NATO’s) conventional military strength by sending additional American air and ground forces to the continent. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was called out of retirement in January 1951 and returned to the continent as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. Mobilized Air Guard units played an integral role in the NATO buildup. More Air Guard units went to Europe than to Korea.

For example, Illinois’ 126th Bombardment Wing (Light) and its assigned support units were mobilized in January 1951. Its flying squadrons included Illinois 108th and 168th plus Missouri’s 180th. After three months of reorganization and training at their home stations, those units and their B-26 bombers were transferred to Largely AFB, Virginia for additional preparations. On October 30, 1950, the first echelon of B-26s departed from Virginia for Merignac Air Base, France. Because of the urgency of the deployment, special long-range bombbay fuel tanks that had been received at Langley were not installed before the aircraft departed. Since most of the aircrews had not flown the Atlantic, each six-ship formation of B-26s was accompanied by a Navy R-4D
navigation aircraft. Poor weather conditions including freezing rain, low visibility, and sub-zero temperatures forced the aircraft to fly at very low altitudes over the ocean. The absence of cockpit heating and de-icing equipment made the crossing even more dangerous. Nevertheless, all of the wing’s 48 B-26s and 2 C-47s safely island-hopped to France with their Navy escorts before the end of November.

The main body of unit personnel and equipment were moved by sea, arriving at Mérignac on December 7, 1951. Overcoming primitive facilities, poor logistical support of their aging B-26s, and an unfriendly local population, they provided air support to NATO ground troops in a series of exercises across Western Europe and England. Beginning in April 1952, selected aircrews from the 126th and other U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) wings were sent to Korea for 60-day combat tours under a training initiative known as Project 7019. In May 1952, the 126th moved to another French air base at Laon. On January 1, 1953, the unit’s designation was returned to the state of Illinois. Air Guardsmen who had not signed extended active duty agreements with the Air Force returned home over the first three months of the year.

Air Guard fighter units assigned to NATO during the Korean War were re-equipped with jets before deploying overseas. Although most received F-84s, Washington’s 116th Fighter Squadron was equipped with top-of-the-line F-86As after it was called into federal service in February 1951. Mobilized with 20 other Air Guard fighter units to strengthen Air Defense Command’s (ADC’s) interceptor force, the squadron traded in its F-84s for “Sabrejets” that spring. Originally it was slated to help defend valuable targets in the Pacific Northwest including the Boeing aircraft factory at Seattle and SAC’s assets at Fairchild AFB as well as the
CONTAINING THE CONFLICT


However, the 116th was notified in June that it was to be sent to the United Kingdom to strengthen that island nation's air defenses against the Soviets. In August, the unit's 25 fighter aircraft flew in stages from Washington state to their new base at Shepards Grove, England. The unit was neither trained nor equipped for air refueling which was still in its infancy. Consequently, the deployment took 14 days.

The 116th was the first Sabrejet unit to deploy to Europe. It served under the operational control of the Royal Air Force. Once bedded down in England, it focused on high altitude intercept training and exercises. While in the United Kingdom, the unit also sent several volunteers for combat duty in Korea. On October 31, 1952, the unit was relieved from active duty following its completion of the 21 months of service authorized by federal law. At the point, only a handful of Guardsmen actually remained in the squadron because its personnel had been returning to the United States since April 1952 under an early release plan. They had been replaced by Air Force personnel. The unit's supplies and equipment, including its aircraft, were transferred to the Air Force's 78th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Shepards Grove. 27 During its federal service, "...the 116th accomplished 12,282:15 hours of flying time. This time was accomplished in T-33, F-84, and F-86 type aircraft without a major accident. No pilots or aircraft were lost during this time, and only three minor accidents were sustained." 28

South Carolina's 157th Fighter Squadron had a difficult active duty experience during the war because of the uncertainties of changing Air Force requirements. After being called to active duty in October 1950, it was sent to Lawson AFB, Georgia and traded in its F-51s for reconnaissance versions of the Mustang. Joined by mobilized Air Guardsmen from Alabama's 160th Fighter squadron and Ohio's 112th Fighter Bomber Squadron, the South Carolinians were consolidated into the 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing. South Carolina and Alabama Guardsmen trained for day reconnaissance while their Ohio counterparts prepared for night operations. In the summer of 1950, the 157th received the RF-80 Shooting Star and began intensive preparations for a planned deployment to France. But, "haggling over unit assignments and organizational
structure delayed deployment of the new 117th Tactical Reconnaissance Wing to a point where its Guard members had less than 12 months to serve of their 21-month callup; with less than a year to serve, the Guardsmen could not be sent overseas under Air Force regulations. 29

Under pressure to send trained units to NATO as quickly as possible, the wing commander urged Air Guard officers to sign indefinite career reserve statements so that they could be sent overseas. Many signed the statements under the impression that they were mere formalities that would allow them to go to France for 12 months before they were released from active duty. Some refused to sign the statements. Those who signed were deployed to Europe in January 1952 along with support personnel. They crossed the Atlantic in their RF-80Cs without incident. South Carolina Air Guardsmen who did not deploy overseas were released from active duty on schedule in July 1952. But, the Air Force refused to release those who had signed indefinite career reserve agreements as the end of their 12 months on the continent approached. The disgruntled South Carolinians then hired an attorney in Washington, DC who persuaded the Air Force to release them in March 1953, approximately 14 months after they had gone overseas. 30

For some Air Guardsmen from other states, signing indefinite career reserve agreements did not prove to be a major barrier to returning to civilian life. Once they were mobilized in October 1950, Oklahoma’s 125th, Kansas’s 127th, and Georgia’s 128th Fighter-Bomber Squadrons were organized into the 137th Fighter Bomber Wing. Some members of the wing were eventually persuaded to sign indefinite career reserve agreements which made them eligible for overseas service. The unit was supplemented by regular Air Force personnel and equipped with the F-84G, the most advanced model of the Thunderchief, an aircraft capable of in-flight refueling and delivering tactical nuclear weapons. The reorganized wing deployed to France in May 1952. Two months later, its Guard squadrons returned home and returned to state control after training new Air Force fighter pilots how to fly F-84Gs. The Guard left their aircraft on the continent. 31
Ground crews with the Air Guard's 127th Pilot Training Wing maintain F-84 Thunderjets at Luke AFB, Arizona in March 1951.

GLOBAL AIR POWER
While many Air Guardsmen deployed to Korea, most remained on duty in the U.S. where they braced for a possible confrontation with the Soviet Union.
GLOBAL AIR POWER

The majority of Air Guard flying units mobilized during the Korean War were not deployed to either the Far East or Europe during the conflict. Although many of their pilots were transferred to combat assignments in the Far East and other key personnel were sent to active duty organizations, their units remained on duty in the continental United States where they helped to expand the Air Force for the expected global confrontation with the Soviet Union.

For example the 127th Pilot Training Wing, consisting of Arizona’s 197th as well as Michigan’s 107th and 171st fighter squadrons, trained pilots in F-84s at Luke AFB, Ariz., for Air Training Command. Other Air Guard units augmented TAC, SAC and Air Defense Command at bases in the states.

The major air commands were not impressed with the Air Guard units assigned to them, at least not at first. According to ADC, those units “didn’t immediately assume an air defense capability commensurate with that of regular Air Force squadrons.” General Whitehead, ADC’s Commander, was even blunter. He commented that “We have found that most of the Air Guard units are not in a position to do what is expected, and the units above the squadron level [i.e., wing headquarters] are not capable of doing their jobs.”

Altogether, 15 Air Guard flying squadrons remained with ADC after they were mobilized. Some of the Guard’s air defense units were hampered by the loss of their experienced pilots to overseas commands and the retention of older and less capable fighter aircraft. For instance, Connecticut’s 118th Fighter Squadron was called into federal service in February 1951 and redesignated a fighter-interceptor unit. Virtually all of the unit’s aircrews and support personnel with World War II experience were reassigned to combat units overseas. Retaining its obsolete F-47 Thunderbolts, the unit was moved to Suffolk County Airport on Long Island, N.Y., to help defend the eastern United States. On Dec. 1, 1952, the squadron was returned to state control.

However, other mobilized Air Guard units including Delaware’s 142nd Fighter Squadron and the District of Columbia’s 121st Fighter Squadron were equipped with modern jet aircraft better suited to their air defense missions. The 142nd and the 121st were first transitioned to F-84Cs and then to F-94Bs before being returned to state service.

Personnel from Colorado’s 120th Fighter Squadron had an unusual active duty tour after they were mobilized in April 1951. They remained at their home station until the following December when they and their

F-51D aircraft were transferred to Clovis AFB, New Mexico. Organized under the 140th Fighter-Bomber Wing, the 120th was joined there by Wyoming’s 187th Fighter Squadron and Utah’s 191st Fighter Squadron. Clovis had been a temporary bomber base during WWII and had been closed in 1948. In addition to their normal training activities, the mobilized Air Guardsmen were forced to play a leading role in rehabilitating the installation. Major General Joe C. Moffett, a Colorado Air Guardsman who commanded the 140th during the Korean War, recalled that they “had to clean all of the sheep manure out of the officers’ club and other buildings before we could use them. They had pot belly stoves in every doggone building. We had a lot of these kids from Denver who had never seen a pot belly stove. The first thing they wanted to do was to find out where the thermostat was. The stoves would get too hot and the first thing you know is you’d have a burning building.”

Moffett stressed that “... we had to redo all the runways, and completely rehabilitate the place. It was a great experience ... None of the 140th went to Korea as a unit, but many of its individuals went as replacements. I know an awful lot of the pilots went to Korea. For all intents and purpose, the mission of the 140th Fighter [Bomber] Wing during the Korean Crisis could have better been described as the 140th CTU [i.e., Combat Training Unit].”

While at Clovis AFB, the 140th primarily trained recalled Air Force Reservists as fighter pilots in F-51s. In addition to fighter transition training, about 400 members of the wing served as guinea pigs for an atomic bomb test at Yucca Flats, Nev., in April 1952 known as “Tumbler Snapper Shot Number III.” The wing and its units were demobilized on December 31, 1952.

South Dakota's 175th Fighter Squadron was mobilized at Sioux Falls in March 1951. When a flood hit their home station, the unit was transferred to Ellsworth AFB at Rapid City, South Dakota to provide “spot defense” with its aging F-51Ds for a B-36 unit at that installation. Years later Brigadier General Justin L. Berger recalled that “We worked with the bomber people. They had tail gunners that needed runs and practice shooting at fighters ... [Joe] Foss brought back from the Pacific the overhead pass ... where depending on the type airplane you are in you would be a couple thousand feet above it and out in front of him a mile and see him coming and so you would come up and have a complete vertical pass on him.”

According to Berger, the Air Guardsmen enjoyed a great deal of success against the giant B-36s. He stressed that “They would never see us. We had a lot of fun with those guys. Finally, they realized that they had to move gunners in the back and then we would have some kind of tail pursuit and we would come in and let the guy get it and break off and come back in.”

Maintaining unit integrity after mobilization became a big issue for members of the 175th. Their commander, World War II Marine Corps ace and Medal of Honor re-
GLOBAL AIR POWER

cipient, Colonel [Brigadier General] Joe Foss, was reassigned as the operations officer of an air defense sector at Kansas City, Missouri which was responsible for fighter squadrons in 20 states. But the 175th for the most part successfully resisted Air Force efforts to reassign most of its experienced pilots to Korea. However, several of its more senior officers were transferred to other Air Force billets in the continental United States. The squadron was returned to state service on Dec. 1, 1952. 44

Air Guard units assigned to SAC had an especially difficult time adjusting to active duty. Fighter units comprised four of the six ANG wings gained by the command in 1951. After briefly experimenting with the 108th, 131st, 132nd and 146th Fighter Bomber Wings as escorts for SAC’s bombers, they were reassigned to TAC. The 106th and 111th Light Bomb Wings remained with SAC until they were returned to state control. Neither organization was prepared to switch from flying B-26s to B-29s or RB-29s which they eventually obtained. The 111th flew RB-36s before it was mobilized. The experience levels of their personnel were poorly matched with SAC’s demanding strategic bombing and reconnaissance missions. Training in those units was extremely slow. Shortages of aircraft, spare parts, and supplies as well as excessive personnel turnover exacerbated their problems.

Unit cohesion and the distinctive Air Guard character of those organizations were destroyed. These circumstances lowered morale and delayed readiness. Many Guardsmen were either reassigned to other units or subjected to administrative action, including release from active duty, to deal with morale and associated problems. Neither wing was rated fully combat-ready prior to returning to state control. 45

Instability of aircraft and assignments plagued many mobilized Air Guard units during the Korean War. The former was especially true of California’s 115th Bomb Squadron (Light). Called to duty in April 1951, unit personnel and their B-26 aircraft were sent to Langley AFB, Va., that May as part of the 47th Bombardment Group. The following September the unit was outfitted with B-45A jets, the Air Force’s first atomic-capable light bombers. However, five months later the unit was stripped of its B-45As while still undergoing transition training and relieved of its assignment to the 47th Bombardment Group. It was reassigned as a combat crew training squadron for B-26 instructors. The unit stayed in that assignment until it returned to state control on Jan. 1, 1953. 46

Although flying squadrons garnered the lion’s share of attention during the Korean War, almost all of the Air Guard’s Air Control and Warning (AC&W) units were called into federal service during that conflict. On the eve of the war, it had boasted 48 AC&W squadrons plus 12 radar calibration detachments - all of them organized in 12 groups. Their wartime mission was to strengthen the nation’s air defenses. During the Korean conflict, 11 AC&W groups, 45 AC&W squadrons, and 12 radar calibration units were recalled to active duty. Nearly 11,000 of the approximately 45,000 Air Guardsmen mobilized during the war were from those units. 47

As elsewhere in the Guard, many individual AC&W personnel were transferred to Air Force units. For example, Alabama’s 115th AC&W Squadron was ordered to active duty in December 1951 with 13 officers and 133 enlisted men. By the time that it was returned to state control in November 1953, the unit consisted of only one officer and one airman. It was never actually assigned an operational site during its active
A Michigan Air Guard pilot and crew chief with the 107th Fighter Squadron talk prior to a training flight at Wayne Major Airport, Mich., in January 1951.

AC&W squadrons, the 101st, 102nd, and 104th. In November, members of the 103rd participated in a combined training exercise with Army and Air Force units designed to defend Cape Cod from a mock invasion. The squadron’s mission during that exercise was to provide close control of Air Force fighters and bombers attacking enemy ground positions along the front lines of the battle area.

In January 1952, the 103rd moved to Fort Drum, N.Y., to participate in winter maneuvers with air and ground units. Working in canvas “Quonset Hut” type operations shelters with temperatures as low as 40 degrees below zero took some getting used to, but unit members made the necessary adjustments. The squadron returned to Camp Edwards in February and manned a new radar site. Many members of the 103rd were transferred to a new Air Force AC&W squadron that was organized in May. That fall, they were transferred to Iceland where they set up a radar installation at Keflavik.

Back at Camp Edwards, the 103rd had begun operating a CPS-1 search radar. Some of the remaining original squadron Guardsmen were transferred to other units around the U.S. and overseas. From January through June 1953, some squadron personnel were released from active duty and returned to the Connecticut Air Guard. On Sept. 1, 1953, the 103rd was returned to state control.

Elsewhere, some Air Guard AC&W units were formally converted to tactical control groups to help direct Air Force fighters against enemy ground forces. All of the units from the Air Guard’s AC&W community were mobilized in 1951. They were returned to state service before the end of 1953.48

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duty tour. Instead, the 115th’s personnel had been scattered across the Air Force as individual replacements.

Some of the mobilized Air Guard AC&W organizations managed to maintain a degree of unit integrity. Several were dispatched to Europe to strengthen NATO. Others were sent to Alaska and Newfoundland. At least four were deployed to French Morocco to help defend new air bases that were built in North Africa for SAC bombers.

The experience of Connecticut’s 103rd AC&W Squadron was typical for that type of Air Guard unit during the war. It was mobilized on Sept. 1, 1951 and then moved to Camp Edwards on Cape Cod, Mass., later that month to set up a base of operations. Korea was the first real taste of extended full-time military service for almost all of its members. They constructed an operational AC&W site in October. The unit was assigned to the 151st Tactical Control Group which consisted of a radar calibration flight plus three other New England Air Guard
REVAMPING THE

The Korean War mobilization fiasco forced the Air Force to reach an accommodation with the Air Guard and overhaul its reserve system. Congress played a key role.

RESERVES
A New York Air Guard pilot with the 138th Fighter Squadron flies his F-51 during a training mission in the early 1950s.
REVAMPPING THE RESERVES

The initial Korean War mobilization fiasco forced the Air Force to reach an accommodation with the Air Guard and to thoroughly revamp its entire reserve system. 49

Then, as now, Congress played a key role in placing reserve programs on a sound footing. Capitol Hill was more willing than either the Department of Defense or the military services to fund the reserves properly and reform the policies that governed them. The Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1951, passed in June 1951, required that each man inducted into the armed forces serve 24 months of active duty and transfer to the reserve components for six years upon discharge from active duty. Those who volunteered and were accepted into the reserve components could be released from active duty before they completed their 24 months of service.

The Armed Forces Reserve Act of 1952, the so-called “Magna Carta” of the reserve components, was enacted in July 1952. It was designed to rejuvenate the reserve programs of the armed forces. Each of them was required to maintain three categories of reserves -- ready, standby, and retired -- with each subject to different degrees of recall to active duty. For example, all Air Guardsmen were members of the ready reserve which could be involuntarily recalled for 24 months during a war or national emergency. The legislation gave all servicemen -- volunteers or draftees -- an obligation to serve in the ready reserve if they had less than four years of active duty. 50

A little noticed provision of the 1952 legislation proved to be an essential component of the Air Guard’s future success. While requiring National Guardsmen to mobilize in units during national emergencies, the act permitted individual Guardsmen and Reservists to volunteer for active service. Subsequently, “volunteerism” was employed to integrate small numbers of ANG members into active duty Air Force peacetime missions like airlift and the air defense runway alert program for relatively short periods of time. In larger contingencies, it provided a “silent call-up” option that enabled the Air Force to draw upon the Air Guard’s resources without requiring that Congress or the President employ their formal mobilization authority in situations that could be
National Guard Bureau Chief Maj. Gen. Winston Wilson visits the Idaho Air Guard's 190th Fighter Interceptor Squadron. He insisted that Air Guard units meet active-duty training standards.

Politically or diplomatically difficult. 51

Following the Korean War, Congress remained concerned about continuing weaknesses in reserve programs. In 1955, it enacted two key pieces of legislation to address such problems. The 1955 Amendments to the Universal Training and Service Act extended the draft until July 1, 1959. Next, it passed the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 which increased the size of the Ready Reserve from 1.5 million to 2.9 million men; authorized the President to mobilize up to 1 million ready reservists in a declared national emergency; reduced the total military service obligation from 8 to 6 years; required all those who entered the armed forces after Aug. 9, 1955 to participate in reserve training following completion of their active service, and authorized specific sanctions for those who failed to do so; allowed direct enlistments in the reserve components for non-prior service youths; and established a system of continuous screening for members of the ready reserve to ensure they were available for active duty.

The act failed to include provisions authorizing universal military training, mandatory basic training for all National Guard recruits, or authority to induct men into the reserves through the draft if sufficient numbers could not be obtained voluntarily. Although concerned by those omissions, President Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the bill into law in August 1955 after vigorous lobbying by Secretary of Defense Charles E. Wilson. While the Reserve Forces Act of 1955 had little direct impact on the ANG, it reflected a continuing high level of concern in Washington about the strength of reserve programs. Sensitive to that political climate and the desire of the Eisenhower administration to cut military spending, the Air Force continued to strengthen the Air Guard and the Air Force Reserve. 52

With volunteerism as an example, the ANG helped pioneer new approaches to reserve training and management within the Air Force during the 1950s and 1960s. Blessed with innovative leaders like Major Generals Earl T. Ricks and Winston P. "Wimpy" Wilson plus a strong political base, the Guard traded some of its autonomy as a state-federal force for closer integration with the active duty Air Force.

After World War II, Ricks and Wilson had left active duty with the AAF and rejoined the Arkansas National Guard. Both were
REVAMPPING THE RESERVES

brought to Washington by the Air Force to clean up the mess in the Air Guard revealed by the Korean War. Wilson had expected to serve in the National Guard Bureau (NGB) for 21 months. Instead, he remained for 21 years. Wimpy was appointed acting chief of the Air Force Division of the NGB in July 1953 after Ricks became ill with cancer. In January 1954, he was assigned as chief of the division and promoted to brigadier general. Wilson served in that position until August 1962. He then became the first Air Guardsmen to be assigned as Chief of the NGB on a non-acting basis. He held the latter position from August 1963 until August 1971.

Wilson and Ricks recognized that the Air Guard faced a dim future unless it became a thoroughly professional force. For them, that meant that the ANG had to acquire definite wartime missions. It also had to be integrated into Air Force planning, budgeting, exercises, and operational missions on a regular basis. To increase flight safety, the NGB persuaded the Defense Department to authorize 36 annual flight training periods for its aircrews after the Korean War. Since the Air Force could not accommodate all of its growing training needs, the ANG established its own permanent field training sites. Applying an innovation pioneered in Texas and Arkansas before the Korean War, ANG unit training assemblies were concentrated on one weekend per month instead of being held each week. The Air Guard also added more full-time technicians. These reforms were initiated to strengthen the Air Guard to the point where its units could be ready for combat the moment they were called into federal service.

Wilson fought hard to acquire modern aircraft and facilities. To accommodate high performance jet aircraft, the ANG launched a major program to lengthen runways and construct other facilities at the municipal airports that hosted its units during 1954. At installations which could not adapt to jet fighter operations, the Air Guard began forming air resupply and air transport squadrons starting in 1955. Initially, they were equipped with C-46s. By the decade’s end, the C-97 had begun to enter the Guard’s inventory. Above all, Wilson was determined to ensure that the Air Guard met the same tough professional training standards as the active force. 53 “Wimpy” was able to sell these concepts to the ANG, the Air Force, Congress and the states. Under his leadership, the ANG was transformed from a flying club into a valued and professional re-
nuclear-armed strategic air power under the latter’s “New Look” defense strategy, the Air Force was more receptive to the needs and policy initiatives of its reserve components during the 1950s than it had been in the late 1940s.

In 1951, the Air Force established specific mobilization requirements for the Air Guard in its war plans for the first time. The ANG would train against those requirements. Major General George G. Finch, CONAC’s Deputy for Air National Guard Matters and a Georgia Air Guardsman, proposed the air defense runway alert program as a way to combine realistic training and support of a significant combat mission in peacetime. Beginning on an experimental basis in 1953, Finch’s proposal involved two units -- the 138th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Syracuse, New York and the 194th Fighter Interceptor Squadron at Hayward, California -- standing alert from an hour before sunrise to an hour after sunset. The alert force was manned by five pilots at each location who signed on for voluntary tours of active duty for the duration of the test. During the test, none of the other pilots in their squadrons obtained any training from the program. Initially, the experiment was slated to last 120-days but then was extended to 169-days. Each site maintained two F-51s on five-minute alert.

Working with SAC and ADC radar sites, the Air Guardsmen conducted periodic scrambles to test the concept. Despite Air Staff doubts and initial resistance, the experiment was a great success. By 1961, it had expanded into a permanent, round-the-clock program that included 25 ANG fighter squadrons. By 1992, the ANG provided 100 percent of the Air Force’s much smaller air defense interceptor force based in the continental United States. The runway alert program was the first broad effort to inte-
REVAMPING THE RESERVES

grate reserve units into the regular peacetime operating structure of the American armed forces on a continuing basis. It was the genesis of the total force approach to reserve components' training and operational support of the active duty military establishment. 58

Through the 1950s, stimulated by the adoption of the air defense runway alert program, inclusion in Air Force war plans, equipment modernization, and more generous funding, the Air Guard evolved into a force that was increasingly integrated with the planning and operations of the Air Force.

By the end of the decade, the Air Guard had become a larger and more capable organization involved in an increasingly broad range of Air Force flying missions including airlift, special operations, and aeromedical evacuation. 59

The Korean conflict was a crucial turning point in the history of the modern Air Guard. It reversed the downward slide of the Guard's relationship with the Air Force and marked the beginning of the former's evolution into an effective reserve component of the latter. That transformation was driven initially by political expediency, not military requirements.

The inequities and military shortcomings highlighted during the mobilizations of 1950-1951, had generated an avalanche of public and congressional hostility. In response, the Defense Department and the armed forces had moved to strengthen their reserve component programs. Senior Air Force civilian and military officials were convinced that, unless they developed effective reserve and Guard programs, the active force would lose the political support and additional military capabilities it needed.

Congress encouraged those developments and passed legislation that significantly
Maryland Air Guard maintainers with the 104th Fighter Interceptor Squadron repair an F-86 engine in November 1958.

strengthened such programs. Greatly increased Air Force budgets during and after the Korean War provided the additional resources needed to translate reforms into more effective air reserve component programs.

For their part, Air Guardsmen had overcome their initial mobilization shortcomings during the Korean War and demonstrated that, if properly trained and equipped, they could contribute significantly to combat operations and other critical Air Force missions during the buildup for the expected Cold War confrontation with the Soviet Union.

As in both world wars during the 20th century, many Guardsmen served as individual replacements to help fill out a rapidly expanding active force. Reflecting the growing importance of electronics in modern warfare, the Air Guard’s AC&W community made a significant contribution to the Air Force’s global buildup during the war.

During the Korean conflict, the Air Guard’s senior leadership recognized that realistic training for legitimate military missions -- closely supervised by the active duty Air Force -- was essential to guarantee the Air Guard’s future. The Air Force tacitly agreed to ignore the Air Guard’s anomalous dual state-federal status. Guard officers were very responsive to Air Force organizational, training, and operational requirements. Air Guardsmen also achieved an effective voice in the formulation of plans, programs, budgets, and policies relevant to their reserve component of the active force. In effect, they permitted increased Air Force control of the ANG and greater involvement in the active force’s operational responsibilities in exchange for increased federal support. That modus vivendi reflected a mutual appreciation of the political, budgetary, and military facts of life after the Korean War. 60
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Charles J. Gross wrote *Turning Point* while serving as Chief of the Air National Guard history program in the National Guard Bureau.

He holds a Ph.D. in military history from The Ohio State University. The degree was granted in 1979. In addition, he holds bachelors degrees in political science (1964) and education (1970) from the same institution. He was awarded an MS in American history by Utah State University in 1973.

From July 1964 until September 1969, Dr. Gross served on extended active duty with the United States Air Force (USAF). His assignments included three years as an intelligence watch officer in a NATO air defense command post in Germany and 12 months as officer-in-charge, Target Analysis Branch, 12th Reconnaissance Intelligence Squadron at Tan Son Nhut Air Base, Vietnam.

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Dr. Gross joined the USAF history program in May 1979 at Headquarters Air Force Logistics Command. Subsequently, he served at Headquarters Air Force Systems Command and Headquarters USAF.

Dr. Gross has written numerous articles and studies focused primarily on the USAF reserve components. His award-winning *Adapting the Force*, hailed by a newspaper reviewer for its “unflinching look about the Air National Guard”, chronicled the Air Guard’s struggle to become a relevant force after the Korean War.

He and his wife, Barbara, live in Crofton, Md.
FOOTNOTES


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Pilots from the Texas Air Guard's 182nd Fighter-Bomber Squadron fly a bomber mission over Korea.

Layout and Design by MSgt. John Malthaner

PA-00-306