WEBVTT

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they are silent defenders , protecting

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federal , state and civilian agencies

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from cyber attacks . During the last

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two weeks of July , over 200 National

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Guardsmen considering counterparts from

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across New England participated in

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Cyber Yankee 2020 a two week cyber

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exercise held at the ever cross

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training center in Pembroke , New

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Hampshire . It's all the New England

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states that are involved and that we do

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work with the partners from the

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critical infrastructure . So we worked

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with electrical sector and water cycle

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primarily . But that's a great training

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opportunity for us to work with those

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people who had actually owned the

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network that we would potentially

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respond on and for our soldiers and

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airman . To get that experience and for

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the engineers from those various

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entities , they get the training of

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working with us . We have a blue cell ,

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which is your defense team . You have a

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red cell which is Thea Offensive Team ,

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and we are the liaison between the two .

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So we monitor how successful the blue

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team is being cause we're really here

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to exercise the looting as the red team

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were playing the part of the bad guys .

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So we go into their virtual network

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and kind of wreak havoc on them . So

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we'll we'll we'll send them information

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that they're supposed to look at and

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ingest , um , to kind of get the

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scenario of what they're involved with .

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And then they work with their teams ,

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their industry partners to try to

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defend their piece of this virtual

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network . A lot of people think we're

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just out there hacking away and

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everything like that , and it was gonna

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catch her one . No , it's very slow ,

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methodical . So the junior folks that

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around the blue team side can really

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get a lot of training benefit out of

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the out of this out of this exercise ,

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we're currently finishing up our

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enumeration of the network . We found

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some discrepancies , including

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a website that looks like it may have

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been defaced . So the team is digging

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into finding the source of that

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defacement and then making steps to

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correct It's part of the red team for

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Cyber Yankee 2020 . What we're doing is

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we're providing white noise , so we're

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providing social media chatter , media

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chatter to inundate the training

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audience with information so that they

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can sift through that information and

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find the key information pieces they

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need to make decisions and discern who

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threat actors are . So this would be

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considered a domestic operation . This

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is outside of the Department of Defense

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Network . It just showcases that the

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National Guard is an available force ,

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you know , in every state with cyber as

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well , just like any other responses

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we've done for Kobe . You know , we've

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done sustainment logistics kind of work

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we've done , you know , the testing .

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We don't the call center support will .

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Cyber is part of that . The long term

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support was ableto happen a lot easier

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because of the relationships

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established because of Cyber Yankee .

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So that's a big part of the adjective

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General talks about building during

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partnerships Will six years of Cyber

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Yankee . We have done that . We have

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built in during partnerships with state

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government and the critical

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infrastructure sectors , something that

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if we do have a major cyber attack

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against one of those , we would be

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ready to respond and already know each

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other . Reporting for the 1 57th airy

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Feeling Wing . I'm Technical Sergeant

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Aaron Viso