So, in theory, our development projects should cause a steady chain reaction of first, second, and third order impacts that gradually strengthen the Afghan economy, build the infrastructure, stimulate other types of development, help to legitimate the government, and eventually allow us to pull out of the process completely.

But unfortunately, this has not always been the case – and solar wells are only one of many types of development projects that have failed to produce these desired results. This is not to say that ADT, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts have not stimulated local economies and improved prosperity in some areas – they have. But in reality, the Afghans haven’t built a single one. And in many cases, they haven’t even maintained the wells that the ADT has built for them. So the question is: why has a technology that appeared to be so perfectly suited to Afghanistan, not taken off?

On a general level, consider that the development efforts of coalition forces are intended to serve as both a stimulus for economic activity and growth, and as a catalyst for larger scale development efforts by the Afghans themselves. So, in theory, our development projects should cause a steady chain reaction of first, second, and third order impacts that gradually strengthen the Afghan economy, build the infrastructure, stimulate other types of development, help to legitimize the government, and eventually allow us to pull out of the process completely.

But unfortunately, this has not always been the case – and solar wells are only one of many types of development projects that have failed to produce these desired results. This is not to say that ADT, Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT), and United States Agency for International Development (USAID) efforts have not stimulated local economies and improved prosperity in some areas – they have. But Afghans, in general, have not made much of an effort to continue the momentum and take charge of their own development. It seems that if coalition forces do not fund, manage,
and maintain an infrastructure improvement, the Afghans will not do so either.

And since coalition forces, by themselves, don’t have the time, resources, or will to develop Afghanistan into a prosperous and stable nation, we need to ask ourselves what forces are at work here that are keeping Afghans from building upon what we have given or done for them.

As an analogy, consider the process for starting a hand-cranked lawn mower engine. If we prime the carburetor with the right amount of fuel, if the fuel is of a high enough quality, if the electrical system is capable of providing a good enough spark, and if we generate enough momentum when we pull the starting handle, the lawn mower engine takes off into steady-state, self-perpetuating motion.

However, if any of these conditions are missing, it doesn’t matter how hard we pull the starting handle, the motion of the engine will be temporary and will not sustain itself. It may cycle a few times depending on how hard we pull the starting handle, but the end result will be the same. So, using the lawn mower analogy as a guide, our challenge is to determine what conditions are necessary to set Afghan development efforts into self-perpetuating motion, and then establish those conditions.

The Missouri ADT IV staff has developed three theories as to why many U.S. government-led development efforts here have fizzled.

The first is that they have been out of balance either technically, financially, or culturally; the second is that these efforts have not had a solid foundation of knowledge, experience, or understanding upon which to build; and the third is that our approach to development has contributed to a pre-existing sense of helplessness among the Afghan people.

“So the question is: why has a technology that appeared to be so perfectly suited to Afghanistan, not taken off?”

By examining each of these theories in some detail, we hope to get a better understanding of how to better manage future development efforts so they generate the type of chain reaction and self-perpetuating motion described above.

The first theory says that development has not flourished because we have not taken an integrated, balanced approach – either from technical perspective, a financial perspective, or a cultural perspective.

For instance, if we teach Afghan farmers how to triple their tomato production but don’t concurrently improve their transportation infrastructure to allow them to get their produce to market, the excess tomatoes rot and, in reality, we have not helped the farmers at all. In such cases, they will likely discontinue the improved production methods we showed them. Likewise, if we teach the farmers how to utilize drip irrigation techniques but we don’t ensure that they can conveniently purchase drip irrigation equipment locally, they will be unable to take advantage of the training. These are examples of development efforts that are technically out of balance.

As an example of a development effort that is financially out of balance, consider, once again, the solar powered well. In western societies, standards of living are high so labor tends to be more expensive than capital, relatively speaking. In Afghanistan, however, the reverse is true.

Yet, solar wells represent a capital intensive solution to an Afghan problem where labor intensive solutions like karize repairs may be better suited because they are more affordable and sustainable. Consider that the cost of one solar panel is equivalent to one or two days wages for an average American worker while that same panel costs an Afghan half a year’s salary. So when a solar panel fails on one of the wells we have built for a small group of Afghan farmers, the cost to replace the panel is financially untenable by Afghan standards.

In addition to development being out of balance technically and financially, projects can also be out of balance culturally. Prior ADTs have built numerous cold storage facilities but few of them are being used by the Afghans. This is due, in large part, to the fact that there are complexities associated with managing these facilities with which the Af-
On October 3, Missouri ADT IV conducted a formal assessment of our phase 1 operations. This formal assessment reviewed progress made in executing tasks from the Campaign Plan and provided an initial “grade card” on agriculture reconstruction efforts throughout the province.

The results of the formal assessment produced changes to our Campaign Plan that will drive our operations during Phase 2. This article briefly explains how and why ADT IV leaders conduct formal assessments throughout this mission.

At the core of the Army’s operations process are three basic tasks: Plan, Prepare and Execute. Each of these phases includes an equally important requirement to conduct ongoing assessments and adjust accordingly.


The ADT IV faces a challenging mission here in Nangarhar. The best information and intelligence that were available in early August drove our initial planning and preparation. But Afghanistan is a dynamic operational environment and agriculture redevelopment is a non-standard mission. These factors demand rigorous and frequent assessments to ensure our efforts have the intended effects.

Col. Michael Fortune clarified the intent of the formal assessment process in saying, “We need to pause and reflect on what we said we would do to determine if those actions are achieving our goals of legitimizing governance.”

A wide variety of participants assembled for the formal assessment. All members of the ADT IV agriculture team were present. Our civilian partners, to include Mr. George Roemer from the United States Agency for International Development and Dr. Gary Hart from the United States Department of Agriculture, were on-hand. Lt. Col. Max Velte represented the Civil Affairs staff section of Task Force Bastogne. Maj. Jocelyn Leventhal participated on behalf of the Nangarhar Provincial Reconstruction Team.

To begin the discussions, the ADT IV S2/3, Capt. Ken Huenink, presented an updated intelligence summary—a vital prerequisite to any assessment. Huenink reviewed activity since our Transfer Of Authority on August 10 and presented a best guess on likely trends for the next 90 days.

Next the team reviewed our Lines Of

(Continued on page 4)
Conducting Formal Assessments

To execute the Agriculture Extension LOO, the ADT IV agriculture team assigns one Soldier as the liaison, mentor and point of contact for the Agriculture Extension Agent in each KTD. That Soldier provided a formal assessment of his KTD’s AEA using five categories: competence, corruption, cooperation, perception and project management.

A color coding system allows for a quick visual understanding. Green means the standard is being met in 90% or more of the measured metrics. Amber is from 80% to 89%; red indicates 79% or below; black shows insufficient data for evaluation.

In addition, Lt. Col. Ray Legg and his Ag Team staff produced similar assessments for all other LOOs. This provided an overall provincial assessment that allowed the commander to quickly visualize progress made thus far. Based on this information, he was able to determine where the team is not achieving its goals.

The result of the formal assessment was a fragmentary order changing our Campaign Plan for Phase 2 of our operation.

Phase 2 began October 15 and our efforts incorporate the lessons we learned during the first 75 days on mission. After another 60 days, or approximately December 15, we will conduct our second formal assessment to review what we have accomplished. ADT IV will continue assessing and revising our efforts as we conduct this mission.

The Army operations process recognizes the importance of assessing ongoing operations. Formal assessments are especially important during stability operations, when units are conducting non-standard missions such as agriculture redevelopment in a complex operating environment with a number of external variables.

Operational Timeline

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Across Nangarhar Province, many projects started and completed by ADT and international donors are underutilized or have been abandoned. Still others have been destroyed or system components are missing.

In order to address these issues, U.S. military forces in Afghanistan have amended the Commander's Emergency Response Program—a pool of money previously available to military commanders to fund U.S. led development efforts—to focus more on building the capacity of the Afghan government to manage and sustain these efforts. The new process has also received a new name: CERP as a Budget.

Under the old program, commanders used CERP funds to build large-scale projects such as cold storage facilities, micro-slaughter facilities, and solar wells. The Afghan government provided minimal input in the planning, prioritization, and construction of these projects.

While a large number of projects were completed, they are now largely unsustainable and unused.

Because of the rapid pace of construction, both by ADT and international donors, the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock was often unaware of the full scope of the projects undertaken in Nangarhar on his behalf.

As a result, the Afghan government did not budget for the operation and maintenance costs of those projects.

According to Oxfam International—Afghanistan, donors are failing to coordinate between themselves or with the Afghan government. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development noted in 2005 that donors did not coordinate their programs consistent with the government's strategy, and just one-third of donor work was undertaken jointly.

Largely due to lack of donor coordination and communication, the Afghan government does not have information on how all assistance since 2001 was spent.

Starting October 1, the U.S. military implemented procedures designed to address the shortcomings of the previous CERP process.

While it only addresses U.S. military development spending, CERP as a Budget
CERP as a Budget

(Continued from page 5)

encourages the Afghan government to identify, prioritize and coordinate donor efforts.

A key component of the new funding process is a $100,000 per quarter rolling CERP budget for each provincial line director. Any money not spent in a particular quarter rolls over into the next quarter, effectively resulting in a $400,000 annual budget.

This budget restraint not only conserves American tax money, but also forces the provincial line directors to focus on their actual needs instead of a project “wish list.”

CERP as a Budget seeks to prevent the creation of unsustainable, poorly thought out projects and ensure that a more absorbable amount of U.S. aid money flows into the Afghan economy.

The ultimate goal of the new CERP as a Budget process is to work toward transitioning development and maintenance to the Afghan government.

CERP as a Budget is a strategic building plan that seeks to train the Afghan government to work within the limits of their provincial budgets, reduce inflation, and encourage private sector growth. Ultimately, it brings the counterinsurgency effort one step closer to transitioning the fight to the Afghan government.

The new process will move the Afghan government to a performance and outcome based budgeting process that works toward achieving a strategic end state. It creates clear lines of responsibility, reporting, authority and functions for each provincial line director.

CERP as a Budget emphasizes budget control at the provincial level based upon performance measure evaluations.

Before ADT can begin construction of any new project under these new CERP rules, the DAIL, and every other provincial line director, must draft a six-month, one-year, and five-year strategy. The

The new CERP as a Budget process is just one step that transitions the counterinsurgency effort to an Afghan led effort and sets the framework to allow the withdrawal of NATO and American forces from Afghanistan.

With multiple international donors having provided a wide range and large number of development projects over the past several years, developing this inventory is a complex task. But when completed, the inventory will provide the DAIL a complete and accurate assessment of his assets and the funding required to sustain them.

The on-the-ground work of development begins after the DAIL has completed his budget and strategy. Before ADT can fund an agriculture development project, the DAIL must complete project development steps previously accomplished by the ADT.

He must prepare a new project initiative form, technical drawings for the project, a land rights memorandum, a statement of work, an individual government estimate for the cost of the project and a sustainment memorandum. These documents allow vetting of the project through the Provincial Development Council process.

ADT will fund the project only after the vetting process is complete. While the new process will slow down the rate of development, it will result in a well thought out process that addresses the real, rather than the perceived needs of the people.

In addition to his departmental strategy, the DAIL must also complete an inventory of all agriculture-related assets and personnel under his control. The purpose of that strategy is to establish a detailed and achievable end state and define intermediate results essential to achieving that end state. Importantly, the development of these strategies promotes efficient use of resources rather than creation of a random list of projects that may or may not address needs.

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Implementing the Agriculture Extension Agent Leadership Academy

By Capt. John Paluczak

ADT IV has implemented an Agriculture Extension Agent Leadership Academy to increase the capacity and capability of the Nangarhar AEAs. The Leadership Academy has four separate components.

The first component is a series of monthly classes taught by the ADT IV Agriculture Team at FOB Finley-Shields.

The second consists of close and frequent mentoring between the individual AEA and a designated ADT liaison officer.

The third component of the Leadership Academy requires the AEAs to identify and manage a series of small projects that provide quick and visible impact to improve the agriculture infrastructure in their respective districts.

The final component is a series of training support packages being created by the agriculture specialist team members for use by the AEAs in providing agriculture specific training to local farmers.

This article focuses on the first component of the Leadership Academy – the monthly classes hosted by the ADT – and highlights the classes taught during the months of September and October.

The ADT worked with the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock – the provincial line director who manages the AEAs – to identify topics that would have the greatest impact while providing a solid foundation for future training.

Project management techniques were the subject of the first class taught in the Leadership Academy on September 15, 2010. Nine AEAs from ten of the key terrain districts attended the training. In addition to the AEAs, the DAIL and his Extension Manager also attended and their presence emphasized to the AEAs the importance of the event.

Sgt. 1st Class Dannie Thompson developed and taught the Project Management class. The class started with the four basic elements of project management: scope, resources, time, and money.

Thompson explained that project size, goals, and requirements make up the scope. He then told the group that resources consist of people, equipment, and material. He also reviewed the time element, which includes tasks, schedules, and the critical path.

Finally, Thompson told the AEAs that when thinking about money, they needed to factor in costs, contingencies, and cost controls. He also advised the AEAs that, “in addition to the basic elements of project management, people skills such as motivating, coaching, leading, and conflict management rank as some of the most important skill sets that a Project Manager must have.”

Thompson continued the class with a discussion of the five phases of...
Implementing the Agriculture Extension Agent Leadership Academy

(Continued from page 7)

The first phase of project management is initiation; the need to develop an idea for the project and gather information about project needs. The second phase is planning. During planning, the project manager determines the who, how, when, and what of the project. The third phase is execution, or following the plan to get the job done. The fourth phase, control, consists of checking on the work. Finally, the project is closed when all of the work, including the paperwork and payments, are completed.

Following Thompson’s class, Col. Michael Fortune, ADT IV Commander, discussed the important role AEAs play in legitimizing the government in the eyes of the people. He said that AEAs need to be seen by farmers and villagers as the most honest, uncorrupt and transparent members of the government. Col. Fortune stressed that AEAs are the most visible sign that the government is working for the people in rural areas.

Recognizing the importance of leadership in the extension process, Col. Fortune taught ADT IV’s second Leadership Academy class on October 18, 2010.

The class started with a discussion of the five most fundamental characteristics of great leaders; integrity, candor, selfless service, technical competence, and personal courage.

Fortune told the AEAs that if they embraced these concepts and led by example, they would be better able to inspire the farmers in their districts. Col. Fortune also talked about standards of conduct and the ADT’s anti-corruption stance.

After Fortune finished, Engineer Safi – the DAIL, took the podium and spent about 30 minutes discussing leadership with his AEAs. In addition to reinforcing the points that Fortune had made, he emphasized time management, team building, taking responsibility, conflict resolution, planning, transparency, care for subordinates, decision-making, prioritization skills, and the difference between leadership and management.

The AEAs seemed to embrace Safi’s message and were proud to see their leader take such an active role in their training. Safi’s actions demonstrated all of the signs of a great leader with a vision for his organization.

Col. Fortune said afterward, “I didn’t know Eng. Safi was going to follow my class with a lecture but I’m really glad he did because it reinforced the importance of leadership to the AEAs. I think the AEAs left the training inspired to go back to their districts and get the Afghans to take charge of their own development and their own future.”

Empowering the AEAs to provide better services is the cornerstone of the ADT’s strategy for improving the quality of individual farmers’ lives in Nangarhar Province. The small projects identified, managed, and led by the AEAs will increase farmers’ ability to produce crops while improving confidence in their government.

ADT’s goal is that the AEAs lead by example and manage these projects in an uncorrupt and completely transparent manner so the villagers know their government officials are working for them, not for themselves. Projects identified, managed, and completed by Afghan government officials without the taint of corruption increase security in Nangarhar and deny insurgents the opportunity to criticize the government.
Tuned-in to Information Operations

By Capt. Marie Orlando

The Taliban cannot match the professionalism of our Soldiers and Airmen; they do not have tanks, uniforms, or an Air Force. They have killed hundreds of Afghan civilians, including women and children this year.

And yet, many of the Afghans are undecided about who the true enemy is, because the Taliban understands that the war to win the support of the people is not only fought in the mountains or the cities of Afghanistan—it is also waged across the airwaves where they can shape any outcome and influence opinions.

To help level the playing field, the Missouri Agri-Business Development Team has decided to take their battle to the airwaves in Nangarhar. Following their assessment of phase 1 of their operation, ADT IV determined Information Operations would stand alone as a separate Line of Operation.

According to Lt. Col. North Charles, “The staff recommended, and the commander concurred, with pulling IO out from the agriculture lines of operation to give CPT Orlando’s work with the DAIL and the media more focus and additional resources.” The DAIL is the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock for Nangarhar Province.

While the team originally planned to increase the level of Public Affairs activities in Nangarhar, it became increasingly clear that the media in Afghanistan could play a key role in supporting the commander’s campaign plan.

The goal of ADT IV IO is to work through the DAIL to leverage the media in support of the agriculture extension program; to aid in transparency; combat corruption; inform the public of DAIL programs and activities; and to utilize agriculture programming to inform and educate the farmers in Nangarhar as part of agriculture extension services provided by the agriculture extension agents.

The decision to make Information Operations a separate line of operation evolved as the operational environment came into focus for the team. At first, a public affairs mindset was adopted. According to Joint Publication 3-61 “Joint Doctrine for Public Affairs,” both PA and IO activities directly support military objectives, counter adversary disinformation, and deter adversary actions. However, their efforts differ with respect to audience, scope and intent.

PA has three basic functions: public information, internal command information and community relations. The goal is to keep U.S. citizens informed with timely and factual reports, informing unit members of the commander’s objectives and messages, and keeping local communities informed within the area of operations.

Public affairs activities solely focus on ADT mission capabilities and accomplishments; but PA does not put an “Afghan face” on the accomplishments of the DAIL or include the Afghan themes and messages which are an important part of communication from the DAIL to the citizens for which he provides services.

While both PA and IO operations seek to inform and educate, the audiences differ in that IO targets Afghans rather than U.S. audiences. Another difference is that IO seeks to influence the local population and works to change their behaviors and opinions, not just inform.

The decision to incorporate IO into the campaign plan was the result of much discussion and input.

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Tuned-in to Information Operations

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Afghans are inclined to believe what they hear on the radio, and radio offers a means to counter the disinformation broadcast by the Taliban. It allows the DAIL to reach the farmers in all his districts. Radio can also give voice to the farmers through call-in shows and could allow the DAIL and AEAs to better respond to their needs.

TF Bastogne has actively worked to build radio programming, provide training for journalists, and has five active “radios in a box”, which brings Afghan programs, in the local language of Pashto, to 400,000 listeners that would otherwise not have a regular source of outside news.

Additionally, the

Communication towers in a traditional open market. Most Afghan families own a phone and the majority listen to radio.

(Continued on page 11)
health. However, there is currently little emphasis on agriculture sector messaging.

Initially, the ADT’s plan was to incorporate IO into the other four lines of operation in its campaign – Agriculture Extension, Economics, Administration, and Education. As the plan was mapped out though, it became clear that IO needed to be added as a separate line of operation.

Fortunately, the ADT does not have to start from scratch. The efforts of the PRT and the IO office at TF Bastogne have already established contracts and relationships with the media. The Afghans and coalition forces are both eager for the ADT to provide agriculture messages and programming.

The first step is to identify what agriculture programming exists, what radio stations the farmers prefer, and to further develop relationships with the local media.

The second step is to work through the DAIL to mentor his staff on leveraging the media in support of their goals. The ADT plans to demonstrate to the DAIL and AEAs by example and training, how to conduct public affairs and information operations.

The commander’s vision is to have the DAIL make weekly radio broadcasts to inspire farmers to take charge of their own development, encourage them to experiment with new technologies, and to garner their support.

These weekly broadcasts can serve as a springboard for the DAIL to address concerns of Nangarhar farmers, share his plans and visions for the future, and to talk about accomplishments and growth within the province.

To prepare for its information operations campaign, the ADT is distributing hand-held crank radios with stickers advertising the frequency, dates, and times of a popular agriculture program, “Agriculture and Livestock”, which includes market reports on 25 commodities. The radios are provided to the Agriculture Extension Agents for distribution within their districts and handed out by team members to key personnel.

Training will also be conducted for the AEAs to discuss media interaction and ways to leverage the media in support of extension services.

By adding IO to the campaign plan, the commander wields an additional tool which will enhance the efforts of the other LOOs, build the capacity of the DAIL and AEAs in Nangarhar, and multiply the effects of ADT projects and programs.

Capt. Marie Orlando conducts an impromptu interview with the sub-governor. Voice recordings are used for broadcast on local Radio-In-A-Box programs which are intended for Pashto audiences.
The Missouri Agri-Business Development Team had the advantage of a unique resource during their recent assessment of Phase I of the team’s campaign plan. Dr. Jeffrey Bordin, a political and military behavioral scientist, provided a Red Teaming capability as ADT reviewed progress and considered the way ahead.

According to the University of Foreign Military and Cultural Studies, Red Teaming is a structured, iterative process, executed by highly trained, educated, and practiced team members that provides commanders an independent capability to fully explore alternatives to plans, operations, concepts, organizations and capabilities in the context of the operational environment and from our partners’ and adversaries’ perspective.

Dr. Bordin arrived at Forward Operating Base Finley-Shields on September 22 and stayed with the ADT for a week to provide that capability.

He is currently in a civil affairs battalion and he has worked as an embedded trainer with the Afghan National Police, as a civil affairs planner in Kabul, and was the officer in charge of psychological operations product development in Bagram.

Other red teamers usually do not have doctorate degrees, and most are not also military scientists. He has served in ten war zones as part of his professional studies of warfare, including war crimes and human rights investigations in Sudan, Ethiopia, the Balkans, and Cambodia.

Dr. Bordin also previously worked with the Laghman Province ADT and he has a personal interest in horticulture and animal husbandry; he has a small orchard and raises goats as a hobby back in the States.

Lt. Col. Raymond Legg, agriculture chief for the ADT, worked closely with Bordin throughout the week. He said Dr. Bordin provided many insights into the realities of Afghan culture and suggested ways to facilitate and achieve improved results.

Bordin’s experience in human terrain collection and background as a social scientist was brought to the table to assist the agriculture chief develop metrics for assessing the professional capabilities of the agriculture officials they work with.

Legg concurred and commented that “People need to be told what they may not want to hear. Otherwise they develop tunnel vision and can’t conduct an honest assessment of their performance.”

Bordin said the ADT was very responsive, open and hospitable, and found it a refreshing experience.

“I thought it was a very positive experience,” said Legg. “Because of the assistance he provided we will be able to conduct the first effective assessment of ADT progress in Nangarhar.”
How and why the ADT mission has evolved

(Continued from page 2)

ghans have little or no experience dealing.

For instance, these facilities need a dedicated manager who has some training in food storage and preservation, and who can perform daily operations and maintenance. Because of the time required to tend to these tasks, this manager must be compensated for his efforts, which means that users of the facility must be charged, records must be kept, etc. Most Afghan villages are not ready for this level of complexity.

The second theory says that in order for people to embrace a technology, they must fully understand it - and in order for them to fully understand it, they must have been involved in its development from the start.

If we look back at the history of our own country, we developed on our own accord and it was a very iterative process that unfolded slowly and deliberately over time. Each step in our development was built upon and supported by prior steps. But here in Afghanistan, we are trying to inject modern technologies into a culture that has no fundamental base of knowledge to support them. Using solar wells as an example once again, Afghan villagers do not necessarily know how to rewire an electric pump, much less repair an inoperable solar panel.

So with this theory, the gap in knowledge, experience, or understanding within the culture, as it relates to solar power, serves as a barrier to further development using this technology.

The third theory says that the Afghan people have been disillusioned by a 30-year span of destruction, oppression, and corruption which, according to Dr. Tom Vermeersch of the U.S. Department of Agriculture, "...seems to have dashed the hopes, dreams, and confidence of the Afghan people and left them reliant upon outsiders to do the things they have been doing for themselves for hundreds or thousands of years."

Furthermore, the theory says that many of the efforts of coalition forces to help the Afghan people have only served to make them feel even more helpless. Either we have done too much for them while they have stood on the sidelines and watched, or we have injected technology that they simply have not been able to maintain for reasons discussed earlier - either they can't afford the technology, it doesn't fit into their culture, or they just don't understand it.

Discussion of these theories begs the question as to which one is correct or most dominant since each seems to have merit. However, let's assume for the time being that all three theories contribute to the problem and see where that assumption leads us.

The first theory tells us that if we knew more about what the Afghans needed, what they could afford, and what they would accept, we could better balance our efforts.

The second theory suggests that we should only attempt to inject simple technologies that have a solid foundation of knowledge and understanding in the Afghan culture.

The third theory implies that we must somehow inspire the Afghan people, and especially their leaders, to once again take charge of their own development and their own future - to convince them there is hope for a better life if they are willing to put forth the effort.

Fortunately, if we can achieve what the third theory tells us we must achieve, it is likely that the Afghans themselves will fix the problems associated with the first two theories. This is because the Afghans know what they need, can afford, and will accept. They also know, much better than we do, what technologies are a good fit for their culture and their current level of understanding, knowledge, and experience.

So the obvious course of action is to stop doing development for the Afghans and encourage, train, and empower them to do it for themselves, at their pace, and with technologies that work for them. But to make this possible, we must also find ways to inspire them and restore in them a sense of pride, confidence, resourcefulness, and hope.

Based on lessons learned with solar wells and other ADT projects, ADT IV is no longer planning to build agriculture infrastructure for the Afghans. Rather, we are pursuing several lines of operation that we
How and why the ADT mission has evolved

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believe will lay the groundwork for a chain reaction of development efforts by the Afghans themselves.

As our main effort, we are empowering the province’s Agriculture Extension Agents to be good trainers and to manage agriculture-related development projects in a transparent and uncorrupt manner. At the same time, we are teaching them about leadership qualities such as selfless service, integrity, and candor. We believe that if the AEAs consistently demonstrate these qualities, they will be in a better position to inspire the farmers they serve.

As a secondary effort, we are helping the Director of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock to effectively and transparently administer his program so he can continue to provide his AEAs the resources and training they need to succeed after coalition forces have left Afghanistan.

As part of this process, we are assisting the DAIL in developing an Operations and Maintenance budget to allow him to sustain the agriculture-related infrastructure under his control.

As a supporting effort, we are working to improve agriculture education within Nangarhar Province by developing continuing education opportunities for the AEAs and hands-on training opportunities for Nangarhar University students.

Finally, we are exploring ways to leverage the media to inspire and motivate Afghan farmers to come together as a team and take charge of their own development.

Lt. Col. North Charles, the ADT deputy commander, says that “because these lines of operation focus on investment in human capital rather than technology or material solutions, our belief is that they are a first step in getting Afghans fully invested in their own future – and we also believe that this is the only way to guarantee that development will continue after we have left.”

Contact Information

The Muleskinner Report provides insights and analysis on the Nangarhar Missouri National Guard Development Team’s mission. If you have questions or comments on the Muleskinner Report, please contact Col. Mike Fortune at Mike.Fortune@afghan.swa.army.mil.

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