Executive Summary
This white paper describes the current Army National Guard (ARNG) environment and deployment demands, reviews training and readiness requirements established by the Army, and presents a flexible and viable strategy to build readiness in the ARNG to meet the nation’s safety and security needs. The Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model provides a resource-efficient means of meeting these requirements and fully operationalizing the ARNG.

The ARNG training strategy allocates scarce resources to ensure all units enter the Available year of ARFORGEN—their Available Force Pool Date (AFPD)—at the HQDA-required training readiness level of T2 (Company/Staff). The ARNG strategy creates efficiencies by recognizing that not all units need additional training time to meet DA’s collective proficiency requirements. Units must have additional training days in Train/Ready Year 3 (T/R-3) to conduct Combat Training Center (CTC) collective training validation or CTC-like training events prior to mobilization, in order to enter their Available year at required T2 readiness levels.

This document describes the most cost-efficient method to provide ready forces for the nation, while preserving the great strides in readiness and combat experience gained by the RC over the past decade – rejecting a return to the Cold War strategic reserve model, which involved tiering or “banding” of resources. With the RC’s inclusion in the Army’s Operational Force, the Active Army, ARNG, and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) truly reflect the “Total Army” concept. This framework shows considerable promise in realizing efficiencies in this era of fiscal constraint. The ARNG has been participating fully in the Operational Force through continued combat rotations in support of ongoing contingencies and stability operations; deployment in support of core Unified Command Plan (UCP) missions such as Homeland Defense (HLD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), as well as Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) activities around the globe.

The ARNG enthusiastically embraces its role as part of the nation’s Operational Force, and continues to break down all barriers to achieve full operational parity and further the proud legacy of America’s Citizen Soldier.

Background
Throughout the Cold War (1945 – 1989) and the early pre-9/11 post-Cold War period (1990 – 2001), the Reserve Components (RC) of the United States were organized as a strategic reserve with the primary mission to expand the armed forces rapidly in the event of war. Under this model, the Guard required long mobilization timelines in order to build the readiness necessary to respond to National security crises. After

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September 11, 2001, the Army National Guard entered a period of sustained deployments, mobilizing more than 430,000 Citizen Soldiers since 9/11. This use of the RC as an Operational Force on a recurring basis required the U.S. Army to adapt the force generation model.

Today’s Army is out of balance due to the sustained demand for landpower shared by all three of its components. The demand for war-fighting capability exceeds the sustainable supply while readiness is consumed as quickly as it is established. The Army addressed this problem in 2006, when it replaced its linear, Cold War force management model—based on tiered readiness and sequential deployments—with a 21st century model based on progressive readiness and cyclical deployments. This new process developed into today’s Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) model, and applies to all conventional Army units.

The Army continues to adapt and improve ARFORGEN to meet operational requirements more effectively and efficiently. Full implementation of the model has been slow, however, due to the elevated demand for forces in support of Operations Iraqi Freedom (OIF) [now, New Dawn (OND)] and Enduring Freedom (OEF). A force generation model that was intended to be supply-based has, out of necessity, been driven largely by demand. As Operation New Dawn draws down and we return to pre-surge force levels in Afghanistan, an opportunity presents itself to implement a supply-side force generation model.

This paper describes the current ARNG environment and deployment demands, reviews training and readiness requirements established by the Army, and presents a suitable, feasible and acceptable strategy to build ARNG readiness – within the ARFORGEN model – to meet the nation’s critical force requirements. One overriding principle central to the mandate to Operationalize the Reserve Components, is the imperative to sustain the great strides in readiness and combat experience gained by the RC over the past decade of high demand and heavy investment. This concept has been voiced consistently by senior leaders in both Department of Defense (DoD) and the Congress. Senior leaders provide a clear warning against any return to a tiered-readiness construct for the Reserve Components. The ARNG’s ARFORGEN strategy heeds that warning and presents a plan to build affordable, effective, and available readiness without tiering or “banding” resources.

**Army National Guard as Operational Force**

The steady demand for ARNG units of all types in support of OEF, OIF/OND, along with the Balkans, Sinai, Horn of Africa and Counterdrug missions, has resulted in an unprecedented level of combat and operational experience within the Army National Guard. This hard earned experience firmly establishes the Guard as a part of the Army’s Operational Force. Senior leaders in the Congress, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Headquarters, Department of Army (HQDA), National Guard Bureau (NGB), and ARNG agree that the nation must preserve these dramatic gains in readiness through continued operational employment in support of the nation’s military missions.

**Note:** Title 10 United States Code Section 10101 defines the Reserve Components. It states:

The reserve components of the armed forces are: (1) The Army National Guard of the United States; (2) The Army Reserve; (3) The Navy Reserve; (4) The Marine Corps Reserve; (5) The Air National Guard of the United States; (6) The Air Force Reserve; (7) The Coast Guard Reserve. By convention, the term “Reserve Component” is often used collectively to refer to two or more Reserve Components.

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“The Reserve Component plays a vital role in meeting our defense missions and in enabling us to manage stress on the active force. In short, we could not have accomplished what we have these past eight years were it not for our Reserve and National Guard forces… Access to the Reserve Component remains a critical lever for meeting global operational demands without substantially increasing the size of the active force.”

Admiral Mullen, 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review
port of predictable and recurring requirements – even as combat demand declines.

In October 2008, DoD published Directive 1200.17, “Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force.” This directive establishes an overarching set of principles and policies to promote and support management of the RC as an Operational Force.

Under the framework provided by DoDD 1200.17, the United States has formulated a dramatically new strategic posture. Since the Reserve Components are, under this directive, managed as an Operational Force, it follows that they cannot simultaneously be managed as a reserve force. Therefore, no specific portion of the Army is managed as a reserve force. Instead, elements of all three Army components assume roles as strategic depth, reserve, and Operational Force based on their position in the service’s readiness or force generation cycle. In effect, the structure of the nation’s reserve force and Operational Force are constantly changing as units move through their readiness cycle. With the inclusion of the RC in the Army’s Operational Force, the Active Army, ARNG, and U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) now truly reflect the “Total Army” concept. This framework provides a solution to realizing efficiencies in this era of fiscal constraint.

As of August 1, 2011, 44,281 ARNG Soldiers are currently mobilized in support of overseas missions and domestic operations. The overseas deployments are to Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, Guantanamo Bay, Djibouti (Horn of Africa), the Sinai, and other worldwide locations across the globe; the domestic operations include counterdrug, southwest border, and state active duty. Based on an Active Component operating force of ~351,000, an ARNG operating force of ~308,000, and an Army Reserve operating force of ~150,000, the ARNG is providing approximately 38 percent of the Army’s operating force. The National Guard also provides “smart power” approaches to our overseas operations with programs such as the State Partnership Program and Agribusiness Development Teams. National Guard Soldiers possess a unique blend of civilian and military skills, enabling them to conduct varied missions with exceptional effectiveness.

This versatile force is able to carry out both domestic and overseas missions with only 10.9 percent of the total FY10 base budget of the Department of the Army. The central reason for the National Guard’s cost-effectiveness is the part-time/full-time force mix. Until called and placed in paid-duty status, traditional National Guard members incur minimal cost to the Department of Defense. The Guard achieves cost savings based on fewer paid days per year; lower medical costs; reduced retirement expenditures; lower training costs; virtually no cost for moving Families and household goods; fewer entitlements such as housing and food allowances; and lower base support costs in terms of services and facilities, including commissaries, base housing, base exchanges, and childcare facilities. Further, the men and women of the National Guard are battle-proven in combat, humanitarian, and domestic response missions. They consistently perform at the professional level that the nation expects. This level of performance is due to increases in resources, training, and combat experience that this nation has invested in the ARNG over the past decade. The ARNG resolves to continue this upward trend in capability and performance, through implementation of the ARNG Training Strategy.

**ARFORGEN in the ARNG**

ARFORGEN is the cyclic process the Army uses to man, equip, and train units to meet Combatant Commander (CCDR) requirements. ARFORGEN is designed to focus training, training support, and other limited resources for units as they prepare for operational employment in a timely predictable manner. The Forces, Training, and Doctrine linkages are described in the Links to Policy chart.

ARFORGEN cycles units through three separate and distinct force pools to include RESET, Train-Ready, and Available. Resourcing and training support increase as units progress through the Force Pools in order to assist commanders in meeting their readiness objectives to move into the Available Pool. This recurring cycle of units provides required trained, ready, and cohesive RC units prepared for operational deployment in support of Combatant Commanders and Civil Authorities worldwide.
**ARFORGEN Construct**

ARNG units in the ARFORGEN cycle are assigned as Contingency Expeditionary Forces (CEFs) or Deployment Expeditionary Forces (DEFs). These designations correspond with their planned employment during the Available year. All units in the RESET force pool will initially concentrate on Soldier/family reintegration and equipment reset. They gradually begin training for Full Spectrum Operations (FSO) in an assigned operational role (possibly CCDR aligned). At any time during the RESET or Train/Ready years, ARNG units may transition to the DEF. This rotational cycle depends upon sourcing against immediate requirements and organizing tasks to execute operational needs.

A Notification of Sourcing (NOS) from U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM) initiates transition to the DEF. These DEF units proceed through the rest of their training cycle by manning, equipping and training specifically for their new DEF mission requirements, focusing on the unit’s Deployment Manning Document (DMD), Mission Essential Equipment List (MEEL) and Mission Essential Task List (METL). Units that are not sourced for deployment in the DEF are designated as part of the CEF. Once available, these units may be sourced to meet operational plans, exercises and other CCDR requirements as identified and validated in the Guidance for Employment of the Force (GEF). These forces are capable of rapid deployment in support of contingency operations if additional (surge) forces are required.

Each Force Pool within ARFORGEN has assigned readiness criteria, or Aim Points that increase as they move from RESET, through Train/Ready, to the Available Pool. Each Aim Point was developed as a tool to measure a unit’s readiness and serve as a series of benchmarks for a command to achieve in order to meet requirements for entry into the Available Force Pool. These Aim Points also optimize execution of the ARFORGEN process by synchronizing resourcing, manning, and equipping capabilities with training at specific points across the ARFORGEN Force Pools. The Mobilization Spanning chart shows the relationship between resources, what the Army receives, and the preparation level determined by post-mobilization training days.

**ARFORGEN Training Strategy**

The ARNG ARFORGEN training strategy development process applies doctrinally correct training solutions to build progressive readiness in order to fulfill HQDA training requirements. The process begins with identifying the Army’s readiness requirements for operational ARNG CEF units. The source for these requirements is the most current Army Training Strategy (ATS). The current ATS requires 100% of non-mobilizing RC units (CEF) to enter the Available Pool at T2 for company level employment on FSO METL tasks and staff proficiency at battalion (BN) and brigade (BDE) levels; and requires them to sustain T3 or greater for the duration of the pool.
Training readiness requirements for RC CEF units are developed by a stakeholder working group which meets to analyze current Army doctrine. This stakeholder working group includes senior planners from the ARNG, USARC, HQDA DAMO-TR, FORSCOM Operational (G-3) Training, and TRADOC’s proponent schools and Centers of Excellence (CAC, MANSCEN, and CASCOM). The working group uses the latest Doctrinal Training Templates and Combined Arms Training Strategies (CATS) to compile the list of applicable training events. Units must conduct these events each year of the ARFORGEN cycle to progressively build toward the ATS requirement.

These compilations are then captured in Event Menu Matrices (EMMs) developed for each BDE type in the Army inventory (AC, ARNG, and USAR), and are used to assist the HQDA staff in validating resource requirements in the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) process.

As in the Links to Policy chart (above), the training requirement is to produce CEF units proficient at the specified level for employment along the full spectrum of operations. Once sourced against a mission, an ARNG unit focuses training against that mission’s requirements and trains to the readiness level required for deployment.

The amount of time required, either as additional training days prior to mobilization or post-mobilization training conducted under the guidance of U.S. Forces Command (FORSCOM)/First U.S. Army, will vary based upon the unit’s training readiness and mission requirements. However, this will always consist of doctrinally correct training conducted to standard. For strategic planning purposes, we estimate ARNG CEF units meeting T2 for company level employment on FSO METL tasks and staff proficiency at BN and BDE levels will require post-mobilization training. Changes in the training readiness level attained prior to mobilization will affect the amount of post-mobilization training required.

Based on our fiscally constrained environment, the ARNG has developed a modified readiness model that focuses scarce resources to provide the right level of readiness in the right types of units at the right time to meet national security needs. The ARNG’s ARFORGEN strategy synchronizes resources to efficiently and effectively bring units through the three phases of their readiness cycle, utilizing a series of Aim Points along the way to measure progress. The ARNG’s strategy allocates resources to ensure all units enter the Available year—their Available Force Pool Date (AFPD)—at the required overall readiness level of C2.

The ARNG’s pre-mobilization training strategy culminates in urgency, level of effort, and complexity in the final year of the training cycle, Train/Ready Year 3 (T/R-3). Differing types of units are required to train for missions of varying complexity. Resource allocation must be weighted toward the most time-consuming training requirements. The ARNG CEF Execution Strategy chart illustrates this concept and depicts the ARNG’s modified ARFORGEN execution strategy for CEF forces.
The first imperative of the ARNG strategy is to reduce the required post-mobilization training time to a minimum for all types of units. In 2007, the Secretary of Defense set a maximum total mobilization time for the Reserve Components at 365 days plus 30 days of leave, including post-mobilization training time. This constraint means that the more time ARNG units spend in post mobilization training, the less time they are available for combat operations (or Boots on the Ground [BOG]). In order to standardize expectations for the Army and maximize BOG time for Guard units, the ARNG has established benchmarks for maximum post-mobilization training time required by category of unit.

**ARNG CEF Imperative**

The CEF benchmarks were established based on the complexity of the unit’s mission—the more complex a unit’s mission, the more training and resources required to reach collective proficiency. For example, a Combat Aviation Brigade (CAB) must successfully conduct combined arms fire, joint airspace coordination, personnel and materiel lift, and reconnaissance—very complex, coordinated training tasks. In contrast, a finance company conducts Funding Support to Financial Elements which requires a high level of individual and team expertise, but which is not operationally taxing.

Division headquarters and modular Combat Service Support units require only the 39 statutory days to execute training to standard (T2). This limits post mobilization training days to 7 and 15 respectively. Combat support units require 9.5 additional training days in Train/Ready Year 3 (T/R-3) to conduct collective training to reach T2 prior to AFPD, for a total of 48.5 days in T/R-3. These additional days allow post mobilization training days to be flexible from 15-40 days. Combat Aviation Brigades require an additional 9.5 days in T/R-2, and 15 days in T/R-3 to conduct collective training to reach T2 prior to AFPD, for a total of 48.5 days in T/R-3. These additional days allow post mobilization training days to be flexible from 15-40 days. Combat Aviation Brigades require an additional 9.5 days in T/R-2, and 15 days in T/R-3 to reach T2 proficiency—plus 8.1 additional Flying Hours (required by the Aviation Flight Hour Program). This plan shortens post mobilization training time for CABs to between 45-60 days. Brigade Combat Teams require an additional 8 days in T/R-2, and 15 additional days to conduct Combat Training Center rotations in T/R-3. Heavy and Striker Brigades require a total of 21 added days in T/R-3 to conduct gunnery. The additional training days prior to AFPD for CEF BCTs reduces the post mobilization training time required to 30-45 days. This model realizes the goal of T2 for CEF units at AFPD in accordance with the Army Training Strategy.

**Manning and Equipping for ARFORGEN**

In order to achieve success during T/R-3, units must meet all previous Aim Points, and enter T/R-3 at a minimum readiness level of P2/S1/R1/T3 – C3. The training strategy sets forth specific Combined Arms Tasks that each unit must complete during each year of the ARFORGEN cycle to meet these objectives. The following sections describe the equipping and manning activities required during each Force Pool to achieve success:

**RESET Force Pool.** The manning focus of the RESET Force Pool includes: Yellow Ribbon Program ac-
vities and Soldier-Family reintegrations, block leave, unit reconstitution, changes of command and senior grade management plan, receive and stabilize new personnel, reclassification and recruitment to shortage Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) fields, and medical/dental reset operations. A full reset is conducted on the unit’s assigned equipment during this phase. There is no readiness expectation for the unit during the entire 12-month RESET period. Aim Point 1 is P3/S3/R2/T4/C4 for CEF units, which, based on the composite rating of C4, could be summarized as a unit needing additional resources.

**Train-Ready Force Pool.** Units will increase training readiness and capabilities given resource (manning and equipment) availability. The manning focus of the Train-Ready Force Pools includes: Duty Military Occupational Specialty Qualified (DMOSQ) and reclassification operations, Soldier non-availability management, medical readiness, retention/Deployment Extension Stabilization Pay (DESP) operations, Deployment Manning Document (DMD) development and pass-back operations, medical/dental readiness, and Full Time Equivalent (FTE) management operations. Manning Aim Points 2, 3, and 4 for CEF units is P2, as shown in the Aim Points chart. The ARNG Equipping Strategy ensures CEF units achieve desired equipping requirements upon entry into the Available year. By equipping to the designated ARFORGEN AIM Points, CEFs from Division HQ organizations through enablers will have sufficient equipping assets on hand to both train and deploy as required. Aim Point 2 is P2/S2/R2/T3/C3 for both CEF and DEF units, which could be summarized as a unit needing many of its resources. Aim Points 3 and 4 are P2/S1/R1/T3/C3 for CEF units, which could be summarized as a unit having most or all of its resources. For additional information on status reporting, see Army Regulation 220–1.

Once equipping Aim Points goals are achieved at T/R3, no additional unit equipment will be required for pre-mobilization training unless large quantities must be shipped 60-90 days prior to mobilization to meet transportation/shipping schedules. Should additional training and equipping assets be required, it is anticipated that the equipment will be provided through cross-leveling actions either at the intra-state or inter-state level. Additional funding may be required to support Second Destination Transportation (SDT) costs to ship/transport equipment from States/units designated as donors to the mobilization and/or training sites.

**Available Force Pool.** The Available Force Pool consists of fully-capable units at the highest state of training and readiness capability as certified by the senior command authority with Training Readiness Oversight (TRO). All ARNG units will be assigned to the Available Force Pool for 12 months whether they deploy to meet an operational requirement or remain focused on a contingency requirement without deploying. The manning and equipping focus of the Available Force Pools includes sustainment operations for noncommitted forces. Maintain Aim Point 4 readiness, P2/S1/R1 for CEF.
Utilization: Operational Employment of ARNG

In April 2011, Department of Defense released the “Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components.” This report provides insightful analysis and strong recommendations on a wide variety of topics surrounding the operationalizing of the Reserve Components, including consideration of suitable roles and missions.

According to the comprehensive review, the Reserve Component must perform the following roles:

- Contribute to America's resolution of overseas conflicts
- Ensure defense of the homeland against external attack and support civil authorities in response to attacks or to natural disasters
- Augment and reinforce the National effort with combat and support forces in case of major combat operations
- Efficiently support Combatant Commanders around the world
- Provide vital National Defense capabilities
- Support efforts to preserve the All-Volunteer Force

Recurring, Predictable Missions

Army National Guard Soldiers serve part time, juggling responsibilities to Family, Employer, State and Nation. Citizen Soldiers bring valuable civilian skills with them to the battlefield in addition to their Military Occupational Specialty. These skills have proven to be powerful force multipliers in Counterinsurgency Operations (COIN), Stability Operations (SO), and Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) missions, as well as Domestic Operations (DOMOPS).

As with military skills, these valuable civilian skills come with a price: Employers need lead time prior to their Guard-employee deploying to maintain business continuity. Employers make a conscious decision to hire Guard Soldiers knowing they could deploy. They do this because Guard Soldiers possess the rare blend of maturity, discipline, leadership, professionalism and Army Values that are so desirable in today’s workforce. Without sufficient lead time to make preparations prior to deployment, Employers may not be able to justify hiring Guard Soldiers. For this reason, it is imperative the ARNG fill those roles in the Army’s Operational Force which are Recurring and Predictable.

The “Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components” noted: “When rebalancing the force to meet future National security challenges, the Guard and Reserve should be a “force of first choice” for those tasks for which they are particularly well suited, owing to their overall cost effectiveness and the skill sets that they can provide. Missions that follow a predictable, operational schedule fall clearly into this category.”

It also recommended, “Service force-generation processes should consider predictability, consistency, continuity, and the desirability of establishing enduring relationships or exploiting regional expertise when determining whether Guard or Reserve units are appropriate to support particular Global Force Management Process (GFMP) requirements.”

The ARFORGEN model provides a resource-efficient means of operationalizing the ARNG in support of suitable missions. These mission sets include continued combat rotations in support of ongoing contingencies and stability operations; deployment in support of Combatant Commander TSC and Building Partner Capacity (BPC) activities around the globe; support of core Unified Command Plan (UCP) missions such as Homeland Defense (HLD) and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA), in concert with organic support to Governors in state security; and finally, limited support to high priority DoD or Army institutional missions.
**Support to Combatant Commanders**

In addition to continued employment in combat rotations, the ARNG is particularly well suited to provide continuous, long term support to Combatant Commander TSC and BPC requirements. The “Comprehensive Review of the Future Role of the Reserve Components” recommended:

The National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP) is an excellent example of a program that establishes enduring and mutually beneficial partnerships between foreign countries and American States and Territories. SPP is an important component of DoD’s security cooperation strategy, the regional CCDRs’ theater engagement program, and the U.S. ambassadors’ Mission Strategic Plans. A primary aim is to promote partnerships among the many nations working with us to advance security, stability, and prosperity around the globe. Today, American states are partnered with 63 foreign nations to focus on military-to-military, military-to-civilian, and civil security activities.

Created in 1993, SPP has helped the United States European, African, Southern, Pacific, and Central Commands engage the defense and military establishments of countries in every region of the globe. The program’s benefits include:

- Providing Combatant Commanders and U.S. ambassadors with avenues for building international civil-military partnerships and interoperability during peacetime by linking state capacities to the goals and objectives in the Foreign Assistance Framework of the U.S. Government.
- Enhancing current and future coalition operations by encouraging and assisting partner Nations to support efforts such as NATO’s Operational Mentor and Liaison Team program in Afghanistan, and exercises supporting the Association of Southeast Asian Nations region.
- Heightening cultural and global awareness of Citizen Soldiers and Airmen to help them operate in today’s complex multi-national and multi-agency environment.

This valuable mutual security cooperation program will continue to expand in size and strategic importance to the Combatant Commanders, ambassadors, and broad U.S. Government interagency requirements as we enter the second decade of the 21st century.

Two related missions come naturally to the Army National Guard: Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities. The ARNG’s long history of rapid response to local emergencies on behalf of our Governors has established the Guard as a leader in this vital National security area. However, HLD and DSCA are not the National Guard’s missions alone. As specified in DoDD 1200.17, “Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities are total force missions. Unity of effort is maintained consistent with statutory responsibilities in operations involving Federal and non-federalized National Guard forces with Federal forces under Federal command and control and non-federalized National Guard forces under State command and control.”

While HLD and DSCA are Total Force responsibilities, particular component and individual competencies resident in the Reserve are important contributors to these missions. National Guard forces can support these activities under different statutes—under state authority, as designated in U.S. Code, Title 32, or under Federal authority, as designated in U.S. Code, Title 10. In such an environment, the Guard and Reserve must unify their efforts with Federal forces and other interagency partners, as required.

Citizen Soldiers have gained America’s trust and confidence through their consistent willingness and ability to respond immediately to local and state emergencies and by bringing organizations, manpower, expertise and equipment needed to assist civil authorities in managing their crises. As a continental United States (CONUS)-based force, the National Guard provides significant military capabilities in response to unexpected domestic emergencies. Whether called upon to provide manpower, logistics, communications, chemical, biological, and radiological...
detection, emergency medical treatment, or any other type of support to civil authorities, the National Guard has always responded with speed and purpose. With more than 358,000 Soldiers located in more than 3,000 communities around the country, the National Guard is ready when called.

**Challenges**

The ARNG has redefined itself during a decade of deployments. Contrary to predictions of failures and beyond our own estimations of success, recruiting has been strong and retention has been stronger. More than 80 percent of our ARNG soldiers joined the military after 9/11/2001 and more than half of our force has seen combat. Our nation has invested over $37 billion for Critical Dual Use (CDU) and other equipment; this equipment is used for both domestic homeland crisis response missions and overseas contingency operations. We continue to meet and beat our manning and equipment benchmarks.

**Manning Challenges:** The ARNG has consistently met all steady-state, contingency, state and HLD requirements levied over the last decade. However, the manning methodology has led to the reduction of readiness levels of select units in order to increase readiness in others. The consumption of overall unit readiness is directly related to the increasing individual cross-leveling executed among the States and Territories in order to achieve mobilization requirements.

Overseas operations have generated improvements in the capacity of the ARNG to support the war effort, to provide critical assistance during state and national emergencies, and to respond to natural or man-made disasters. Our homeland response enterprise includes 10 Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) – 2 validated in FY11 and 8 in FY12; 17 Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear and High Yield Explosive (CBRNE) Enhanced Response Force Packages (CERFPs); and 57 Civil Support Teams (CSTs).

The ARNG remains in an environment of high demand with critical shortages which prevent meeting all manning requirements as depicted in the Major Manning Objectives chart. Manning priorities, strategies, and goals support the ARNG from reintegration through sustainment. Personnel distribution decisions are a function of a unit’s mission and deployment status across the operating and generating force: deployed; preparing to deploy; or conducting reset activities. FY 2011 is a transition year as we implement ARFORGEN Aim Points in FY 2012. Based on our successful rebalancing of the force and a projected decrease in demand, we expect to be positioned to implement ARFORGEN Aim Points in FY 2012.

**Equipping Challenges:** CDU equipment includes tactical radios, rotary aircraft, ground vehicles, and digital command and control enablers. The Army has improved the ARNG CDU equipment posture and remains committed to ensuring the ARNG has the CDU equipment required to support Homeland Defense/Homeland Security (HLD/HLS) and Defense Support to Civil Authorities (DSCA) operations. ARNG equipment-on-hand rates for CDU equipment are projected to increase to 94% by October 2012 – an increase of 19% over the four years since the ARNG began monitoring CDU rates. During fiscal year 2010, the ARNG received over 154,000 pieces of new equipment valued at $9.8 billion. With this influx, our on-hand March 2011 percentage for all equipment is 88 percent.

**Equipping Agility.** Successfully equipping Soldiers and units in an era of persistent conflict requires the ARNG to be agile in its equipping processes. A key to the ARNG’s success in OEF has been the ability to adapt to a dynamic enemy and changing environment. The Army used Operational Needs Statements (ONS) and Mission Essential Equipment Lists (MEELs) to adapt units to theater-specific requirements, pivoting where needed from the Minimum Mission Essential Wartime Requirements articulated in their Modified Tables of Organization and Equipment (MTOEs). The Army also diverted many pieces of ARNG equipment to meet theater-level equipping needs. These major equipping dynamics drove the need to coordinate and synchronize both new equipment deliveries and the redistribution of existing stocks. This need is expected to remain critical in the foreseeable future.

**Growth.** Although the Army has benefited from larger Base and Supplemental budgets, it still has to cope
with equipment shortages. From 2003 to 2011, the number of items in MTOEs increased by 107 percent due to emerging combat requirements and technological advancements. This growth must be managed in a synchronized, balanced manner linking efforts across the ARNG and in an environment where future available resources are expected to shrink.

**Best Value Readiness.** The ARNG must become more efficient at preserving battlefield and HLS/DSCA capabilities in a time of reduced resources. Critical to success is the constant scrutiny of multiple requirement demands and then prioritizing demands based on meeting COCOM and DSCA requirements. We must not only seek to fill gaps but also to seek out and maximize readiness payoffs.

**Changing Processes and Policies.** A key efficiency is to refocus leadership and Soldier attention on the Soldier, leader, and unit responsibility for equipment maintenance and accountability. The Chief of Staff, Army refers to this as refocusing ourselves on the housekeeping of the Army.

**Resourcing.** The long term equipping goals in the ARNG ARFORGEN Strategy will ensure adequate equipping beyond 2012 to include the RESET Phase through T/R-2. The current Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding for equipment reset must be included in the base budget for at least two to three years following the end of OND/OEF. This action will ensure equipment redeploying from the warfight is returned to both 10/20 Standards and to ARNG units within 365 days of the return of the unit. Additionally, in order to be prepared to execute domestic missions, both Federal and State, all ARNG units must be equipped to at least 80 percent of their on hand equipment designated as Critical Dual Use (CDU) during RESET through T/R-2. Percentages of required CDU equipment must be expressed in terms of individual LINs and not be reflective of overall percentages of CDU on hand.

**Institutional Friction**

Although Army leadership is united in the imperative to fully implement ARFORGEN, several areas of institutional friction exist which will take significant effort, emphasis, and resolve to overcome. For several decades during and after the Cold War, the ARNG established policies, procedures, processes, and infrastructure necessary to successfully direct and support the linear force generation model. Successful transformation to a 21st century model will not happen overnight. However, we must clearly identify and target sources of institutional friction to maintain the pressure to evolve adequate processes that support the rotational force generation model of the 21st century.

First, the Operating Force is by nature more agile and flexible than the Generating Force. As a result, the Operating Force has all but completed transformation to the ARFORGEN force generation construct. Meanwhile the Generating Force’s Title 10 functions have lagged behind and are not properly aligned to support the ARFORGEN process. The Generating Force must take steps to break through bureaucratic stovepipes and fully adopt an Enterprise approach. This approach enfranchises enterprise leads to transform, including conduct of a thorough review of its policies, systems, and processes, especially as they re-
late to readiness, force generation, and mobilization. Secondly, we must ensure that our information infrastructure supports the execution of ARFORGEN. To accomplish this, we must employ an Army Business Architecture within an integrated systems architecture. This enables and builds synchronization of ARFORGEN Knowledge Management toward building a common operating picture across the force. Finally, much concern has been voiced historically and even lately regarding access to the Reserve Components, and specifically the Army National Guard as a part of the Army’s Operational Force. The ARNG has always been accessible, having never failed to respond with ready forces when required by the Nation. All stakeholders must understand that fully operationalizing the ARNG brings about new challenges surrounding how to mobilize Guard units for non-combat contingencies such as Theater Security Cooperation or Building Partner Capacity. The ARNG believes these challenges are best solved by increasing the planning horizons, level of detail, and efficiency of the Global Force Management Process (GFMP), not solely by changing existing law.

The Global Force Management Process exists as a source of external friction to the successful implementation of ARFORGEN. Today’s GFMP remains too centralized, lacks a useful prioritization framework, and overlooks service equities in favor of COCOM requirements. GFMP is biased toward allocation of forces vice assignment or apportionment; is not synchronized with the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES); and is difficult to understand even for practitioners (Information Paper, Army Force Generation [ARFORGEN] Friction and Issues Associated with Moving ARFORGEN from a Demand-Driven to a Supply-Based Model).

Closing Thoughts
The Department of Defense and the Army are currently conducting a thorough review of existing internal policies, procedures, and systems to ensure that they are best utilizing the Reserve Components. In concert with this action, the ARNG is conducting its own internal utilization review. The ARNG readily embraces its role as part of the nation’s Operational Force, and continues to break down barriers to achieving full operational parity and advancing the proud legacy of America’s Citizen Soldier. The ARNG is increasingly integral to our nation’s Operational Force and is now central to the way we build readiness, respond to National security crises, and ultimately go to war. For the last decade the demand for war-fighting capacity has outstripped the sustainable supply. In response, the Army replaced its Cold War force management model with a 21st century model that generates force through stages of readiness dictated by calibrated and timed cycles of deployment – ARFORGEN. Through this model, higher efficiencies are achieved and resources are better allocated. ARFORGEN also resulted in the inclusion of ARNG into the Operational Force.

More than fifty percent of ARNG Soldiers are combat veterans and more than eighty percent joined the Army National Guard after 9/11. The ARNG is a full partner in providing trained, equipped combat resources and enabling units for the overseas fight. We have surely passed an inflexion point. The nation’s need for experienced forces for combat rotations, ongoing contingencies, and stability operations continues unabated. That need is best served by a training, equipping, and high value readiness strategy that has been presented throughout this document. A few barriers to the full implementation of ARFORGEN remain unresolved. Despite these hurdles, the ARNG is committed to implementing the ARFORGEN imperative. This action will ensure the cost effective use of defense assets, contribute to the Army’s sustainability, and provide the Nation with unrivaled defense capabilities.

References
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